FREE UNIVERSITY QUARTERLY

FREE UNIVERSITY QUARTERLY

A QUARTERLY
FOR CHRISTIAN KNOWLEDGE
AND LIFE

VOL. VIII — ~~1962~~ 1961/62

FREE UNIVERSITY AMSTERDAM THE NETHERLANDS

[illegible] LIBRARY
PACIFIC SCHOOL
OF RELIGION

V. 8
1961-62 105278

FREE UNIVERSITY QUARTERLY

A QUARTERLY FOR CHRISTIAN KNOWLEDGE AND LIFE

FREE UNIVERSITY - AMSTERDAM - THE NETHERLANDS

Editorial Committee

R. HOOYKAAS, *Chairman*
I. A. DIEPENHORST - G. A. LINDEBOOM
H. SCHREUDER - F. DE ROOS - N. H. RIDDERBOS
A. VAN DER LEE

CORRESPONDENCE AND BOOKS FOR REVIEW SHOULD BE SENT TO:
the Chairman, Vrije Universiteit, Keizersgracht 164, Amsterdam-Centrum, The Netherlands

SUBSCRIPTIONS SHOULD BE SENT TO:
J. H. KOK N.V., Postbus 11, Kampen, The Netherlands
The price of subscription is ten guilders a year

SUBSCRIPTION-FEE A YEAR:
U.S.A. $ 2.75 - England £ 1.—.— - France NF 9.50
Germany DM. 11.50 - South Africa R 2.00

SELLING PRICE SINGLE ISSUES:
U.S.A. $ 0.70 - England Sh. 5/— - France NF 2.40
Germany DM. 2.90 - South Africa 50 c.

AGENCY FOR GREAT-BRITAIN:
Evangelical Book Shop, 15 College Square East. Belfast

AGENCY FOR SOUTH AFRICA:
Pro Rege-Pers Beperk, Kerkstraat 95 (posbus 343)
Potchefstroom, Suid-Afrika

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Vol. VIII

ARTICLES

	Page
In memoriam Professor Dr. G. Ch. Aalders by *Nic. H. Ridderbos*	1
The theophanies in the Old Testament by *G. Ch. Aalders* . .	3
Notes on the evaluation of a maternal and child health service by *T. D. Stahlie*	16
Buddhist propaganda in the western world and the christian answer by *A. Pos*	26
Self-criticism in science from an educational-psychological standpoint by *G. Wielenga*	43
Theology and mission by *J. H. Bavinck*	59
Conservatism and progressiveness in management by *H. Thierry*	67
A New Responsibility in a Scientific Age by *R. Hooykaas* . .	78
Physical knowledge and creation by *G. J. Sizoo*	99
Communication and antithesis by *S. U. Zuidema*	108
The Dead Sea scrolls by *W. H. Gispen*	117
In memoriam Professor Dr. R. van Dijk by *F. de Roos*	141
Conscientious objections to social insurance by *J. F. Rang* . .	143
Harmonistic and disharmonistic interpretation by *G. J. de Vries* .	172
Reflections on christianity and medieval literature by *A. van der Lee*	184

NEWS ABOUT THE UNIVERSITY

Dissertations	132

GRACE LIBRARY
PACIFIC SCHOOL
OF RELIGION

REVIEW OF BOOKS

G. C. Berkouwer, The Triumph of grace in the theology of Karl Barth by *N. H. Ridderbos* 52

William Hendriksen, The Bible on the life hereafter by *N. H. Ridderbos* 52

Henry Law, Christ is all, The Gospel in Genesis by *N. H. Ridderbos* 53

John H. Gerstner, The Gospel according to Rome by *G. E. Meuleman* 53

J. Gresham Machen, Christianity and Liberalism by *G. E. Meuleman* 53

Andrew A. Bonar, The Life of Robert Murray M'Cheyne by *H. Schreuder* 54

Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2024

https://archive.org/details/free-university-quarterly_1961-1962_8

IN MEMORIAM
PROFESSOR DR. G. CH. AALDERS

Gerhard Charles Aalders was born on 25 March, 1880 in London, of an English mother and a Dutch father. He died on 30 January, 1961.

There are two special reasons why in this periodical an "In memoriam" should be devoted to Professor Aalders. First of all: this number contains a posthumous article from his pen. And further: Professor Aalders was well-known, also outside Holland, especially in the English speaking countries. He lived in England only a short time, but he had a thorough command of the English language. This was one of the reasons why he represented the churches of which he was a member at several General Assemblies in the English speaking countries; that he repeatedly attended Reformed oecumenical meetings; that he published a few books in English (inter alia The problem of the Book of Jonah, London, 1948; A short Introduction to the Pentateuch, London, 1949).

G. Ch. Aalders was from 1903 till 1920 a minister in active service in "The Reformed Churches of the Netherlands". In 1911 he graduated on a thesis: "De valsche profetie in Israël". From 1920—1950 he was professor of the Old Testament and of practical theology in active service in the Free University at Amsterdam.

Professor Aalders was active in many spheres of life. He served many assemblies of "The Reformed Churches in the Netherlands" as Advisory Member. He also made himself useful for the Reformed youth organization and for the Christian charitable organizations. But his attention was focussed on the Old Testament.

Proof of this is a long series of books written by him. Besides those referred to above, I will only mention a few: De profeten des Ouden Verbonds, 1918; Oud-Testamentische Kanoniek, 1952; a great number of commentaries, among which Commentary on Ecclesiastes, 1948;

PACIFIC SCHOOL OF RELIGION

Song of Solomon, 1952; Ezekiel I, 1955; II, 1957 (all these books published by Kok, Kampen).

All his works are characterized by sound scholarship, by a wide knowledge of the relative literature, by a patient listening to what the text has to say, above all by an unshakable faith in the infallibility of the Scriptures. Aalders was a well-armed enemy of what he used to call negative Bible criticism. Especially in this field he broke new ground. He fought criticism on a high level; he did full justice to his opponent. When Aalders assumed his academic office, negative Bible criticism no longer formed the serried phalanx it did about the year 1900; it is typical that his inaugural address is entitled: "Turn of the tide in Old Testament Science". But this does not alter the fact that also in 1920 it required courage to set one's face against Bible criticism. Aalders was never lacking in courage when it concerned the performance of what he saw as his vocation.

From the above it should not be concluded that Aalders was an ultra-conservative scholar. In proof of this the following may be adduced by way of example. Aalders accepted as a fact that the Pentateuch contained plenty of Mosaic material, but nevertheless he considered the Pentateuch to be an anonymous historical work which was completed in the time of the early monarchy. Ecclesiastes he dated in the fourth century, etc.

The Free University suffers a great loss in Professor Aalders' death. We may take comfort from Holy Scripture, in which he had found his support in simple faith.

"Blessed are the dead which die in the Lord from henceforth: Yea, saith the Spirit, that they may rest from their labours; and their works do follow them".

NIC. H. RIDDERBOS

THE THEOPHANIES IN THE OLD TESTAMENT

BY

G. CH. AALDERS *

Next to various other means by which the Divine revelation is presented to man in the Old Testament a really remarkable and interesting place is occupied by the theophany, "a manifestation of God to man by actual appearance", as it is defined by *The Westminster Dictionary of the Bible* s.v. In the Biblical text it chiefly is referred to by the words "the Lord appeared unto" (Gen. XII. 7; XVII. 1; XVIII. 1; XXVI. 2; XXVI. 24; XXXV. 1; XXXV. 9; XLVIII. 3; Ex. III. 2). The verb "appear" has to be understood as "make himself visible" (Köhler, *Lexicon in Veteris Testamenti Libros*); and the preposition "unto" (or "to" as the British Version has in Gen. XVI. 1) indicates that this visibility is to be taken as *external,* which likewise may be derived from the expression "and God went up from" (Gen. XVII. 22). Generally no indication is added as to the shape of the appearance, but in Gen. XVIII we meet with the information that the manifestation of the Lord took place in the form of a human figure. The chapter begins with the formula "and the Lord appeared unto him" (i.e. Abraham), and after giving some particulars as to the place and the circumstances of the appearance, the Biblical text continues "and lo, three men stood by him". That those three men have not to be regarded as a reference to the Trinity which was the general opinion of Roman-Catholics in earlier days, is sufficiently clear: from vs 22 it is manifest that one of the three figures is the Lord himself, whereas the two others according to XIX. 1 must be two angels. Therefore it is generally agreed, even by later Roman-Catholic commentators as Hoberg, Hummelauer and Heinisch, that there is no reference to the Trinity here. The human form was so purely human that Abraham's first impression was that of traversing strangers, to

---

* Prof. Dr. G. Ch. Aalders lectured in the Faculty of Theology of the Free University from 1920 to 1950.

whom he immediately showed hospitality by offering water to wash their feet and some food, just as even nowadays a bedouin sheik might do. Afterwards, however, when the Lord spoke unto him and renewed the promise that Sarah would have a son (vs 10), he came to the conviction that it was the Lord who appeared to him. Now the question may arise: were all the appearances likewise in human form? Surely, the possibility cannot be denied that also in those cases where the notice "the Lord appeared" is not accompanied by any indication as to the shape of this appearance, it may have had the human form; but it is not sure that this always was so. Perhaps one might be inclined to reason: if this was the rule, Abraham would have recognized the Theophany sooner; although it might just as well be surmised that exactly the fact that there were *three* men caused the initial uncertainty. But there is another case of divine appearance where it certainly has no human form: Ex. III. 2 where the theophany is described as "a flame of fire out of the midst of a bush". Here we have to consider how the text has to be interpreted: did the appearance show itself *in* the flame (as the British Version and likewise the American Revised Standard Version have), or, as has been proposed by Gispen in his commentary on the book of Exodus, and has been accepted by the new Dutch translation, edited by the Netherlands Bible society, *like* a flame of fire. I am convinced that the latter undoubtedly has to be preferred: if the first translation is accepted, we should have to suppose that the appearance was different from the flame, but the context has not the slightest indication in that direction; on the contrary vs 4 informs us that God called unto Moses "out of the midst of the bush", not "out of the midst of the flame". It therefore must be assumed that the theophany here had the shape of a flame of fire. Now it must be observed, that the subject of the verb "appear" is "the angel of the Lord", not as in the other texts which have been cited "the Lord", but this presents no argument to deny the divine character of the appearance: in vs 4 the subject is "the Lord", alternating with "God", and in vs 6 he says: "I am the God of thy father, the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac and the God of Jacob", and so in the entire chapter. The identity of the angel of the Lord and the Lord is evident also elsewhere. I refer to Gen. XXI. 17 ff. and Gen. XXII. 11 ff. This may have been the reason for *the Westminster Dictionary of the Bible* to assert that the theophany "was not an immediate revelation of God the Father, but a manifestation of Jehovah in the person of the angel of the Lord", but, as we have noticed, the

Biblical text presents us with a number of theophanies where not even the slightest reference to the angel of the Lord is to be found.

Furthermore there are instances of theophanies where the Biblical narrative does not employ the verb "appear", though it is quite certain that it intends to describe manifestations of God to man by actual appearance, and it is necessary to devote our attention to these now. To begin with there is the experience of Jacob in Peniel (Gen. XXXII. 24—30), one of the most remarkable passages in the Old Testament. On his return journey to Canaan the third patriarch, for fear of his brother Esau who, as he is informed, is coming to meet him with a number of (armed?) men, has risked the nightly pass over the ford Jabbok, and being left alone either on the Northern or the Southern side of the ford "a man wrestled with him until the breaking of the day". Who was this man? According to Jacob's desire to be blessed by him (vs 26), granted by the man (vs 29) he must be more than an ordinary human person. He says to Jacob: "thy name shall be called no more Jacob, but Israel: for as a prince hast thou power with God and with man, and hast prevailed" (vs 28); and Jacob called the name of the place Peniel: for, said he, I have seen God face to face, and my life is preserved". From these data it is sure that we have to regard this man, just as in Gen. XVIII, as a manifestation of the Lord. And this is confirmed by Hos. 12 : 3, 4, where we read that Jacob had power with God, and over the angel, which causes us to understand the occurrence in Peniel as a theophany of the angel of the Lord. Another instance we meet with is Ex. XXIV. 10, where we read that Moses and Aaron, Nadab and Abihu, and seventy of the elders of Israel, commanded by the Lord to come up unto him on mount Sinai (vs 1) "saw the God of Israel; and there was under his feet as it were a paved work of a sapphire stone, and as it were the body of heaven in his clearness". The verb "saw" indicates that this must be a theophany; it is the same *a parte hominis* as "appears" *a parte Dei*. No word is added as to the shape of the appearance: they saw the God of Israel, there was a theophany, but *how* this theophany was is not said. Only a few words are subjoined in regard to an additional phenomenon: under his feet was something like a paved work of sapphire stone. From the use of the expression "under his feet" one might be inclined to infer that the theophany had a human aspect, just as in the case with Abraham (Gen. XVIII) and with Jacob (Gen. XXXII. 24—30): this indeed *may* have been so, but we are not entitled to come to the conclusion that it *must* have been the

case: it remains possible that the words "under his feet" have no more precise tenor than: beneath him, at the lower end; the Hebrew word just like our word "foot" has also a broader sense; cf. e.g. the four feet of the table of the shewbread (Ex. XXV. 26). The addition "as it were" calls attention to the fact that it was not an actual paved work of a sapphire stone, but it merely looked like such a paved work, just as it merely looked like the body of heaven in his clearness. Again another instance of theophany is presented by Ex. XXXIII and XXXIV. It is after the people's sin with the golden calf and the moving mediation of Moses on behalf of the guilty Israel that the Old Testament mediator asks the Lord: "I beseech thee, shew me thy glory" (XXXIII. 18). This "shew" means a combination of "appear" and "see": a request *a parte hominis* for a theophany: it must have been his wish to behold the pure divine majesty. This is evident from the divine answer: what Moses has asked is impossible: "Thou canst not see my face; for there shall no man see me, and live" (XXXIII. 20). But the answer is not absolutely negative, it is not limited to what cannot be granted; it commences with stating what can really happen and indeed will happen: "I will make all my goodness pass before thee, and I will proclaim the name of the Lord before thee; and will be gracious to whom I will be gracious, and will shew mercy on whom I will shew mercy" (XXXIII. 19). "Goodness" has to be understood here not in a purely ethical sense, it is rather "beauty", that is to say "glory"; and the final words give expression to the divine motive of to a certain degree complying with Moses' supplication, his sovereign grace. And how the Lord will do this is described thus: "Behold, there is a place by me, and thou shalt stand upon a rock: and it shall come to pass, while my glory passeth by, that I will put thee in a cleft of the rock, and will cover thee with my hand while I pass by: and I will take away my hand, and thou shalt see my back parts: but my face shall not be seen" (XXXIII. 21—23). Doubtless this must be regarded as an anthropomorphical expression: just as seeing the backside of a man we only receive a faint and vague impression of his personality, so Moses will be able to see a weak reflection of the glory of the Lord. In so far his request will be granted that the Lord will demonstrate a weak reflection of his glory, but the full glory of the Lord cannot be seen. How this partial assent to Moses' supplication was effected is told in XXXIV. 5—7: "and the Lord descended in the cloud, and stood with him there, and proclaimed the name of the Lord. And the Lord passed by before him and proclaimed,

The Lord, The Lord God, merciful and gracious, longsuffering, and abundant in goodness and truth, keeping mercy for thousands, forgiving iniquity and transgression and sin, and that will by no means clear the guilty, visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children, and upon the children's children, unto the third and to the fourth generation". It has to be observed that we do not receive an accurate description of the theophany, in fact we are only informed that there was a theophany, but just as in other cases nothing is said as to shape or character of the theophany; what is coming to the fore is what the Lord says. And therein is expressed the glory of the Lord particularly as it directs itself to man, revealing his pity (which takes the first place) and his chastising justice. There is reason to believe that apart from the few instances which have been mentioned, Moses must have had many more theophanies: what is said in Numb. XII. 8 "the similitude of the Lord shall he behold" may induce us to assume that the theophany (the manifestation of the Lord by actual appearance, here indicated by the word "similitude") even must have been the regular manner by which the Lord revealed himself unto Moses. But in this article we have to limit ourselves to the few cases of which we have made mention before.

Now we can proceed to notice a theophany which falls to the share of Moses' successor Joshua (Josh. V. 13—VI. 5). Here we must start with the remark that the division of the chapters is not correct. At the first glance we observe that the pericope beginning with v. 13 cannot end up with the simple remark that Joshua complied with the divine command to loose his shoe from off his foot. This cannot be a natural close. Therefore we must assume that the natural sequel is offered by VI. 2—5, where an important word of the Lord is quoted; VI. 1 then must be regarded as an elucidating parenthetical intercalation. And so V. 13—VI. 5 form a unity. This commences with the information that "it came to pass when Joshua was by Jericho, that he lifted up his eyes and looked, and behold, there stood a man over against him with his sword drawn in his hand". That there was something unusual in this man making his appearance is immediately clear from Joshua's question: "art thou for us, or for our adversaries?". We may doubtless suppose that it generally will have been clear from some distinctive marks whether a person was an Israelite or a Canaanite: that Joshua could not immediately decide what was the case proves the extraordinariness of the figure. And this is confirmed by his answer: "Nay", i.e. neither; "but as captain of the host of the Lord

am I now come"; Joshua is immediately convinced of the superhuman character of the man, and he falls on his face to the earth, and does worship. Indeed, he is right in doing so: the captain of the Lord's host is the Lord himself, and therefore he says "loose thy shoe from off thy foot; for the place whereon thou standest is holy", exactly what the angel of the Lord said unto Moses from the midst of the bush (Ex. III. 5). So it is manifest that the man with the drawn sword is a theophany, and we are not at all astonished when in VI. 2 the man is introduced speaking as "the Lord". This is the answer to the question put by Joshua (V. 14): "What saith my lord unto his servant?", and this answer discloses in what way the stronghold Jericho will be captured by the people of Joshua; from that viewpoint the parenthetical remark in VI. 1 has to be understood: though Jericho was shut up, to prevent the children of Israel from entering, the Lord will pave their way: "the wall of the city shall fall down flat, and the people shall ascend up every man straight before him" (VI. 5). The drawn sword in the hand of the man pictures that it is the Lord who leads the combat for Israel.

Finally we have to devote our attention to an uncommonly remarkable instance of a theophany. We observe that here again the formula "the Lord appeared unto" is missing, but a fairly definite description of what must be a theophany is given in Gen. XV. 17. The chapter commences with a visionary revelation (vs 1), wherein the Lord promises Abram that his seed shall be as numerous as the stars of heaven (vs 5) and that he will inherit the land of Canaan (vs 7). These two promises are most closely connected together: Abram alone cannot inherit the land, but he will inherit it in his posterity. And then Abram asks "whereby shall I know that I shall inherit it?" This is the demand for a sign, by which the promise is confirmed. Now it is most remarkable what the Lord answers: "Take me an heifer of three years old, and a she-goat of three years old, and a ram of three years old, and a turtledove, and a young pigeon" (vs 9). What has to be done with these animals is not said, but we may be sure that Abram has immediately understood the purpose: he not only fetches the required animals, but proceeds to divide them (not however the birds) in the midst, and lays each piece one against another (vs 10). This reminds us of what we read in Jer. XXXIV. 18: a description of a ceremony which was customary in making a covenant. It is evident that Abram has understood the commission of the Lord as a direction to make preparation for such a ceremony: the sign he has asked for

will be a ceremonial making of a covenant. By the way I wish to observe that evidently the vision must have come to an end: Abram must have executed the divine command to fetch the animals in reality, and what is said in vs 11 about the fowls which came down upon the carcasses, and were driven away by Abram also must have taken place in reality. We cannot be mistaken about that. Furthermore Abram remained waiting for the performance of the covenant ceremony until the sun was going down, and finally he fell asleep from fatigue. In his sleep he was seized by "an horror of great darkness" (vs 12), and then a new divine revelation came unto him, either in a dream during his sleep or after he had been woken up (we cannot decide this with any certainty), but then at last his waiting found its recompense: the covenant ceremony was performed: it is the Lord himself who passes between the pieces of the animals (vs 17). This theophany has a most conspicuous form: "a smoking oven and a flaming torch". The Hebrew word which is employed here for: "oven" means a baking oven; G. Dalman, *Arbeit und Sitte in Palästina,* IV, Gütersloh 1935, presents us with a discussion in detail, cf. especially pp. 96 ff. The "flaming torch" has to be regarded as a glaring flame which ascends from an aperture at the top, see the picture 19 in the quoted volume of Dalman. We must conceive of this oven as removable, for Abram sees it passing between the pieces of the divided animals. It must rouse our interest that only the theophany in the form of the smoking and flaming oven passes, and not Abram; with various commentators we have to notice therein an indication of the monopleuric character of the covenant between God and man; it is obviously an answer of the Lord to the request of Abram for a sign to confirm the given promise.

Apart from the so far mentioned theophanies as manifestations of God to man by actual appearance in the Old Testament we also are confronted with cases wherein a theophany is received in a dream or in a vision: to Solomon in a dream (1 Kings III. 5 and 1 Kings IX. 2; the last of these two texts does not expressly state that it was in a dream, but the supplementary words "as he had appeared unto him at Gibeon" make it clear that it was likewise in a dream); also in a dream (cf. Dan. VII. 1) to Daniel as "the Ancient of days" (Dan. VII. 9 f.). In a vision Is. VI; though it is not explicitly mentioned that this was a vision, the text simply says "I saw the Lord sitting upon a throne, high and lifted up, and his train filled the temple" (vs 1), it is manifest from the nature of the entire description in connection with other visionary experiences of the prophets that it was

a vision; in particular what is mentioned about one of the seraphims coming unto the prophet with a live coal in his hand, which he had taken with the tongs from off the altar, and laying it upon the prophet's mouth (vs 6, 7) can only have taken place in vision. That the theophany in Ezek. I. 26 ff.; III. 23; VIII. 4; XLIII. 2 f. was visionary, is said directly (cp. I. 1, VIII. 4, XI. 2, XLIII. 3). It may be observed that the theophany which is alluded to in Gen. XXXV: 1, which doubtless must refer to Gen. XXVII. 11—13, likewise took place in a dream (cp. vs. 12). Just as what is seen in a dream or in a vision can be something which belongs to the external reality (e.g. the cows and the ears in the dream of Pharaoh, Gen. XLI, or the basket of summer fruit, Am. VIII. 1, the seething pot, Jer. I. 13, the high priest Joshua, Zech. III. 1 in prophetic visions), a theophany, being a manifestation of God to man by actual appearance — can also be the object of perception in a dream or in a vision.

As a rule the theophany is not a thing apart: generally it is accompanied by a divine revelation in *words*. We read in Gen. XII. 7 "And the Lord appeared unto Abram, and said unto him"; in Gen. XXVI. 2 "And the Lord appeared unto him (i.e. Isaac), and said"; in Gen. XXVI. 24 "And the Lord appeared unto him (likewise Isaac) the same night, and said"; in Gen. XXV. 9 f. "And God appeared unto Jacob again, when he came out of Padan-aram, and blessed him and God said unto him". In Gen. XVIII the formula "the Lord appeared unto him" (vs 1) is not immediately followed by a similar phrase, but the one of the three men, who is clearly indicated as the appearance of the Lord, expresses in words the promise that Sarah shall have a son (vs 10, 14) and just as well the announcement of his judgement on Sodom and Gomorrah (vs 20 f.) which is the cause of touching prayer of Abraham on behalf of the wicked population of these cities. In the struggle of Jacob the man who wrestled with him also spoke to him, in particular in revealing the change of his name (Gen. XXXII. 28). Likewise the theophany to Moses in the bush is followed by a revelation in words, and we meet with an analogous case in Ex. XXXIV, where the Lord, who descended in the cloud and stood with Moses on the top of the mount, "proclaimed the name of the Lord" and said "The Lord, the Lord God, merciful and gracious, long-suffering and abundant in goodness and truth, etc." (vs 6 f.). The captain of the host of the Lord, who appeared unto Joshua, is pictured as the Lord who revealed to him the approaching fall of Jericho (Josh. VI. 2 f.). The theophanies in dream or vision are also accompanied

by a verbal revelation: in 1 Kings III. 5 it is the Lord who says to Solomon "Ask what I shall give thee", and in 1 Kings IX. 3 ff. promises that if he will walk before him in integrity of heart, and in uprightness, to do according to all that he has commanded him "then I will establish the throne of thy kingdom upon Israel for ever". The theophanies in Is. VI and in Ezekiel form part of the vocation of these prophets, expressed in terms like "Go and tell his people" (Is. VI. 9) or "Son of man, I have made thee a watchman unto the house of Israel: therefore hear the word at my mouth, and give them warning from me" (Ezek. III. 17). We may gather from this that generally the purpose of the theophany was exactly to bring a divine message to man: either to gladden him with a significant promise or to charge him with an important commission, and so we have to view the principal purpose of the theophany to convey such a promise or commission to people whom the Lord has elected for that reason.

Among the theophanies we have mentioned there are two of the doubtless external manifestations of God to man which force us to go into the matter at some more length. The first is that of the smoking and flaming oven which is described in Gen. XV. As we have noticed the passing of this oven between the pieces of the divided animals has to be regarded as the ceremony of making a covenant, and this ceremony was the answer of God to Abram's demand for a sign to confirm the promise that his seed would inherit the land of Canaan. Now it looks as if here the theophany is not accompanied by a revelation in words. Certainly no words came from the oven, and as far as the divine answer to Abram's demand is concerned, it is factually given in the passing of the oven itself. Words are only used in the divine command to take the animals, which command has been understood by Abram as a stimulation for the necessary preparation of the customary ceremony in making a covenant. The passing of the oven was the making of the covenant, and this was the divine answer. But now we read in Gen. XV. 18 "In the same day the Lord made a covenant with Abram, saying: unto thy seed have I given this land". What is the meaning of this statement? How are we to understand it? Does it intend to say that after the ceremonial act which was performed by the oven a new divine action took place to make a covenant with Abram of which the purport is expressed in the verses 18—21? This is not very probable: 1. the ceremony of the passing oven was the making of the covenant, and it would be entirely unacceptable that this was followed by a second making of a covenant; 2. the contents

of the verses 18—21 are essentially the same as the purport of the covenant which was confirmed by the ceremony: this was meant to confirm the divine promise, expressed in the verses 5 and 7; what is said in vs. 18 "unto thy seed have I given this land" is exactly the same. Therefore I am inclined to interpret the first words of vs 18 "in the same day the Lord made a covenant with Abram" as an explanation of the ceremony described in vs 17. If this is the case, we discover that the theophany of the smoking and flaming oven just as well as others is accompanied by a revelation in words. Of course it is difficult to determine how these words were produced; we cannot suppose that they came from the oven, but Abram must have heard the voice of the Lord, at the same time when he saw the oven pass through the pieces of the animals, confirming the promise which the Lord had given him. This confirmation is characterized by a somewhat more extensive definition, but as Heinisch says in his commentary on Genesis "nach seinen idealen Grenzen", presenting a somewhat general impression of the vastness of the future inheritance.

The second external theophany which has to be discussed at some length is that of Ex. XXIV. 9 f. It is notorious that here no verbal revelation is added. What we read is no more than this that Moses and Aaron and his sons Nadab and Abihu and seventy of the elders of Israel "*saw* the God of Israel", and a description is added of what they saw under the theophany "as it were a paved work of a sapphire stone, and as it were the body of heaven in its clearness". That is all that is said, and then the Biblical text continues: "and upon the nobles of Israel he laid not his hand: also they saw God, and did eat and drink". This addition has the purpose to stress that, although what they saw was glorious and brilliant, the Lord nevertheless did not cause to them any harm, they remained absolutely uninjured, and having seen the Lord they did eat and drink, that is to say they participated in the sacrificial meal (cp. vs 5), nothing unusual happened. Now as it is manifest that in this case verbal revelation is entirely absent, the question arises: what may then be the purpose of this wordless theophany? It cannot fail to be a means to convince the elders of the people that the Lord actually was on the top of Mount Sinai; the theophany was a guarantee that it really was God, who was present on the mount, and that it was really he, with whom Moses had intercourse; that it really was the words of the Lord which Moses conveyed unto the people. We shall not be mistaken in assuming that the purpose of this exceptional theophany without a verbal revelation

must have been to emphasize the special character of the divine foundational legislation for the people of Israel.

With respect to the theophanies in dream or vision a remark must be made concerning the "Ancient of days" in the dream-vision of Dan. VII. We observe that there is no mention of words spoken by this figure, which doubtless represents the Lord God. But it is manifest from the context that the idea is that of a law-suit, wherein the deeds of men are judged. Now the text does not contain a verdict in words, but according to vs 26 f. there will be a decisive result of the law-suit, and this has to be regarded as an act of the "Ancient of days", whether it is pronounced verbally or effectuated in fact. So at least the theophany has not a purpose in itself, as in Ex. XXIV, but it represents the divine judgment in the last of days, when the Son of Man will come with the clouds of heaven (vs 13 f.).

In concluding this article we must occupy ourselves with a very crucial problem: how do we have to consider the substance of a theophany? According to the definition given by the Westminster Dictionary of the Bible, a theophany is "a manifestation of God to man by actual appearance", but it is not identical with God himself: God is a Spirit and cannot be perceived by human sense. And it is absolutely impossible that God in reality can have been a smoking and flaming oven, or a flame of fire, or even a human figure. It cannot have been the intention of the Biblical writers to say that the figures which were seen as appearances of God really were God himself. Gunkel in his commentary on Genesis p. 181 tries to suggest that it was the meaning of the author of Gen. XV that God as he appeared actually was like a smoking and flaming oven ("als er erscheint, sieht er aus wie ein qualmender Backtopf und eine feuerige Fackel"); but he cannot refrain from adding "doch beachte man, wie vorsichtig der Erzähler spricht: er sagt nicht geradezu, dass diese Erscheinung Jahwe gewesen ist (mind you), sondern er lässt das erraten" — for this there is not the slightest proof. As even Gunkel is not quite sure of the correctness of his assertion, we are fully justified in stating that the Biblical writers did not mean to say that the figures of the theophanies were really God himself; we remember what the Lord said to Moses in answer to his request "I beseech thee, shew me thy glory": "thou canst not see my face, for there shall no man see me, and live" (Ex. XXXIII. 20). This is of particular importance with respect to the theophany, and is in keeping with Deut. IV. 12, 15. It is absolutely out of question that the theophany was a real appear-

ance of God himself. All the same the theophany was an actual manifestation, which could be seen by sensory perception. The theophany proper was not internal as in dream or vision, but an external manifestation. Very significant are in this respect the theophany in Gen. XVIII and Gen. XXXII: Abraham prepared a meal for the three men, and set it before them; and he stood by them under the tree, and they did eat, and the man who wrestled with Jacob touched the hollow of his thigh, and the hollow of Jacob's thigh was out of joint as he wrestled with him. Now I am well aware of the fact that Jewish commentators from old have promulgated the opinion that the "eating" of the human figures in Gen. XVIII was not real, they merely appeared to do so, and I found the same interpretation with the Roman-Catholic Hoberg. But this is totally unlikely; the text simply says: "and they did eat", there is not the slightest hint that they actually did not eat. One might put the question: did then the quantity of the food not diminish? Compare also Luke XXIV. 37 ff., where our Lord Jesus by eating before his disciples demonstrated that it was really himself. Likewise there have been commentators who denied the reality of the man who wrestled with Jacob, and ascribed to the wrestling a purely spiritual character (among the Jews Maimonides and among Roman-Catholic scholars again Hoberg). There is, however, no reason whatever to eliminate the reality of the wrestling, but perhaps we may assume with Goodspeed and Welton, that Jacob at first wrestled actually, but after having recognized the true character of his nightly antagonist took recourse to the spiritual strife of prayer. This agrees with Hos. XII. 4: "he wept, and made supplication unto him".

But, as we have to stick to the external reality of the theophanies (apart from those seen in dream or vision), how do we have to judge about their substance? Was the oven a real oven of clay, was the flame of fire in the bush a real flame, were the human figures actually of flesh and bones? Various possibilities might be suggested: one can suppose that the Lord made use of Abraham's oven or of an oven of somebody in the neighbourhood; as to the human figures the guess has been made that God either created persons just as he created Adam and reduced them to nought after they had served his purpose, or that he employed living persons and brought them into a kind of hypnosis. But we must keep in mind that such pure guesses lead us into an utterly unknown land. The flame of fire provides us with an indication that the physical qualities were quite unusual; an ordinary

flame would certainly have consumed the bush, or we might think of the same miraculous divine action which preserved the three men in the burning fiery furnace of Nebuchadnezzar from being attacked by the power of the fire. But, as was said before, all such speculations lead us into an utterly unknown land. Here I would like to quote what Rev. J. C. Sikkel states in connection with Gen. XVIII (*Boek der Geboorten* II, 116): "For us this appearance of the Lord in human figures unto Abraham is incomprehensible. But *every* appearance of the Lord is incomprehensible to us. And of *every* appearance of the Lord, also of this one, on the other hand, it is true for *faith* that not anything is too hard for the Lord" (Gen. 18, 14). That is where we have to take our stand. Scripture does not provide us with any indication how we have to judge about the substance of the theophanies. A theophany is a mystery, and it will and must remain a mystery, but our faith accepts the truth thereof.

NOTES ON THE EVALUATION OF A MATERNAL AND CHILD HEALTH SERVICE

BY

T. D. STAHLIE *

Maternal and child health services (MCH services) are generally accepted as essential branches of any public health service throughout the world. Their general aims, viz. to ensure that

1. "... every expectant and nursing mother maintains good health, learns the art of child care, has a normal delivery, and bears healthy children"; [1],

2. "... every child, wherever possible, lives and grows up in a family unit, with love and security in healthy surroundings, receives adequate nourishment, health supervision, and efficient medical attention, and is taught the elements of healthy living" [2], appeal to practically everyone. This holds true not only for the educated, the leaders of the community, the policy-makers, but also for the common people. Many measures taken to improve the health of the community will not be understood and, as a consequence, not be approved of, by the "man in the street", but he is certain to value any measure to improve the health of children and their mothers. Apparently, this attitude is caused by an innate protective urge rather than by scientific thinking. It is the obvious vulnerability of the pregnant woman, the nursing mother and the child, which makes any man willing to cooperate and participate in any plan to organize, conduct, maintain and extend a programme directed at better health for mothers and children. As such it is understandable that maternal and child health services in many countries were born out of private enterprise, in contra-distinction to *e.g.* quarantine measures, which had to be imposed by the local government, or else would never have come into being. Curiously enough, the bene-

---

* Dr. T. D. Stahlie lectures on paediatrics in the Faculty of Medicine of the Free University.

[1] Wld Hlth Org. techn. Rep. Ser., 1952, *51*, 3.

[2] Wld Hlth Org. techn. Rep. Ser., 1957, *115*, 5.

ficial results of quarantine measures are fairly easy to prove, those of an organization for maternal and child health hardly or not at all. Whereas in the former case continuous re-evaluation of the results and of the means to effectuate them is accepted as indispensable, in the latter most people seem satisfied to contribute to such an organization out of an inward conviction that it is something worth while, and the need for evaluation is not generally felt. The consequence thereof is that MCH services in countries where they have existed for a considerable time already are conducted in a way not much different from that which was en vogue at the time of their inception. It is true that in the meantime all sorts of new measures have been introduced, notably in the field of immunizations, in that of nutrition education, in that of child guidance, to name only a few of the most important. Conceivably this has given those services a new aspect in the course of time, but essentially this new aspect is caused by additions and extensions and not by any basic renovation.

Would there, then, be a need for renovation of the MCH services as they exist, for instance, in present-day Holland? The answer to this question could only, in the writer's opinion, be given after a thorough evaluation not merely of the organization, but also of the results, of the services concerned. And since the need for such a whole-scale evaluation has not made itself felt up till now, it has not been carried out. However, the fact that the MCH services in Holland have not been subject to an evaluation as yet, does not imply that such an undertaking would not have its value. Why then has it not been carried out? The explanation for this curious omission seems to rest on two facts.

The first is that there has been a gradual and rather impressive improvement in the general condition of health of both mothers and children, which may or may not be ascribable to the beneficial effects of the MCH services. The second is that these services never taxed public resources to such an extent that a drastic reduction of expenses became imperative.

It is reasonable to assume that if either had not obtained, large-scale evaluation of the MCH services in Holland would have been undertaken long ago.

Since both points are of basic importance they may need some elucidation. In the Netherlands MCH services were started initially as a purely private enterprise, some eighty years ago.

In 1900 so-called maternal mortality, *i.e.* adult female deaths due to the consequences of pregnancy, childbirth and the puerperium,

amounted to 100 per 10,000 births. In 1955 this had been reduced to 6 per 10,000.

Infant mortalitiy, *i.e.* the number of deaths under one year of age per 1000 live-born babies was 152 in 1900 and has decreased to 17 now.

Child mortality from 1 to 4 years inclusive was 187 per 10,000 of that age group in 1904 and 13,3 in 1954.

In other words, parallel with the development of MCH services there has been a striking reduction in maternal, infant and toddler mortality and the same holds true for the incidence of disease in these groups of the population. The development of the MCH services, however, went hand in hand with an improvement in general conditions: poverty practically disappeared, the level of education rose, and social legislation developed fast. Now it is, of course, quite possible, and even quite probable, that the MCH services played a significant part in the reduction of mortality and disease in the groups cared for, but it is as probable that they were not the sole, nor even the most important, factor causing this reduction. And it is just this aspect of every MCH service in any developing country that makes an evaluation of its achievements so difficult. A MCH service, and, as a matter of fact, a public health service in its entirety, always has to develop at the same pace as the educational, economic and social level of the community; if not, it is doomed to impotence.

On account of its dependence upon the educational and socio-economic structure it becomes almost impossible to analyse its effects proper. Obviously this dependence is actually an interdependence, so that for instance the correlation between a rise in economic level and a reduction in child mortality should be interpreted with exactly the same amount of reserve as that between the development of a local MCH service and that reduction.

In this respect there exists a striking difference between the effects of a MCH service and that of *e.g.* an anti-malaria campaign. In the latter case the mosquitoes acting as vectors of the disease can be made to disappear almost without any dependence upon local socio-economics — (for instance by contributions from foreign countries) — and thus the chain between patient and patient can be broken without any change in the outward circumstances the sufferers have to live in.

Any MCH service, on the contrary, should *aim* at changes in the outward circumstances. As long as these changes have not been effectuated the efforts of the service will remain without result.

The second point is that, as soon as a drastic reduction of expenses

becomes necessary, the local government has to decide which expenses should be reduced, and to what extent. In that case an evaluation of the achievements of the various governmental services becomes necessary in order to answer the following questions:

1. Have these achievements, taken as a whole, been worth the expenses?
2. Could any simplifications be introduced, with consequent reduction in personnel and equipment, without making the service concerned less effective?
3. Is replacement of old methods and techniques by newer ones indicated, and, if so, what would be the cost?
4. Are there any services which, in view of the country's development, could be abolished altogether?

These questions apply to a governmental service as a whole, but they can be applied to any of its branches in particular. As a matter of fact, any part of any organization paid for by public contributions should be frequently evaluated as to its achievements. Apparently, Parkinson's Law sometimes militates against this, and therefore the need for evaluation often makes itself felt only when public resources are at a low ebb.

So much for the possible reasons for the remarkable fact that wholescale evaluation of the MCH services in Holland, or, for that matter, in most Western countries, has never been attempted. This may leave the reader with the impression that, contrary to the statements made above, such an evaluation would not serve much purpose. The Expert Committee on Maternal and Child Health of the World Health Organization expresses a different opinion, however. In its Second Report [3] it states that a comprehensive MCH programme would include:

1. Health protection for all mothers and children, as defined in the second report of the Expert Committee on Public-Health Administration: "Health protection includes the promotion of health, the prevention of sickness, and curative and restorative medicine in all its aspects" [4].

a. Maternity care providing for adequate prenatal, natal, and postnatal care, including health supervision of nursing mothers.

b. Continuing health supervision and total medical care of all children from birth through childhood and adolescence.

2. Studies of problems affecting the health and well-being of

---

[3] Wld Hlth Org. techn. Rep. Ser., 1957, *115*, 5 ff.
[4] Wld Hlth Org. techn. Rep. Ser., 1954, *83*, 4.

mothers and children (to serve as a basis or guide to programme development).

3. Analysis of vital data and statistics concerning mothers and children (to serve as a basis or guide to programme development).

4. Establishment of standards for health personnel serving mothers and children and for facilities providing for their care.

5. Co-ordination of MCH services with those of other health and social agencies serving mothers and children.

6. Health education of parents in child care, of schoolchildren, and of the general public in MCH matters.

7. *Evaluation of the efficiency and effectiveness of MCH services.*

8. Research and development of new methods.

9. Promotion of education of professional and auxiliary staffs through the utilization of MCH personnel and facilities.

The points enumerated clearly indicate *what* should be evaluated in case such an evaluation is attempted. *How* that should be done is much more difficult to tell. According to the same group of experts the term evaluation, as used in the context of a MCH programme, may be defined as the systematic assessment of progress made towards reaching a predetermined goal [5]. It may range from a simple enumeration in answering a specific question as to how many mothers or children received services from a specific programme during a specified period, to the more complex consideration of establishing scientific evidence that a certain programme changed the behaviour of mothers in caring for their children and that such a change is associated with improvements in health of the children, to quote the examples given by the Committee.

Any activity on behalf of a population group may be evaluated on the basis of one or more types of measurement based on different value systems:

1. An estimate which a recipient group places on that activity, according to its own objectives and value systems.

2. The value placed on the activity or service concerned by "experts" after examination and comparison with other services.

3. Assessment by scientific measurement against acceptable standardized procedures [6].

[5] Wld Hlth Org. techn. Rep. Ser., 1957, *115*, 19.

[6] Evaluation in mental health: a review of the problem of evaluating mental health activities, US Dept. of Health, Education and Welfare, Public Health Service Publication No. 413, cited after 5).

All three types of evaluation have their uses, but obviously the third type, if practicable, furnishes the most objective data. However, in the writer's opinion, a whole-scale evaluation of a MCH programme should consist of evaluations on all three of the levels described. As to the first, it fairly often happens that the mothers refrain from taking advice given not because this advice is wrong, inadequate or impracticable from the purely medical point of view, but because it contradicts local traditions, beliefs, superstitions or even taboos. Since all MCH activities are based upon giving advice of some sort — advice which can be taken or left — it is essential that local traditions, beliefs and taboos should be circumvented as much as possible. In other words, any advice given should not only be objectively right, but also acceptable to the recipient. It may be useful to emphasize that the term "to circumvent" has been chosen purposely. Efforts to eradicate such traditions and superstitions by sheer force of argument, or, worse still, by trying to laugh them down, are bound to be ineffectual, and to rouse hostility.

Ostensibly, this type of evaluation is easy to perform, but one should always be aware of the possibility of dissimulation on the recipient's part. Especially if one has to deal with evaluation in one of the so-called underdeveloped regions, chances are that one gets the answer the recipient thinks fitting rather than an unbiased exposition of his innermost feelings. And by having the interviews conducted by inhabitants of the country under consideration — a method which will often be avoidable on account of the language bar — one might receive the opinions of the interviewer rather than those of the interviewed.

The difficulties inherent in the first type of evaluation demand that it should always be supported by some more objective method.

The second type, evaluation by "experts", is the type commonly used in evaluating MCH programmes in developing countries. It is a useful method, provided one is aware of its limitations. In the first place it should be clear that the only thing that can be evaluated in this way is the complex of activities itself, not its effects upon the population. To give but one example: one might construct an up-to-date health centre and staff it with a well-trained, capable midwife who runs excellent prenatal clinics and keeps good records. If the local women choose to have themselves assisted not by that midwife, but by a local unskilled granny when they come to term, the effect of the activities of the MCH centre upon maternal mortality will remain negligible.

The second danger lurks in the fact that this type of evaluation has to be based upon comparison with other services. It is often questionable

whether the standards used by these other services are at all applicable to the service under consideration. From his own experience with the evaluation of MCH services in Thailand the writer may give a few examples of how blueprint copies of Western MCH services could not be applied in that country. The first instance was that in many health centres a poster was hung in a conspicuous place exhorting (in Thai) the women visitors to consume "an apple a day, because that keeps the doctor away". Now fruit is plentiful and inexpensive in Thailand, and the people should indeed be exhorted to use it, but the apple is one of the few fruits which is not to be had locally. Now one might be inclined to think that everyone reading the poster would conclude that if an apple is a good thing to consume daily, other fruits might as well be beneficial. But one cannot put too much trust in this kind of logic, because the local interpretation might as well be that an apple, having to be imported from afar and being therefore extremely expensive, is apparently imbued with magic qualities, and thus such a poster might induce the local people to invest the little money they have in apples.

The second was that all midwives had been equipped with pelvimeters which they used conscientiously. They did not have any standards for the average bi-cristal distance in Thai women — (which is much smaller than that in women of Northern European stock) — and consequently they found a "narrowed pelvis" in practically every case. However, since they knew from experience that this type of "narrowed pelvis" did not cause any difficulties in childbirth, they even took no action when they met a woman who had a real, *i.e.* a pathological, narrowing of the pelvis.

The third and last instance was that, while immunizations against pertussis and diphtheria were propagandized in many health centres, no efforts were made to immunize the children against the much more prevalent typhoid fever as well, simply because immunization against the latter is not advocated in modern American textbooks (because in present-day North America typhoid fever has become a rarity in children).

As a consequence, before using other MCH services for comparison one should be satisfied that the standards in use with those other services really apply.

As has been mentioned above, the third type of evaluation, that of assessment by scientific measurement, furnishes the best data. It is,

however, often difficult to carry out, because "scientific measurement" in this context signifies the measurement of levels of health.

Now health, though everybody seems to know what it means, is extremely difficult to define. The World Health Organization defines it as "the highest possible degree of physical, mental and social well-being". Clearly this is a *relative* concept, and therefore — as a Study Group on the Measurement of Levels of Health already remarked [7]) — it does not lend itself easily to objective measurement. This holds true not only for the concept as a whole, but even for the most measurable part of it, namely physical well-being. Let us compare for instance two groups of middle-aged men, one group being, on an average, slightly underweight, the other slightly overweight. If one selects expectation of life as a criterion of "health", the latter group is definitely the less healthy one. But if one uses the criterion of subjective well-being — (and is not well-being basically a subjective criterion, the person who feels himself well, being well and the person who does not feel himself well just not being well, even if no signs of ill-health can be detected on objective examination?) — the latter group is bound to contain more persons who are "well" than the former.

The usual practice in measuring health scientifically therefore is to "seek guidance from mortality rates, expectation of life and the incidence of communicable diseases, and to use the rise or fall in the levels of these figures as an indication of progress or retrogression as the case may be" [8]. Admittedly, low death rates and lengthening expectation of life do not necessarily reflect improved health in a community, but, generally speaking, there is a positive correlation between the length of life and the improvement of health. Applied to a MCH service this means that data concerning maternal mortality, infant mortality and child mortality, as well as on the incidence of certain communicable diseases in the groups under consideration (syphilis, tuberculosis, the common infectious diseases of childhood) become of prime importance. Evidently, in order to enable one to study these data, they have to be both available *and* reliable. Unfortunately, especially in those regions where the need for evaluation of the existing MCH services is greatest, this is often not the case. Sometimes there are no official data at all, in other cases there are official data, but their reliability is highly questionable. In that situation *sample surveys* are the only practical way out. Sample surveys, however, require careful planning and skilled

[7] Wld Hlth Org. techn. Rep. Ser., 1957, *137*, 8.
[8] Wld Hlth Org. techn. Rep. Ser., 1957, *137*, 6.

personnel, and involve expenditures for equipment and transportation. In under-developed areas neither the personnel nor the necessary money will be available, and therefore the organization of such a survey often becomes only possible with the help of international organizations. In the writer's opinion the international organizations should not consider their task ended by assisting in conducting surveys, but they should also try to create the need for further evaluation in the field. The best way to do this seems to be to insist upon the creation of an evaluation department *within* the MCH service. In the services which are concerned with the combat against infectious disease such evaluation departments are no novelty, in MCH services they are exceptions up till now.

To return to the subject of sample surveys: it is obvious that they need not concern themselves solely with mortality statistics. They have a much wider scope, because they form one of the few ways by which levels of health can be objectively measured. In planning such a survey one should be careful not to attempt to measure too much at a time, because that would involve too much time as well as too much costly equipment. It is of basic importance that such surveys should be extended to a great many persons in order to neutralize by force of numbers possible errors resulting from inaccurate measurements as well as from faulty recording. Moreover, such surveys should not extend themselves over too long periods, since in most under-developed countries circumstances tend to change fast. A survey extended over a period of *e.g.* five years might well yield, by the time of its completion, data which could not be compared any more with those from its inception. To answer specific questions it might be better to plan special surveys for that purpose only.

In a survey planned to measure the level of health of a certain child population it may be sufficient to measure merely weight and height, the haemoglobin level, to record the incidence of recognizable disease, and to count in some way or other the number of children showing signs of malnutrition, without too much attempt at specification. It has been shown [9] that such a survey can be conducted with a minimum of personnel and equipment within a reasonably short time, and still yield valuable data. If, in the course of such a survey, one comes across possible signs of *e.g.* avitaminosis A, a special survey is indicated to establish the prevalence of that deficiency by measuring dark-

[9] Stahlie, T. D., Thai Children under Four, An Essay in the Evaluation of a Maternal and Child Health Service, Thesis, Free University, Amsterdam, 1959.

adaptation, by determining the level of vitamin A and carotene in the blood, by searching corneal scrapings for keratinized epithelial cells, *etc.* Obviously, this would not come into the scope of a general survey, because it would entail special equipment and highly skilled staff. At the same time a nutritional survey in the same area would be indicated to arrive at specific preventive measures.

Thus, by starting out with broad surveys of a more general nature and supplementing them with smaller surveys of a more specific type whenever indicated, it is possible to acquire an insight into the general status of health of a community. Such knowledge forms a useful base-line for comparison not only with other communities, but also with the same community at a later date. Sample surveys may even enable one to gauge the effects a certain MCH service may have on a specified population group, by comparing the "average"status of health of that group with that of another group which did not have access to a MCH service, but is thought to be comparable in every other respect. In practice, the greatest difficulty encountered in this field is to find groups which are really comparable. This is a matter not to be decided by medical personnel exclusively: it requires the assistance of the sociologist, the anthropologist, and often the psychologist as well.

In conclusion it may be stated that evaluation of a MCH service is a matter fraught with pitfalls, difficulties and uncertainties, but that it is the only way to ensure optimal efficiency as well as effectiveness.

BUDDHIST PROPAGANDA IN THE WESTERN WORLD AND THE CHRISTIAN ANSWER

BY

A. POS

In 1952 a book appeared in Holland by Simon Vestdijk entitled: The future of religion [1]. I quote from it the following: "The fact that the evolution to a universal religion of a Buddhist stamp seems to me personally desirable, does nevertheless not mean that I see this evolution taking shape already in the near future. This may take centuries and centuries. The gulf between the East and the West is still too deep, and spiritual things show a tardier development than material things. The adjustment to our modern ideas of Buddhist psychology, clothed as it is in an archaistic garb, is one of the first requisites for closer relations; and although the first steps have already been taken, much work will have to be done still, before Buddhism can lay claim to "universality" and will be able to adjust itself to all spiritual structures. All the same I am convinced that here is one of the great chances of humanity, one of the great chances to conquer the metaphysical projection and to fill up the gulf between earth and heaven, not by decreeing in enlightened fashion that this gulf does not exist, but on the strength of a religious self-experience in accordance with the illustrious rules which were set forth for it 2500 years ago" [1].

Five years later appeared "The religious projection" by Dr. F. Sierksma in which he, too, advocated Buddhism as a non-projecting religion, or as "the religion which cancels religion" [2].

Here we see clearly the presence of Buddhism in the world of Holland, and through the two above-mentioned "prophets" it urgently requests to be admitted further into Western spiritual life. In Germany the advance of Buddhism is much more clearly perceptible. In two publications "Die Weltreligionen im Angriff an die Christenheit" [3]

---

[1] S. Vestdijk, *De toekomst der religie.* Arnhem 1952, pp. 319; 320.
[2] Dr. F. Sierksma, *De religieuze projectie.* Delft 1957, p. 189.
[3] Heft 51 (1956) of *Theologische Existenz Heute.*

and in his "Die Mission der Weltreligionen", which latter appeared in 1959, G. F. Vicedom pointed out the phenomenon that besides Hinduism and Islam it is now also Buddhism which is making itself ready to conquer the hearts in the West, Buddhism particularly in Germany. Already in the last century men like Ram Mohan Roy, Keshab Chandra Sen and Vivekananda in England, and the latter also in America, brought the message of Hinduism. The prophet of Neo-Hinduism, Radhakrishnan has recently tried in many publications [4] to create a synthesis between Hinduism, Christianity and Western philosophy. Since the beginning of the twentieth century (as early as 1903 the Buddhist missionary society was founded in Germany) the propaganda for Buddhism has been at work in Germany. In the days when the peoples in the East lived under Western rule and in connexion with this the various religions felt insecure and menaced by the activities of the mission, efforts were already made towards a revival and re-orientation in the home country, towards concentration of Buddhist organizations in the world and towards a counter-attack against Christianity, but this propaganda had as yet no great driving-power behind it from the East itself. Since Ceylon and Burma obtained their independence, however, and nationalism can have its fling there also in religiosis, Theravada Buddhism has not only become conscious of its own numbers and strength, but started a counter-movement against the church and the mission in these countries and also set ablaze again the fire of Buddhist missionary activities which had been extinct for twenty centuries, to win a place for Buddhism in the West.

From 1954—-956 the sixth Buddhist world council was held at Rangoon. It aim was, 2500 years after Buddha's passage into nirwana (Pali: nibbana), to strengthen Buddhism in the Buddhist countries themselves; to produce an official edition of Buddhist writings; to found a world library and study centre of Buddhism and to stimulate the propagation of the Buddhist doctrine as a message of deliverance and peace in the West. In Ceylon a missionary society was founded, called Lanka Dhammaduta, which intends to direct itself specially to Germany. In that country there are now already Buddhist circles with a total of 10,000 adherents in Berlin, Munich, Uting, Düsseldorf, Frankfort am Main, Cologne and Hamburg. A flood of Buddhist literature finds its way to Germany in periodicals and brochures [5].

[4] The most systematic of his writings is *An idealist view of life*, fourth edition. London 1951.

[5] Walter Holsten, *Buddhism in Germany* in *International Review of Missions*. October 1959, p. 409 ff.

The Cingalese Missionary Society has sent the first three monks to Germany, who have provisionally established themselves in Berlin-Frohnau. The intention is that they move into a monastery where missionaries for Germany will be trained. It is intended to build several of such monasteries in Germany [6].

In many respects we have come now to a turning-point in history. During a period of five centuries there has been a movement from West to East. The Western urge of research and investigation, the passion for trade, the desire of political power and in the midst of all this also the preaching of the Gospel, have spread to the countries and peoples of Asia and Africa. Now the movement turns from East to West and the peoples of Asia are about to exert their influence on world politics and to carry their spiritual treasures to the West.

With a view to this situation a missionary conference was held from 23—25 May, 1960 in the neighbourhood of Flensburg on the German-Danish border, in order to envisage this threat and to find a Christian answer to the Buddhist message. The point at issue was not how the mission in the East is to preach the Gospel, but in what way the Christian Church will answer the challenge of Buddhism in Germany. One might hold the view that the Buddhist message with its negativism is in its nature so alien to the spirit of the West, that we need not be afraid of the influence of Buddhist propaganda, and that consequently an answer to it is not necessary. But in this line of thought we should overlook the fact that in all manner of ways the soil in the West has been prepared for the seed of the Buddhist teaching. In his "Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung" Schopenhauer already struck Buddhist motifs with his renunciation of will and renunciation of the world. Richard Wagner in his Parsifal played with the motif of compassion which Schopenhauer had struck. Rationalism created the atmosphere in which Buddhism can feel at home. More important was the rôle of Theosophy as a preparation for Buddhist propaganda, as Theosophy established a connexion between the Hindu and Buddhist thought of karma and samsara and the doctrine of evolution [7]. It is true: as a rule theosophists cannot be taken seriously when they say that they are Buddhists. Their superficial theory of the equality of all

---

[6] G. F. Vicedom, *Die Mission der Weltreligionen.* München 1959, p. 132.

[7] Edward Conze, *Buddhism,* second edition. Oxford 1953, p. 211: "By its timely intervention, the Theosophical Society has done a great service to the Buddhist cause." See also Colonel Olcott, *Buddhist Catechism* and A. P. Sinnett, *Esoteric Buddhism.*

religions causes them to misinterpret both the Gospel and Buddhism. Their propagation of popular knowledge of the great religions has, however, made Christian faith so relative in various sections of society, that many in uncertainty give up at least the tie with the church. The well-known poem by Edwin Arnold "The Light of Asia" has made many a one an admirer of Buddha. There is no denying that there is a fascination in the sublime nobility of Buddha's life. There are liberal theologians who feel more attracted to the figure of Buddha with his amiability and serenity, who withdraws from the world, than by the active love of Christ who can also be full of holy indignation. Moreover, with Vestdijk [8], is hurts their pride that "without our having asked for it, some one should suffer himself to be nailed on the cross for us: we refuse to be crushed by so much generosity". Besides, historical and natural sciences with their criticism, their ideas of evolution and fixed laws and their world-picture have widely undermined and destroyed belief in the authority of the Bible. The humanist thought of autonomous man, in spite of and perhaps on the strength of the concession of a religiously coloured idealism, forms a smooth and easy transition to Buddhism. The same holds for all manner of forms of existentialism. All that has been mentioned here characterizes especially a well-informed superstratum in the Western world. With the mass of people it is rather a great spiritual vacuum, nihilism, that could offer room for Buddhist propaganda, although in the Western world Buddhism with its philosophical background will be able to appeal rather to an intellectual top layer which, seriously or in play, desires a certain philosophic reflection. Everywhere around us it is clear that, where the answer of the Bible is no longer accepted, any and every answer to the big questions of life has a chance.

* * *

What now is the message of Buddhism to-day and then especially in the Western world? This is the matter occupying us now. On the question who Buddha was and what really Buddhism is, the division in the Buddhist world is no less great than the division there is, alas, also in the Christian churches. But here we are concerned with an answer to the question: In what way does Buddhist propaganda try to make the doctrine of Buddha acceptable to the modern world?

1. In the first place Buddha already clothes his doctrine in the

---

[8] *Op. cit.* p. 273.

garb of "science" when fighting the avidya. Like a physician he diagnoses life and indicates the therapy. "Science" is not to be taken here in the sense in which it is usually understood in the Western world, viz. as exact science. It is true, Buddha was an acute thinker, who used all his intellectual and intuitive thinking-power to fathom the mystery of life and the world in a matter-of-fact and cold analysis. But Buddha only discovered this mystery in a state of samadhi, the deepest mystic meditation into which he had sunk through all the strata of empiric consciousness down to a depth where he fathomed the radical nothingness of self and the insubstantiality and illusoriness of all that exists, and realized the power binding man to it, viz. karma (Pali: kamma), while beyond it he saw the dawn of deliverance: nirwana. We are not concerned here with the question whether the doctrine of brahman and atman (Pali: atta) had in Buddha's life-time already been rounded off philosophically. At any rate, unlike the Vedanta philosophy, Buddha did not feel the need of proclaiming the irreality of the sensible world, but did feel the need of the explanation of its nothingness or insubstantiality over against brahman and atman as an eternal, unchangeable being. He took the world as it presented itself to him, and sought an answer to the problem whether somewhere in this created and therefore transient world an unchangeable and imperishable being could be found. In this Heraclitean stream, however, he nowhere found a fixed point to keep foothold. Everything he saw as an ever-varying combination of dharmas (Pali: dhamma), things and relationships which exist and change and perish, without permanent being and therefore without sense or only the sense which the misleading affect of the sense of beauty or desire attaches to it. And just as in the external world, from matter down to gods, he nowhere found the eternal, unchangeable brahman, he found in his analysis of the inner world nothing but anatman (Pali: anatta), non-self, a conglomerate of senses, ever-varying emotional impressions, perceptions, endeavours or actions and consciousnesses; all this breaks up at death. At whatever depths one would search for the permanent self, Buddha grasps it in his analysing, negativing thought, and explains it away. Thus Buddha triumphantly discovered and preached brahman and atman as the great deceptive illusion.

It is clear why Buddha rejoiced with great joy at this discovery. It was indeed this illusion of eternal existence within and outside man, that held people in the tight grasp of karma and samsara, the law of retribution and the cycle of births. As long as man believes in a per-

manent soul and eternal brahman to which he will return, he will not really be released from himself and the world. Ego-consciousness and desire are indissolubly connected with each other. So long as the fire of desire burns in man, and in the craving for life he wishes to preserve his existence, he continues to be bound in karma and is again and again born anew. When man dies and the whole conglomerate of his existence is disrupted, the remaining flame of desire starts wandering about the world, to attach itself somewhere to a new life in a mother's womb. This new life then bears the retribution for the good and evil deeds of a previous life. Thus by ignorance and the craving inherent in it man continues to be bound for ever in the chain of the ever repeated births. Theosophists like to speak about karma as the law of just retribution and re-incarnation as the way to continuous moral growth. They do not understand, however, the cosmic oppressiveness of this structure of life and world which brought Buddha to such a doctrine in order to tear himself loose from the stranglehold of these powers. Hence his fundamental principle: life is suffering in this state of bondage. Hence also his decision when he is seated under the bodhi-tree in Budh-Gaya: "Let my skin, my sinews and bones dry up, likewise my flesh and blood, but until I have achieved the Supreme enlightenment I will not leave this posture" [9]. Hence also his shout of joy when at last he beheld the chain of causes and consequences which binds man and was able to break it in the detachment from the ego and the world. Buddha's doctrine is built up according to the possibilities of his time and proclaimed to be a logically coherent and consistent system which offered the deliverance from illusion and the way to freedom. This does not alter the fact that he has preached this doctrine with sympathy and compassion as the glad tidings of salvation, and that by the nobility of his bearing in the India of his time the attitude towards Buddha had in it already a certain religious element whch developed more strongly afterwards.

The above-given sketch of this background was necessary to understand that Buddhist propaganda in our days also presents itself in the gown of science. It presents Buddhism as a science without presuppositions, dogmas, revelation or faith, but science which is not only of a theoretical nature, but serves the practical aim of the deliverance of man. In "The Path of the Buddha, Buddhism interpreted by Buddhists", U. Thittila, professor of Buddhist philosophy in the Univer-

[9] *The path of the Buddha. Buddhism interpreted by Buddhists*, edited by Kenneth W. Morgan. New York 1956, p. 8.

sity of Rangoon, writes about "The fundamental principles of Theravada Buddhism". He expounds in it the "rationality of Buddhism" and then says among other things: "In Buddhism there is no such thing as belief in a body of dogmas, which have to be taken on faith". "The Buddha does not ask us to accept belief in any supernatural agency or anything that cannot be tested by experience". "The Buddha taught that we should believe only that which is true in the light of our own experience, that which conforms to reason" [10]. In a letter a Buddhist friend of D. T. Niles of Ceylon, expresses his objections to Christianity thus: "Buddhists are exhorted by their religion to be logical and scientific, Buddhism expounds no dogmas that one must blindly believe, no creeds that one must accept on good faith without reasoning" [11]. In Ceylon and Burma Buddhism adopts a defiant attitude against church and mission as the scientific religion which only bases itself on unprejudiced, objective research in contradistinction to the church which demands belief in unproved and unverifiable truths. In Japan, too, the same view is held, viz. that Buddhism rests on a scientific basis and is in complete agreement with the latest results of modern science. Buddhist propaganda in Germany, too, makes ample use of this view, and impresses with it many who are caught in the magic spell of "science". Here human reason or the autonomous thinker is the criterion of truth. Buddhism is pictured as the ideal for the modern, sovereign thinker, as the sublimest assurance of human freedom. It should be added that Buddhist propaganda reproaches modern western science for having delivered up people's minds to materialism, whereas it is Buddhism which really frees man from the material world.

2. In the second place I must point out that Buddhism preaches a philosophical atheism in which the central theme is man and his deliverance by his own understanding and his own efforts. This theme is so all-important that the question about God is set aside as irrelevant. Buddha did not engage in a deliberate attack on the belief in God or gods, as the Carvakas in India did. Perhaps it is they who are the most consistent defenders of atheism. All the arguments for the existence of God they have tried to refute, and their writings are the arsenal of all arguments that could ever be adduced against such an existence. Buddha was not interested in this dispute. If there are gods, they are, like man, bound by the law of karma and samsara,

---

[10] *Op. cit.* pp. 71, 72.

[11] D. T. Niles, *The Preacher's Task and the Stone of Stumbling*. New York 1957, p. 72.

and need the same way of salvation. This disinterestedness has in the thought of many dethroned God more radically than any attack. This is also the strength of Buddhist propaganda in Western secularisation. In the Dutch authors mentioned at the beginning of this essay we see the opposition against the religious projection and the more or less enthusiastically expressed desire to see Buddhism penetrate the Western world as a way to be delivered from this projection. What is meant is not a biblical purification — always urgently needed — of the belief in God. The belief in God if He is not the living God, is merely idolatry. But the object is rather to get entirely rid of this belief.

In the "Festgabe zum siebzigsten Geburtstag von Emil Brunner" published under the title: „Der Auftrag der Kirche in der modernen Welt" Gerhard Ebeling writes an article on "Elementare Besinnung auf verantwortliches Reden von Gott". In this article he declares with regard to a growing atheism in the West: „Jetzt wird der Gottesgedanke selbst oder jedenfalls die biblische Auffassung von der Personhaftigkeit Gottes als ein versehentlich stehengebliebener Rest mythologischen anthropomorphen Götterglaubens beiseite geraümt" [12]. At present Buddhists like to use the following arguments. How can a man believe in God's omnipotence, if God has failed to prevent the injustice and misery in this world? How can a man believe in God's love, if he makes us suffer in the world, and ordains that we all must die? How can a man believe in the creation of world and man by God, if science shows us the growth of the world in the way of evolution? These questions Buddhists also frequently hear in the Western world. Buddhism meets the doubt in men's hearts by representing man as one who does not need God for his salvation. In this doctrine atheism or nihilism is given an attractive garb, since there is at the same time room for all kinds of religious sentiments deviating from Buddha's views, seemingly religious meditations and mystic yoga exercises, without there being a feeling of being hindered by God. Nor is Buddhist teaching opposed to humanist, pantheist or even theistic gods, provided they form no hindrance for man to walk on the way of Buddha. Buddhism can get on well with different forms of humanism and modernist Christianity which do not impair the autonomy of man. The Buddhist does not need God for his salvation. "The doctrines of Buddhism offer full independence and place full responsibility on each

[12] *Op. cit.* p. 29.

individual to earn his own deserts and to work out his own salvation" [13]. Here man is only responsible to himself and there can be no sense of guilt towards God. It is the way of self-justification, self-deliverance and really also self-deification, for there is no other Lord than man.

3. In the third place the teaching of Buddhism also meets the need of salvation felt by the modern Westerner. In the welfare states of the West the concrete suffering of poverty and disease does not occupy such a place as is the case in the East, neither does the thought of karma and samsara except in theosophic circles dominate the minds and is accordingly not felt as a need. But apart from all this the situation of Western man is felt by many as a critical situation. All manner of forms of existential philosophy have called attention to the risk of human life and thought, his deficit, his inadequacy, his helplessness against fate, his being thrown into the world, his existence "zum Tode". In the midst of all the enigmas of life man has become the great enigma to himself. Menaced by the robot of technology the Westerner feels himself to be in the oppressive grip of laws and powers, the sense of which he does not know and against which he is no longer able to conquer his freedom and maintain it. In existentialism man, having experienced the need of this deficit and limitation, summons his courage not to escape from this limited and menaced existence, but to accept it. The spiritual energy however, of many is not sufficient for this heroic acceptance of life. Here Buddhism shows the way of deliverance. Buddha did not seek the way of his salvation in combating special forms of suffering, injustice, poverty, disease and death, neither in some, though baseless nevertheless courageous, form of life acceptance, but he found it both in the philosophic analysis of the structure of world and life which to their lowest depths prove to be mere suffering, as well as in the means to escape from it. The essence of existence is suffering. This is connected with the nature of existence which in its causality and cyclical regularity is of such a structure that in birth, disease and death, in precariousness and transitoriness nothing else but suffering can proceed from it. Suffering is universal, cosmic, from atoms down to gods, and suffering attends all creatures through all existences. There is no other release from suffering but by radically breaking away from this existence in conquering the illusion of a permanent self and a desirable world, on the sublime eightfold path ending in nirwana.

4. In the fourth place the teaching of the deliverance from this

[13] D. T. Niles, *op. cit.* p. 73.

suffering and the path leading to it acquires a definite tendency to oppose "The Christian West". An important element in its propaganda is the presentation of the Buddhist doctrine as a way to world peace. In the year 1950 the then Prime Minister of Burma, U Nu, had a large temple built near Rangoon, which was consecrated in 1952 as Kaba Aye Pagode, temple of the world peace. According to Buddhists the Christian West has plunged the world into two world wars; Buddha will free the world of war and bring peace. When U Nu heard that the general theme of the second assembly of the World Council of Churches, held at Evanston in 1954, would be: Christ, the hope of the world, he protested: "But surely this is not true; for Buddha is the hope of the world. Only when Buddhism revives, is there a hope of world peace". Buddhist propaganda in the West also makes use of this idea. The ahimsa preached by Gandhi is considered really to have been taken over from Buddhism, which is said to have been the first to pronounce ahimsa one of the principles of human action. Buddha taught the illusory character of human self and the transitoriness of the world, so that "I" and "mine" automatically lose their value and every craving for the world ceases. Then man no longer desires to gain the world. Then all strife ceases and peace will descend. This is nirwana, the extinction of the illusion of self, the extinction of the fire of desire, nothingness, qualified as nothing in respect of all that is experienced in the world, and at the same time the unknown and fascinating order of eternal peace. In this emphasis on Buddhism as the way of universal peace, its propagandists, maintaining the negative valuation of the world, think they can nevertheless take up a positive attitude vis-à-vis the present concrete political, social and cultural problems of East and West. Buddha was not interested in the concrete problems of earthly existence, neither are his monks. But the laymen among the Buddhists live in the world and have a cultural task. In imitation of the mission and the activities of the churches in the Asiatic countries, they also devote themselves to all kinds of social work: the care of sick people, the welfare of crippled persons; the poor; education, etc. This task also serves to attain good karma and thus to make progress on the way of deliverance. They are at great pains to argue that it is just in Buddhism with its self-denial and renunciation of the world that the solution will be found of all concrete problems in the internal economy and in the relations between the nations.

* * *

The Christian answer to the Buddhist message lies in one name. One

name is our hope. It is the name "that unites heaven and earth". Jesus says: Who has seen me, has seen the Father.

This does not alter the fact, on the contrary it implies, that we have to proclaim this name against the background of Buddhist thought, so that the Buddhist may be able to understand the content of this name. When we compare Buddha and Christ, the incomparableness of Christ leaps to the eye.

1. I first wish to make a few general remarks. We do not give an answer to Buddhism, but to Buddhist man, that is the Buddhist man who in the West brings the message of Buddhism or feels attracted by it. It is the message of Theravada Buddhism, not of Mahayana Buddhism, although the two are not radically different. This Buddhist is the man seeking an answer to the ineluctable question as to the meaning of life, and with an unquenchable desire aspires after the eternal rest, to which, however, he cannot give a name. In self-sufficiency he seeks to find this answer by his own philosophy and then becomes the captive of his own constructions. It is the fatiguing effort of all autonomous thought to understand here and now the secret of world and life, of time and eternity, eliminating God and basing himself on our empiric existence. The Buddhist, too, belongs to those who labour and are heavy-laden and are called by Jesus: Come to Me and I will give you rest.

The answer to the Buddhist is not a theory overagainst theory but it is Somebody, Jesus Christ. Much can be said against Buddhism as a theory. It presents itself as unprejudiced science, but karma and samsara in the sense in which they function in Buddhism, are exactly the unproved presupposition, the axiom, the dogma which Buddha started from in his philosophy. Furthermore, Buddhism knows and recognises only those facts which it can know from sense perception, by thought and intuition. The Gospel also deals with facts, God's facts, which sense perception and the profoundest meditation do not bring to light. The Christian faith rests in the reality and the work of God in Jesus Christ. If the answer only consists in words, in ideas proposed as a better, a more scientific theory, a more satisfactory philosophic system, this may seemingly make us gain much, but in reality it makes us lose all. For if God is only a postulate of human thought, He is nothing but an idol. The Gospel is not a theory, but the power of God unto salvation to every one that believes. The all-important question is the meeting with the living God in Jesus Christ. The Buddhist is the man who in his philosophic yearning for the un-

changeable being — which is not to be found in the empiric reality — reveals the yearning sustained in the heart by God, for the true God, the living God and for that eternal life which can only be bestowed by Jesus Christ.

2. In the second place we see Christ as the answer in his attitude towards suffering. Buddha was moved not so much by the concrete suffering of mankind which really pales into insignificance compared with the suffering of the whole of existence in the fetters of karma and samsara. Hence it is that in the concrete suffering which befalls a mother when a child dies, Buddha has no other comfort to give than that this happens to be the transitoriness of life which befalls every one. Buddha teaches an infinite sympathy with all creatures, but — here I quote Hermann Oldenberg in his "Buddha, sein Leben, seine Lehre, seine Gemeinde" [14] —: "Solches Fühlen aber zielt vor allem auf den Segen hin, den diese seelische Gymnastik den Fühlenden selbst zu bringen verspricht. Nie wird dabei vergessen, das alles Haften des eigenen Herzens an anderen Wesen ein sich verstricken in die Freude und darum in das Leiden der Vergänglichkeit ist". In so far as we would like to use the word love here, it is nevertheless not an active love felt for a person, but a general feeling of sympathy or compassion for all creatures. We do not wish to deny the value of this inner rest and unperturbedness, which is able to assert itself also in its own difficult situations and painful experiences, but it is in great danger of falling into quietism and — worse — into spiritual egotism. Buddha is a lovable person but with all amiability he represses and is bound to repress every affective attitude towards concrete persons so as not to lose his inner rest. It is only fair to admit that Buddhist man is frequently better than his doctrine.

Jesus Christ makes us understand that suffering is not the essential structure of life and the world, but an alien power foreign to this being. God is the Creator of the world and of life and therefore they are good in themselves and not liable to death and doom. But man has revolted against God and man is to blame for the fact that suffering and death have come into the world. Suffering does not mean being in this transitory world, but being under the judgement of God. Whatsoever a man soweth, that shall he also reap (Gal. 6 : 7), but this is a different law from the automatic and impersonal natural law of karma which rules all. And Gal. 6 : 7 is preceded by these words: Be not

[14] Hermann Oldenberg, *Buddha, sein Leben, seine Lehre, seine Gemeinde*, thirteenth edition. Stuttgart 1959, p. 307.

deceived; God is not mocked. Numbers 32 : 23 says what karma says: Your sin will find you out, but the words that precede are: You sin against the Lord. We are all bound in transitoriness, but Psalm 90 : 7 tells us: We are consumed by Thine anger. The whole creation is indeed made subject to idleness or vanity, but Romans 8 : 20 tells us: not willingly, but by reason of Him who has subjected it. Behind the idleness of life and the world God stands with His judgement and we stand with our guilt before God. Now we no longer regard suffering with a kind of philosophic annoyance that this world should be of such a structure, but only in deep humility and admission of our guilt. And in this not a single theodicee invented by man is able to fathom what justifiable connexion there is between the guilt of men and nations and the individual and collective suffering. God's justice will be revealed in eternity, as is shown for instance by the parable of the rich man and Lazarus. Neither can the Buddhist with his doctrine of karma show the justice of the retribution within the boundaries of this life. For this he would need the knowledge of previous and subsequent lives, which fall outside all scientific control. The previous lives are for him only the object of unbridled fantasy and for want of a permanent ego the subsequent lives are only bound up with this life by a kind of mythological bond, the flame of desire. Without permanent ego it is difficult to speak of identity and of reward and punishment of personal deeds, and, in consequence, of justice in one's allotment in life.

Jesus Christ not only makes known to us the guilt behind suffering. He has also borne this guilt and this suffering. Buddha in philosophic serenity gives us a doctrine, Christ gives Himself, on the cross. He makes Himself one with humanity in its guilt and suffering and does not preserve his inner rest and unperturbedness, but steps right into the middle of a world of pain and distress and suffering and transitoriness, into a world which without light from above seems to be meaningless and He does not refuse to perturb His rest by entering into the depth of guilt and death and hell. Thus He bore the world-karma in a solidarity of love which Buddha did not know. Buddha holds: Everything is just; there is no unmerited guilt. For Christ there is the righteousness of love in his unmerited suffering (unmerited, because it was not caused by his guilt) in order that we should be cured by it, and that the nature of suffering should change and should become the means of purification. If for a moment we should accept the idea of karma, the law of karma would also hold for Christ. He has sown himself in the field of this world in his death, and will therefore reap

a new life and a new world for all who follow Him (John 12 : 24). Christ on the cross is an incomprehensible and repulsive spectacle for the Buddhist, because he does not know the appalling depth of suffering, of the revolt against God born of the depth of hell, neither does he know of that divine love which cannot give up man and the world to perdition. Buddha only avoids suffering, Christ conquers it. That is why he can cure the sick, cleanse lepers, give blind men the light, feed the hungry, raise dead men as tokens and a guarantee of a new humanity and a world, freed from guilt and suffering and all bonds.

3. In the third place we see Christ as the answer in His attitude to the world. For Buddha the world is merely a deceptive kaleidoscope of deceptive figures, but Christ teaches us to know and love it as God's creation. Instead of depriving the lily of its beauty by destroying it in a cold analysis into particles of dust, Christ praises its beauty, which exceeds that of Solomon. Not knowing God, Buddha did not know God's world either nor could he love it. Christ brings us not the renunciation of God's world, but its salvation. He loves the world so much that He was ready to die for it and to rise from death to return to it. He has remained faithful to the earth. His resurrection is the guarantee that transitoriness and death have been vanquished. The question asked by Buddha and Buddism is this: Is there a life that is free from birth, disease, old age and death? The answer is the word of Christ: He who believes in Me, has life eternal, now and here, in the midst of time and transitoriness. Not in the evolutionary way of many births, but in the creative manner of the one regeneration, this life is given us. Who is in Jesus Christ, he is a new creature. We need not seek a negative, indescribable nirwana. Jesus Christ is the resurrection and the life. With Christ we die, but with Him we also arise in a new life and we are bound to the world in a new way. In Jesus Christ eternity has come into time. In Christ, God is with us in the world. In the Kingdom of God the new world is there now. Therefore Christ's word: "Do not lay up treasures for yourselves upon earth", or that other word: "Do not love the world" holds good in quite a different meaning than in Buddhism. Because the world is God's world, we are called to love it (but not to love it and leave God out of it); and seek its treasures not only for ourselves, for pleasure and power and honour. For the world and its treasures without God pass away, are subject to transitoriness, nothingness and senselessness, but the creation itself will be freed from the bondage of transitoriness, and all the potentialities given in it will in a purified state come to development. Loving this world,

we fight against all powers of injustice and corruption, examine all its treasures in the depth of the earth and in space, and we work to promote the glorious sovereignty of God.

4. In the fourth place we see Christ as the answer in His attitude towards the human soul, towards the ego or self. Buddha declares self to be mere delusion, and thus sees the way free to a life without suffering. Christ comes to save man from suffering, body and soul, and to give him eternal life. For it is not the ego, but the inclination, the disposition of the ego which is the real need of man. Not the ego, but egoism; not being an individual, but individualism; not the permanent soul or self, but the self which autonomously wishes to assert itself in the face of God and man, is the cause of suffering. In Jesus Christ we see true Man in the midst of the violence of the world in true ahimsa giving Himself to the service of God and man. More than that. Christ is the proof that the heart of the universe is not a cold, impersonal, heartless law, but that God is a Father, who in Jesus Christ seeks our salvation and is willing to make, for this salvation, the greatest sacrifice. Jesus Christ is at the same time the true man, who does not deny His self, and does not assert it, but made Himself nothing, humbling Himself in the deepest humiliation, in order to save us. He gave Himself to those who did not desire Him, and prayed for His enemies. In the meeting with the living God in Jesus Christ we only learn to know our true self, the same self that by the power of sin has become the source of all misdirected desires and the cause of all bondage in this world and especially of all averseness from God. In the existential meeting with God in Christ, this ego is judged and renewed, and is freed from all its directedness to itself and is directed to God and the neighbour, to love and to serve them. When Christ occupies the dominant place in our life, the hypertrophy of the ego disappears. "He must increase, but I must decrease". "I am crucified with Christ; nevertheless I live; yet not I, but Christ liveth in me". This is not the philosophic denial of the permanent soul, nor is it its total absorption in God, neither is it its deification as eternal, imperishable and all-wise in the undefinable mystic nirwana, far above "being" and "non-being", life and death, subject and object; but it is the ethical and religious victory of its sinful directedness. It is not the killing of all desires and affects, but directing them all in love to the Other and the others. The Buddhist repudiation of self in nirwana carries the danger of becoming the most haughty form of self-preservation.

5. The answer to the Buddhist is Jesus Christ Himself. He gives Himself as an answer in His suffering and death, His resurrection and ascension; He gives Himself as an answer in His gospel, but also wants to give Himself as an answer in His church and in the believers. In them He wants to take a form, He calls upon them to live in the same spirit which moved Him to make Himself nothing; it is them He wants to make His "epistles read of all men", read also of Buddhists. Every answer to the Buddhist ends in many questions to the Christians.

Have we in word and conduct of life interpreted Christ and made Him understandable to the Buddhist world in East and West? Have we with radical earnestness, deeper, more intensely than all yoga-exercises, repudiated, not simply denied, ourselves; renounced the things of this world not as inherently bad, but used them for God and the neighbour instead of desiring them for ourselves, and has Jesus Christ in supreme reality become everything to us? Has it become manifest in the unity of the Christian church that only He is our Lord, and that we wish to renounce for Him all our thoughts and our own will in order that, according to the prayer of our Lord, the world might believe that He was sent by the Father? Or is the divided and torn church an obstacle on the way to Christ? Did the voice of the church and of the believers strike a note of its own in the chorus of all the voices from the West? Did the church and the Christians in their attitude towards the distress, the poverty and the disease of so many millions, towards the conflicts and menace of war, show the figure of Jesus Christ as the Lord of compassion, conciliation and peace? When Buddhists speak of Buddhism as the way to peace we may perhaps remind our readers of the fact that in the past Buddhist monks in China and Japan were not always so peaceable and that the monasteries were centres of strife and unrest, while at present Buddhists in Ceylon are not quite examples of tolerance, but all this does not silence the question whether it might not be our fault that Buddhists do not believe in the propagation of Christianity, or rather in the preaching of the Gospel as a way to peace for the world? Did we perhaps in the history of the Christian church devote more energy to a reflection on Who Christ is rather than to obeying His call to love one another and to love our neighbour of whatever rank or race, which would show ourselves to be disciples of Christ to the world? Is it possible that the church and the Christians, is it possible that empiric Christianity is perhaps to blame for the fact that there are Buddhists who say: I should

believe the gospel, if the church and the Christians did not stand in my way?

The answer to the Buddhist is a call to the church and the Christians to repent. The words spoken by Kenneth J. Saunders at the conference of the International Missionary Council at Jerusalem still hold: "Unless the love of Christianity is greater than that of Buddhism, it is very difficult to lead the Buddhist to Christ" [15].

---

[15] Christianity and Buddhism in *Jerusalem Meeting Report*. London 1928, vol. I. p. 157.

SELF-CRITICISM IN SCIENCE FROM AN EDUCATIONAL-PSYCHOLOGICAL STANDPOINT

BY

G. WIELENGA *

Self-criticism is one of the most essential qualities of scientific pursuit.

Perhaps it might be said to be: *the* essential characteristic. It has to attend scientific work in all its phases, from the moment when its basis is laid till the conclusion is drawn. The collection of the facts, the arrangement of the collected material, the drawing up of hypotheses in explanation of them and the testing of these hypotheses, all of them must be permeated with self-criticism. This will apply in particular to fundamental research, the inquiry into the presuppositions from which every investigator proceeds, which every investigator carries into his work. There still exists, it is true, a group of men who think that science can (must) be pursued without presuppositions, but this group is becoming smaller and smaller — a consequence of self-critical analysis, also under the influence of the criticism of fellow-researchers.

In this latter statement one fact stands out demanding brief attention. What does one mean by "self" in the term "self-criticism in science"? It would seem to me that what is meant by it is a complex whole consisting of: the person pursuing science, his fellow-workers, as well as the object of science, since the ideas of the former are not only considered critically by himself and by his colleagues, but the chief test of criticism is whether they fit in with reality.

Self-criticism in science is really a kind of "self-communion", an inner discourse, between these three alter egos, in which each plays its own part.

This applies to all sciences. It would serve little purpose for me, the

---

* Prof. Dr. G. Wielenga lectures on Pedagogy and Experimental Psychology in the Faculty of Arts of the Free University.

representative of the science of pedagogics, to enter into this in greater detail. It is more natural to expect me to discuss instances furnished by this field of study. Yet I won't do this either. For one thing, because this self-examination in pedagogics often does not take place in that serene atmosphere which is usually associated with the concepts "communion" and "self-criticism". On this point I might refer to the intensity with which at this moment in the United States the fight is fought for and against the Public Highschool and the progressivism current in it and to the fierceness with which some 30 or 40 years ago Dewey's "Philosophy of Education" was attacked and defended. In fact, nearer home examples are to be found as well. When among Protestants in the Netherlands the problems in connexion with the *Christian* school come up for discussion, this discussion nearly always degenerates into an attack or a defence of "standpoints", in which participants say much, but hardly listen.

One might wonder what this tendency, which all too often threatens to bring down the discussion in the court of science to the level of abuse or heresy-hunting, may be owing to — in particular in pedagogics, but also in the humanities in general. I hope to revert to this later on. Psychologically it is indeed understandable and the phenomenon as such will be discussed in due time.

I intend to deal with self-criticism as a typically human activity, self-criticism in its psychological and educational aspects and significance. The subject fully justifies the representative of these sciences to do so, since self-criticism as a typically human activity is also the object of the sciences in question.

The expression "as typically human activity", used a few times in the above, is employed intentionally to state that self-criticism is one of the essential aspects of man. The fact that man is a rational moral being implies the power to look at oneself critically; it implies the power to stand back from oneself and one's own deeds so as to judge them according to rational and moral standards. Self-criticism is, however, especially a characteristic of the *adult* man and consequently it plays an important part in the aims of education and hence in educational theory and practice. So the manner in which self-criticism functions and for what purpose it should function, is a very important problem for the psychologist as well as for the pedagogue.

In order to understand the problem of self-criticism better, it is important first to consider the criticism of others.

There are two ways of criticizing others and their world of thought. First of all there is the purely disapproving judgement, the *rejection* of the other; a very natural reaction, which has become second nature to fallen man. Is not man — to use the terminology of the Heidelberg Catechism — "of his own nature inclined to hate his neighbour"? This is not done on the strength of rational and/or moral standards, but exclusively because it is *another*. In our view we had better no longer include it under criticism or judgement, since it is mere rejection and repudiation.

Genuine criticism or judgement is based upon contact. It implies (1) *a conscious handling of standards* and on the strength of this (2) *a sifting of the various views that are possible* into those that are acceptable and that are non-acceptable.

With all our criticisms we should therefore first recognise that we have to handle *valid* standards and *what* these standards are. This means that we should be well aware why we use these standards here, why they suit this situation and why they apply to it. The question presents itself whether the other, the person criticized also has to accept this validity. So far we need not go, I think, but the fact that we pronounce these standards to be valid for this situation, *does imply* that we have a certain knowledge of the object of our criticism, have a certain bond with it. In other words, we must have been in communication with the other and his world of thought, have had an open mind for it, have listened and heard. Criticism is of the nature of a conversation with the other. Criticism which has not first seriously asked what the other *means,* is no reasonable and certainly no morally justified criticism. For that reason, criticism, via a "reductio ad absurdum" by means of consequences drawn from his standpoint, which are *forced upon* the other, but not accepted by him, is nearly always objectionable.

We mentioned in the second place the sifting of various possibilities. This implies that we *see various possibilities,* accept them, at least for the time being, and do not reject a priori the other possibilities because they are different from the only possibilities which are visible to us. Not before we have tolerated and admitted the other views, can we on definite grounds choose *for* some and *against* others.

Genuine criticism is therefore based upon contact. One can reject only after one has met the other. Judging, like touching and understanding demand a multi-lateral approach and a close contact upon every side. But for that very reason criticism is always constructive, indicating as it

does other possibilities as correct. That is also the reason why criticism of others is such a delicate and difficult matter. It is difficult *to be able to* understand another in his motives, in his argumentation, in his starting-point and in his conclusions. It is perhaps even more difficult to *be willing* to understand the other, because this demands self-criticism and self-conquest. Yet it is essential when criticizing to apply *suitable* standards in an *objective* manner.

All this holds — and often with greater force — for self-criticism.

It is true that here the object is immediately accessible and that we are not faced with the almost unbridgeable gap as is the case in the meeting with the other. Yet, we may perhaps not find a gap on our route, but surely impenetrable brushwood! The "Know thyself" as a problem is certainly no discovery of our times, but the disclosure of the unconscious by modern psychology has shown how dark are the origins of our behaviour and how extremely complicated the forces determining it.

Self-knowledge is perhaps after all even more difficult than knowledge of the other. True, clear observation is hindered, sometimes prevented, by too great distances, but no doubt just as much by too short a distance. The smokescreen of others, raised by way of camouflage, is difficult to see through, but our own smokecurtain in the midst of which *we are ourselves,* is a disguise just as much — it is even extra-dangerous, because it affects our eye-sight.

It is generally known to-day how our psyche, like our body, has *defence mechanisms.* I need only mention the concepts of repression and rationalisation. Unpleasant experiences and unpleasant facts may be suppressed by it and these separate units may even come to lead a life of their own, thus unconsciously influencing our thoughts and actions. These complexes are more easily observed in another than in ourselves — the self-defence mechanism would not function effectively, if we ourselves could easily see it and see through it.

Every one knows, too, how our more conscious thought and judgement is influenced by our emotions and hidden motives. It is especially our deeper *convictions* that have a strongly affective charge so that if they are imperilled by others doubting them, there is a chance of an affective shortcircuit in which all rational and moral judgements are eliminated. Even the scientific investigator is in such a situation only partially responsible for his words and acts.

Every one knows it, but what is the use of it? The knowledge of finding oneself in a labyrinth (of the dark motives) or in a storm (of

the emotions) does not offer a solution of the difficulties — although it may be the beginning of a solution.

In the second place we mentioned the factor of seeing and provisionally admitting other possibilities. This, too, is a difficult point in self-criticism. This admission is experienced by the entrenched ego as a dangerous menace leading almost automatically to a closing of the gates, a drawing up of the bridges of the castle of self-assertion and to the launching of the counter attack.

I feel myself threatened by the mere admission of the possibility that there are other good solutions; that *I* may have committed a mistake or may *be* in fault. The fear of losing one's face is not an oriental monopoly. Just as the primordial sin is pride, the primordial fear is to be small, unimportant, worthless. And the person to whom I am least willing to admit my smallness is myself, for who could have faith in me, if I cannot have it in myself? This is in fact the relieving character of the faith in the Lord Jesus Christ that I need no camouflage in the meeting with Him, because He knows me all the same and He loves me in spite of all.

How deep-rooted pride is, is proved by the phenomenon that occasionally a person is as proud as the Pharisee of his being humble as the Publican — an attitude every Christian is apt to fall into. Similarly self-mockery — in itself a good thing — may in this way be reversed and be used to demonstrate impregnable social status by the attitude of "that's what I can permit myself".

All the phenomena mentioned can equally clearly be observed in group psychology. The self of the group, the party, the clan to which the individual belongs and to which from motives of safe-guarding itself, it wishes to continue to belong at any cost, entrenches itself in an even higher degree than the self of the individual. It makes itself unassailable by its prejudices; it worships itself by way of self-defence against the sense of its own smallness and to overcome its inferiority-feelings; it fiercely rejects all self-criticism by expelling individual members who threaten to assail this bulwark of self-maintenance from within, branding them as heretics. All peoples show this tendency and all churches — and communities like the Free University. These phenomena are also very conspicuous in youth gangs — not forgetting student-societies.

At the end of these observations of a more psychological nature, this may be the place to revert to the phenomenon referred to before, namely that the "self-criticism in science" taken as "mutual criticism

within the group of those pursuing science" is often fiercer in the circle of psychologists and pedagogues, and shows in a less degree the serene rest of the objective pursuit of science than is seen in the group of the physicists. This at least seems to be the case to *me* — for it is very difficult to prove this opinion and it is, therefore, little more than a personal impression. I see two reasons. In the first place the third partner in the conversation between the individual investigator, his colleagues and the object of investigation, is weaker here. The facts are less "hard", the phenomena rather require further interpretation. In physics there is always an objective criterion. The answer given by nature to the questions asked in the experiment, will cause every physicist to submit. But in the humanities the answer is much less clear. The psychologist and the pedagogue have to interpret it and in this process the chances are much greater for them to transform it and to adapt it to their wishes.

In the second place the convictions (the presuppositions) of the investigator *can* and *must* exercise a much stronger influence in this field. These views, based as they are on one's conception of life, are highly "Ich-bezogen" and "Ich-betont" and on account of their affective charge, they are much more open to self-camouflage. For the worker in the field of the humanities the risk of committing himself a priori to one definite hypothesis that seems to be an integral part of his already existing personal system is much greater.

Thist is a psychological explanation, but "tout savoir" should not lead to a "tout pardonner", and certainly not to a self-pardon, which is so easy. On the contrary, the more we know of these dangers, the more we ought to arm ourselves against them.

After the foregoing psychological remarks about self-criticism, we will now proceed to discuss it from an educational angle.

All definitions of the aims of education are really variations on the great theme indicated by the word maturity. Although its definition may have a pretty strong personal colouring according to the character and conception of life of the pedagogue in question, it is always independence, emancipation, personal responsibility, acceptance of life and its obligations and so on, which prove to be the central concepts.

Self-criticism is never specifically included, but self-judgement and conscience are, which indeed are closely related to it. It is in fact only one aspect of maturity, which moreover is always more or less impli-

citly present in the characteristics enumerated. At any rate it seems to me to be an aspect important enough to be mentioned and considered separately.

That independence is an essential feature of maturity almost goes without saying. After having as a child stood under the protection and responsibility of others, the time has come now for the adult to stand alone. *To stand for himself,* for the *values* he has personally recognized as values and for the life-task which he has accepted as his assignment. It is evident, too, that this acceptance of a life-task is a question of inner attitude, of spiritual courage and an act of surrender rather than of insight. But it is equally evident that this insight, the self-knowledge and the true self-judgement, is an indispensable condition for a true choice and fulfilment of the life-task and by it also for a progressing development of life and of spiritual growth.

A man who *cannot* and *dares* not look upon himself critically, has been stunted in a definite phase in his growth and has therefore in certain respects not become adult, but has remained a child. He may be able to keep up a semblance of independence towards the outer world and towards himself, but this lack of courage and strength reveals that as yet he is not a real *man.*

We are speaking here of *self*criticism. This does not mean a plea for a critical attitude towards all life-values indiscriminately, particularly not when they are values revealed by God, because they could not enter into the heart of man. Here we are concerned with a critical view of oneself, of one's own acts of surrender and acceptance. Was that really a personal act, or was it an act based upon a tie to a human authority? What was the motive? Was it self-protection or an escape from feelings of insecurity or was it an urge of love? How complete is the surrender; how much self-willed reserve is still left?

This self-criticism is on the one hand essential for adultness, but on the other hand maturity is essential for the strength and the courage thus to be consciously critical of oneself. This shows how strongly these concepts are interwined and how much self-criticism is an indispensable element of maturity.

This applies not only to the individual, but just as much for the group. Groups which do not tolerate self-criticism, which are at least soon ready with the charge of "heresy", give evidence of a lack of inner firmness, of a lack of self-confidence, of immaturity. From this point of view the democratic form of government, but particularly the

democratic way of life, may be called the most mature, because it makes self-criticism the regulating principle.

If self-criticism is an essential aspect of adultness, *education towards self-criticism* must necessarily be an essential aspect of education.

We see the child growing as it were towards maturity, inter alia in the growing ability to be conscious of itself, judging itself, criticizing itself. Education means aiding, stimulating and guiding this self-development by affording it an opportunity of exercising these faculties under more or less controlled and controlling conditions. As regards the education towards self-criticism in the classroom, the teacher will always have to be aware of this function of his teaching by giving his pupils the opportunity to find and analyse their own mistakes and by always rendering an account of *his* judgement to the pupils.

Yet there are limits here which should not be overstepped. So long as the child is not yet fully capable of judging itself, it should, indeed, be given an opportunity for practice, but we ought not to let it bear the full burden of this "judgement", i.e. his responsibility for it. Too early independence leads to self-defence mechanisms being put into operation; it leads particularly to an escape into the protection which the peer-group and its specific standards seems to afford. Many aspects of modern youth-life, especially in America, demonstrate that giving too much liberty and independence at too early an age does not further the acceptance of self-chosen, individual standards, but rather the blind acceptance of group standards. The educator therefore *should not withdraw* but will have to accept his task on this point. This task is teaching the young to choose their standards and to handle them; to assist them in this and to support this growing process with his *authority*. One may put it in these words: the adult should dare to be the substitute conscience of the child.

That this is not a matter of what one says, but of what one is, has almost become a platitude (although it should not be forgotten that speech is nevertheless also inherent to the nature of man). It is, however, anything but superfluous to repeat this truth again and again. The educating adult should demonstrate this self-criticism in his own life, if necessary by having the courage to admit his own shortcomings and or by self-mockery. An educator, a father or a teacher who takes himself too seriously and can never have a good laugh at himself, *is* laughable. In the matter of education towards self-criticism he is like a blind man leading the blind. Fortunately the young are

usually not long in finding out the deficiency in the leader and do not take him seriously as such.

The educator should be well aware of the educational aims he tries to attain. He should choose these and the norms determining them personally. Moreover he should continuously and self-critically test his loyalty to this choice, which is for himself, too, the choice of *his* aims of life.

This also applies, be it said once more, to the group, e.g. the group in which we find ourselves now, the Free University. This Free University professes to have an educational task with regard to the Netherlands nation, and not without justice. But it can only perform this task well when it demonstrates in itself the purifying action of continuous self-criticism. Self-criticism, which is particularly needed here. For we stated in the above that *convictions* are strongly ego-bound and affectively charged and therefore particularly liable to self-camouflage and apt to become rigid. Our fundamental principles are of a religious nature, that means associated with a very personal choice of the ego. It is therefore not only easy to fall into self-delusion, but at the same time this is difficult to see through. It is so extremely tempting here to cover one's own views with the authority of God, that is to camouflage them. Moreover, the group in which we live as Free University, takes up an isolated position (used to, at least), in consequence of which defence mechanisms become particularly likely and particularly strong. A self-critical reflection on the *sacredness* of the principles and of the fervour with which we defend them, will make it possible not only to increase the strength of the defence, but especially also strengthen the appeal to and the grip at those who do not (yet) belong to us.

REVIEW OF BOOKS

G. C. Berkouwer, *The Triumph of grace in the theology of Karl Barth.* Grand Rapids, Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1956; 414 pp. Paper-back edition: $ 2.45.

The appearance of the English translation of Professor Berkouwer's well-known work also in a cheap paper-back edition, is very welcome indeed. Although this edition is already a few years old, it is a great pleasure for me to call attention to it. It will be known that the first American edition was a little more concise, chiefly because some notes had been omitted, although on the other hand an Appendix had been added: The problem of interpretation; in this Appendix the author enters more fully into the difference with C. van Til about the interpretation of Barth.

This paper-back edition is practically identical with the first American edition, except for the addition of a preface of the translator, Dr. Harry R. Boer.

Dr. Boer begins his preface with the remark: "Perhaps no contemporary theologian is so well-known by name in the English speaking world, and so little in terms of his thought, as the Swiss theologian Karl Barth."

This is certainly an undesirable state of things. Let us hope that also this edition of Berkouwer's work may contribute to effecting a change in this situation.

N. H. RIDDERBOS.

William Hendriksen, *The Bible on the life hereafter.* Grand Rapids, Baker Book House, 1959; 222 pp.; $ 3,95.

In fifty chapters or lessons all possible questions which can be asked with reference to "eschatology" are dealt with. The book particularly intends to be a guide for study groups. For this reason a series of questions is put at the end of each chapter, which really make it possible to stimulate a discussion.

The author's style is very clear and to the point, and therefore also attractive. We are given a good survey of the Scriptural data bearing upon the life hereafter. Valuable are also the quotations given from the works of various authors; the writer quoted most often is H. Bavinck.

Sometimes the author writes, I think, with too great a certainty and shows too little that there are various sides to a matter; see chapter 6 (on "dichotomy, etc.), 13 ("Shall we know each other there?") and others. Other chapters I have read with appreciation and complete agreement, e.g. chapter 8 (on the immortality of man); 42, 43 (on the dispensationalists).

N. H. RIDDERBOS.

Henry Law, *Christ is all, The Gospel in Genesis.*
London, Banner of Truth Trust, 1960; 188 pp.
Paper-back reprint: 2/6.

This volume appeared for the first time in 1854. It is a remarkable booklet. It is certainly possible to criticize it. Fault may be found with its use of Scripture; when the author writes on Gen. 5 : 29 we are given some very general reflections on the comfort which is to be found in Christ; etc. One might speak of individualism: again and again the author addresses the single individual and reminds his readers of the value of their undying souls. And yet I find it difficult somehow to pass a criticism on this book. It reveals a warm love of Christ, an earnest zeal for the salvation of the fellow-man. It may be added that the "writer proves to be a man of culture and good taste". Many of us no longer read such books. Still it might do no harm if now and then we were to read a book like this.

N. H. RIDDERBOS.

John H. Gerstner, *The Gospel according to Rome.*
Baker Book House, Grand Rapides, Michigan, 1960.

The pamphlet makes a scholarly impression by the translation of official decrees of the Roman Catholic Church at the beginning of each chapter. The author's idea is then to prove next that the pronouncements cited are at variance with Holy Scripture. However, the very interpretation of the Roman Catholic documents is often challengeable After a number of questions which do not mention with a single word the role played by the good works in justification, the writer concludes: according to Rome, good works produce justification. No Roman Catholic theologian will put it thus. The same Council of Trent quoted here states that sanctifying grace is the only formal cause of justification. This only by way of example. Nor do I always like the manner in which the position of the Reformation is described. Furthermore there are a good many traditional trends of thought in the pamphlet.

G. E. MEULEMAN.

J. Gresham Machen, *Christianity and Liberalism.*
Eerdmans, Grand Rapids, Michigan.

A far less pretentious book than the preceding one, but based on a much deeper insight into the subject. For the rest it is a little difficult to review it. The fact is that the work in question is a reprint of a book dating from 1923. The form of liberalism described here is at present only occasionally met with at least on the continent of Europe, that is to say, as a movement that claims to be the true form of Christian faith. Perhaps we should also describe the position of "orthodox" Christianity somewhat differently now. Thus I myself would never write: "Ration-

al theism . . . is at the very root of Christianity" (page 56) and "the logical confirmation of the belief in God is a vital concern to the Christian" (page 57f). Yet it is a book which is first of all of historical importance, viz. to make us understand the situation in which Machen found himself in the Presbyterian Church, a situation illustrative of conditions in many churches of those days. But also a book giving us many a warning important for our present situation. And furthermore a book which makes us understand something of the person of Machen: a decided character and on the other hand in a marked manner a man who had a large heart, fighting with heart and soul for the confessional character of his church and of the church in general. But by no means the type of the heretic-hunter.

G. E. MEULEMAN.

Andrew A. Bonar, *The Life of Robert Murray M'Cheyne.* The Banner of Truth Trust, 1960, 192 pp.

Bonar's Life of Robert Murray M'Cheyne is the religious biography of a Minister of Christ in the Church of Scotland who, during the short lease of life allotted to him (he died in 1843, aged 29) stamped an 'indelible impress on Scotland' by the power of his word, by his own deep devotion, and by the earnest pursuit of personal holiness. He emerges from the pages of the book as a man whose heart was touched by the Spirit of God, a man who preached not only doctrine but above all Christ.

From the introduction we learn that Robert Murray M'Cheyne and the writer of his biography, Andrew Bonar, were both born in Edinburgh and after an education at the High School and University entered the Divinity Hall in 1831. Far from spending their hours in idleness, they worked hard at their studies without allowing these studies to absorb their whole attention and interests. Although there is no reason to assume that the breezy laugh was unnatural to them, the key-note of their life was *ora et labora.* One example by way of illustration may suffice.

Every Saturday morning they met with a few other students at half past six in the morning for Bible study; together they sought out the spiritually needy in the poor quarters of the city, and it was their constant aim to live under all circumstances a life near to Christ.

In the autumn of 1866 M'Cheyne was called to the pastorate of St. Peter's, Dundee, and it was in this city that, with the exception of a six months' absence— when he went with three other Church of Scotland ministers to Palestine to explore the possibilities of missionary work— the scene of his short ministry was laid. The breath of the religious revival was then pervading the air of Scotland, and M'Cheyne, constrained by the love of Jesus and a presentiment that his life was short, began with great moral earnest to impress on the hearts of the large audiences which were flocking round him 'the things of the human heart and the things of the Divine Mind', exhorting those that were sleeping to awake and arise from the dead, to walk in the faith of the Lord and the comfort of the Holy Ghost. His work was not in

vain, there were marks of the Spirit everywhere and many souls were saved. Of him it may be truly said that the zeal of the Lord's house has eaten him up. He was night and day engaged with this flock in St. Peter's, but he also stood in the open air in the Meadows at Dundee "setting life and death before them".

No inclemency of the weather could deter the preacher or his hearers. While the rain was falling heavily the dense crowd stood still to the last. The effect of his preaching, whether in the church or in the open air was one of rich blessing to the congregation, to those who live on the fringe of the church as well as to many unchurched people. But it cannot be denied that in his zeal to bind the Word of God on the consciences of his hearers, certain primitive emotions were aroused which resulted sometimes in an excess of religious ecstasy, not to say religious derailment. In this respect M'Cheyne's methods did not differ from those of the great revivalists before him. There is a tendency to push some statements to their harshest forms. The evangelistically minded preacher of today, it must be admitted, anxious to win souls for Christ and lightly going over the hopelessness of the sinner's condition and the unchangeable justice of God, too easily holds up to his hearers God's mercy as rejoicing against His judgment. But M'Cheyne falls into the other extreme. Coming to Christ is to him associated with "a recognition of the complete righteousness and justice of God, that could do nothing else with us but condemn us utterly, and thrust us down to lowest hell, a feeling that, even in hell we *should rejoice* in his sovereignty, and say that all was rightly done." (p. 25).

Such statements, and there are many of this kind in the book, are one-sided, speculative and contrary to the general character of the Bible as God's revelation of man's salvation. It is hard to believe that God can be glorified in the case of the woman (p. 144) who to the question whether she would like to be holy, replied: "Indeed, I often wish I were dead that I might sin no more", or in that of the 'awakened' man on whom the piercing effects of the word preached resulted in the remark that "hell would be some relief from an angry God" (p. 160).

Again and again we hear of people who are so bowed down under a sense of their guilt that they are crying aloud or sobbing piteously (pp. 145, 147, 148, 150, 156, 157 etc.). One wonders whether the light of the triumph of God's grace ever falls into the hearts of such desperate sinners.

Or is Paradise lost still a stronger argument than Paradise regained?

These remarks are not meant to suggest that Mr. M'Cheyne did not bring to his hearers the complete gospel of God's gracious purpose with man as well as the human obligations to Him; but personal religious experiences or despondencies, however appalling they may be, should never blur our view on the absolute reality of God's promises, scattered all over his Word from Genesis to the Revelations, and their fulfilment to every one who puts his trust in the Mediator between God and men, our Saviour Jesus Christ. By looking at it in that light the gospel will become 'the power of God to salvation', and there is no grimness or sentimentality in that.

On his return home from Palestine Mr. M'Cheyne's health, which had

long given rise to grave anxiety, completely broke down, just before he reached Smyrna. He really believed that his Master had called him home, "but", he says later on — and then follows the finest personal witness man can give — "I had no fear to die, for Christ had died."

Is not this the full gospel in ten words? There are numerous observations of a similar kind, fitly spoken and delighting the reader: apples of gold in pictures of silver. "Never see the face of man till you have seen his face who is our life, our all" (p. 37). The grace of God can also make a lad wise in his studies and "a ray of Divine light in the soul sometimes clears up a mathematical problem wonderfully." (p. 37). He knows that his life is in the hands of his Father in Heaven, "who is all love to me not for what I am in my self, but for the beauty he sees in Immanuel." (p. 107).

It comes a little as a surprise to read that the scholar M'Cheyne, of whom we learn that at the age of *four* he selected as his recreation the study of the Greek alphabet and was able to name and write all the letters, and in whom the poetic temperament found utterance during the last year of his attendance at the High School in a poetic composition characterized chiefly by enthusiasm for liberty and Grecian heroism, should regard the value of classical studies with such absolute disfavour. To a young student he wrote: "Beware of the atmosphere of the classics. It is pernicious indeed; and you need much of the south wind breathing over the Scriptures to counteract it. True, we ought to know them; but only as chemists handle poisons— to discover their qualities, not to infect their blood with them." (p. 37).

This exclusively negative estimate of the classical studies does not do proper justice to the historical and cultural role they have played and still play in the long pilgrimage of mankind.. Of course, the humanism of antiquity and Christianity admit of no synthesis; they can never be accepted as partners. But let us not forget, says Calvin that "in reading profane authors the admirable light of truth displayed in them should remind us that the human mind, however much fallen and perverted from its original integrity is still adorned and invested with admirable gifts from its Creator. And moreover, let us not forget that there are most excellent blessings which the Divine Spirit dispenses to whom He will for the common benefit of mankind." [1]).

In the early half of the nineteenth century such terms as ecumenicity, ecumenical movement and all that they stand for today, were quite unknown, but when in 1841 the General Assembly repealed the statute of 1799 forbidding i.a. the admission to the pulpit of ministers of other churches, Mr. M'Cheyne immediately embraced the opportunity of showing his desire for unity, scriptural unity, that is, by inviting two dissenting ministers to the pulpit. He had to defend his conduct when attacked for it but in his diary he wrote almost triumphantly: "How sweet are the smallest approximations to unity." (p. 162).

In the relation between the State and the Church he was for complete independence for the latter in regu-

---

[1]) *Institutions* 11, 2, 15. See also A. Sizoo's article *Why classics and how to judge them*, Free University Quarterly, Vol. VII. No 4-March 1961.

lating all spiritual matters. When in 1843, shortly before his death, in prospect of the Disruption of the Church of Scotland, the cause of the Church was finally to be pleaded at the bar of the House of Commons, he was found writing "Eventful night this is in the British Parliament! Once more King Jesus stands at an earthly tribunal, and they know him not!"

On the 13th of March, after a meeting in St. Peter's with the view of preparing his people for the inevitable disruption, he felt chilled and unwell. There followed a sick-bed of twelve days; then came the end. In his life he had exemplified his own remark that the oil of the lamp in the temple should burn away in giving light.

The publishers of the life of M'Cheyne have a claim to our gratitude for bringing his biography and the atmosphere of his days within easy reach of the general public. Will it appeal to the modern reader and to the modern mind? It is hardly to be expected that the book will become a best seller, numerically, but if it were to win sinners for Christ, it would fully deserve this distinction.

H. SCHREUDER

THEOLOGY AND MISSION

BY

J. H. BAVINCK *

When about thirty years ago the famous Swiss theologian Karl Barth wrote his study on the relationship between missionwork and theology, he compared theology with a fellowworker, a companion who does nothing but asking questions. "Are you on the right track?" "Is that what you are doing now, quite correct?" In a certain sense theology may be called the great criticizer, who follows the missionary to the field and never ceases to interfere with his work. No wonder that many missionaries felt a certain bias against theology, they did not like to be disturbed by all those nauseating problems with which theology confronted them. They wanted to work, to preach the gospel and nothing more. They preferred to be left alone and to accomplish the work they had chosen as their life-task. And yet theology refused to leave them alone, it was never possible wholly to get rid of her. She is indeed the permanent companion of every missionary activity. Yes, that is a nice word: companion. It seems literally to mean somebody who eats from the same bread from which I am eating. That is what theology does: she eats from the same bread as mission, but she does it in a different way.

It cannot be denied that theology had clear and warranted reasons to follow the missionary to the missionfield. She saw or at least she presumed that missionary activity always presupposes a certain theological outlook. Missionary activity is not as innocent as it may seem, unwittingly the missionary takes theological decisions, decisions behind which theological conceptions are concealed. He himself is not aware of that, he is actively busy, but his whole attitude in the missionfield, his whole approach, the way he is preaching is rooted in theology, in his own, personal theological conviction. Therefore it is quite correct when theology every now and then interrupts him and begins to ask questions. To love the Lord and to obey him is

* Prof. Dr. J. H. Bavinck lectures in the Faculty of Theology of the Free University.

not only a matter of doing things, but it demands from us to do things in the right way, so as they need to be done. That is why missionwork never is allowed to divorce her helpmate, to sever the ties with her companion. Theology and mission belong together and the moment of this truth is becoming very conspicuous in our own days, in the tensions and confusions with which we have to wrestle. Theology now has to show us, what we can do and how we have to do it, she can be our guide in the mist and the darkness of our present era.

As soon as we ask what theology can achieve in this situation, one point immediately comes to the fore. Theology can tell us what missionwork essentially is.

The essence of missionwork.

It is a striking fact that the Church of the first centuries never paid much attention to the question of the motives of her missionwork. In the religious literature of those days only very seldom is referred to the last command of the Lord. This very old Church did missionwork out of a certain internal, spiritual necessity. That is what St Paul also proclaims: "Necessity (anagke) is laid upon me." (1 Cor. 9 : 16, 17). It is a matter of course that time and again the Church of the first centuries had to defend her missionary attitude. In those cases she was usually inclined to point out that she displayed her missionary activity for no other reason but that of sincere compassion with the needs of the world. In his interesting discussion with his opponent Celsus the Church-father Origen concedes that the Church likes it to gather the poor and the wicked people, the same persons, he acknowledges, who would have been chosen by the chief of a group gangsters. But, he adds, the Church seeks these people for an entirely different reason, she wants to heal them and to help them. In one of his sermons this same Church-father says: "Come now to Jesus Christ, our heavenly physician, enter into this his hospital the Church."

A second connotation of the missionary consciousness of the ancient Church was the belief that the day of the second coming of the Lord was at hand. That eschatological feeling appeared to be a very stimulating factor in missionary activities. It entailed a feeling of absolute certainty which here and there almost resembles an attitude of pride. Those Christians of the first centuries did not hesitate to call themselves a new people, "the third genus" ("triton genos"). The

Jews had been the first genus, the pagans the second, the Christian Church was the third, the very culmination-point of world-history. One of the first apologists of the Christian faith ventures to say: "This world exists only for the sake of the prayers of the Christians." (Aristides). And another apologist says: "The Christians hold this world together." (Epistle to Diognetus). This complete lack of inferiority-feelings was one of the most powerful strongholds of this early Church.

But, although all these ideas are mentioned in the literature of those days, they can hardly be called motives. Motives begin to come to the fore in later periods of the history of the Church. And then it appears that these motives at the same time more or less determine the whole method of working.

Various motives have played a part in the history of missions. Missionaries of the Iro-Scottish Church of the 6th and 7th century sometimes called themselves "peregrini propter Christum" (pilgrims for Christ's sake). Their missionwork was an ascetic act, they felt that in their own environment they were living in the permanent temptation of an abundant and selfish life, the missionfield was the school where a Christian through hardships and disappointments can learn to become a real disciple of the crucified Lord. This ascetic missionary motive is a motive of a strictly personal character. God alone knows how many men and women have gone to the missionfield out of a strong desire to escape from the dangerous aspects of the life in the homeland. In our own days this desire is still here and there visible. I am thinking now of Albert Schweitzer, who in one of his books says that the Church in the Western countries resembles an army which has suffered a severe defeat, and which must try to become sturdy and resolute again. There is a penitentiary note in his missionary outlook.

In other periods the eschatological motive got a very heavy accent. Then with an overwhelming strength the idea began to awake that we are living in the last days and that we have to work in a great hurry, in order to gather the sheep for the Lamb. The history of missions shows us how every now and then new motives seem to catch the heart of the Church and to stimulate her to go to the missionfields.

But of all these missionary motives none has exerted a greater and more lasting influence than the idea of the Corpus Christianum, i.e. the idea of the necessity not only of the gospel but also of the

cultural garment with which the gospel is clothed in our own civilization. It is obvious that the missionary activity of the Church has been a very important chapter in the history of culture. This missionary activity almost always implied the strenuous endeavour to propagate the cultural heritage of the missionary and all its implements.

This motive began to get power since the days of Constantine the Great. The Church of those days began to become a political and cultural power. Apparently it was the heir of the Roman empire and it had occupied the glory and the richness of that empire and had incorporated it in the life of the Church. In the impressive Cathedral, the St Peter in Rome, we see the clear proof of this victorious attitude. Statues and pillars of old Roman temples are integrated in the Church, they are Christ's prey. The new Rome, the see of the vicar of Christ, the eternal city, has laid her hands upon the treasures, which the old Rome, the pagan Rome, had conquered. In that context it is a matter of course that missionwork is much more than the spread of the gospel, it is by its very nature at the same time the serious effort to make the savage world civilized and to subjugate her to the Roman empire, and to the pope. That means that from that moment on missionary work began to be a very complicated whole, in which a multitude of factors were involved.

In the first place it is noteworthy that there may enter a political element in missionwork. This political element was already present in the Middle-ages and it was also a stimulating power in the time of the rise of the colonial empires. Spain and Portugal, later Great Britain and the Netherlands were colonial powers, they discovered and subjected remote parts of the world, but they did it not only for their own sake. Time and again they proclaim that their final intention is to create a new community in which the gospel of Jesus Christ can be spread, and in which Christian civilization can be cultivated.

We would not be sinful creatures if this idea, which was lying on the background of the endeavour to build colonial empires, was not frequently abused. The propagation of our Christian civilization not seldom was the pretended aim, but in fact entirely different goals were strived after. Missions and colonialism were knitted together and this too intimate connection has in the long run proved to be dangerous, in every respect.

A second element was the cultural factor in missionwork. Those other peoples, the tribes of Africa and the peoples of Eastern Asia were regarded as uncivilized peoples, as savages, who needed to be

educated by us. The missionary was aware of the fact that alongside of his missionary activities he had to bring our own, christian civilization to those childish, underdeveloped nations. He had to build a school, he gave medical help, he gave instructions about hygiene and everything. That was part of his task. It belonged to the essence of our missionary calling.

This whole idea was very vigorous in those days when people really still believed in the Christian character of our civilization. Since the two worldwars serious doubt has risen whether this conception is warranted. Is our own civilization really a Christian culture? Our contacts with other peoples have shown that our science and technique, our economic attitude, the stress we are putting on prosperity and the external blessings of life, may have a hazardous effect upon the lives of other peoples. It more and more became clear, that there are demonic, devastating powers in our civilization and it is by no means an easy task to detect them and to conquer them.

A third element which is implied in that complicated conception, is that it emphasizes the deed-element in our missionary work. Missionwork is the spread of the gospel, yes, that it is, but it is much more, it is above all a permanent doing of things of which we expect that they are helpful for the creation of a better social and economic life. Every aspect of life has to be drawn in our missionary outlook. Our whole approach has to be really comprehensive, we are not allowed to neglect any part of the life of those to whom we try to communicate the message.

And that is missionary work as it has got shape in the life of the Church. It is true, every now and then there have been missionaries who with great earnestness proclaimed that this whole conception of the missionary task was wrong. I remind you of the various books, which have been published by Roland Allan and other missiologists. And yet the practice of our missionwork stayed what it has been for decades already.

It is on this point that theology comes in and she begins to ask questions. Are you correct in assuming that missionwork is such a complicated business? Don't you lay too much emphasis upon elements which have only a secondary importance?

As soon as we try to fathom the conception of the missionary task, we begin to see, that at the bottom of pure missionary practice lies a very peculiar conception of the Kingdom of heaven and its relatedness to the Church. The Kingdom, that almost always forgotten chapter

of doctrinal theology, that is one of the most dominant ideas when we are dealing with missions. A theology of missions has to find its starting point in a thorough and warranted consideration of what the Bible teaches us about the Kingdom of God. Apparently our missionwork has from the very beginning been guided by the vague inkling that the final object of our work was the spread of the Kingdom. That is why it had so many aspects, and why ith could not leave political and cultural factors out of sight. The missionary has felt himself obliged to lay, in the name of the Lord, his hands upon every aspect of life, the social as well as the cultural, the collective as well as the individual aspects. Therefore he could never confine himself to preaching, he had at the same time something to do, the whole approach had to be comprehensive from the beginning.

When we investigate what the O.T. is saying about the future of the nations, it strikes us, that there only very rarely is spoken of a missionary task of the Church. The idea of the coming Kingdom of the Lord, with its immense blessing of "sjalom" (peace) is by far the most dominant factor in it. The O.T. shows clearly that this world, in which we are living is a very strange world, a topsy-turvy-world, in which the glory of the Lord sometimes seems to be absolutely absent. The powers of the nations, that immense darkness of human accomplishments overshadows the greatness of Him, who seems to be seated upon his heavenly throne as an impotent monarch. This world does not seem to be what she essentially is, everything seems to be distorted and deprived of its original beauty. That is why time and again in the O.T. are found those profound complaints about the face of Yahveh, which is hidden, about his arm and his hand which are far away and do not show their vigor and glory. (Is. 63 : 11; 64 : 1). But Israel had one very peculiar thing, it lived in the trustful certainty that there would come a Day, the Day of Yahveh when the mist and the darkness would be blown away and the majesty of the Lord would appear to all the nations. And that would be the day of the Kingdom.

This same idea is the background of the message of the N.T. The curtain of darkness is not uplifted yet, it is still there and on the mountain of Golgotha it is there in a suffocating strength. But there is more already. There also is the knowledge that the Kingdom is already at hand and that the times had been fulfilled. The epiphany, the appearance of the Lord has already taken place. (2 Tim. 1 : 10; 4 : 1). In the resurrection the dawn of the great Day is already visible and present in the midst of this embarrassing world. That is why we

can say that we are living in "the last days", as Peter said in his address on Pentecost. It is true, the beaming glory of that great Day can not yet be made concrete and can not yet overcome the fierce and cruel armies of the evil one. In some of his parables Jesus clearly shows the reason of this impossibility. I am thinking now of the parable of the unjust husband (Matth. 21 : 33—44): the Kingdom is still to be given to "another people". I am thinking of the parable of the great feast (Luke 14 : 15—24; Matth. 22 : 1—14): those who had been invited do not come and therefore other people have to be called. "All things are ready", and yet the feast cannot yet begin. And I am thinking of the parable of the talents and the pounds: the Church has still an immense task to do.

This whole idea clearly reveals that we are now living in a very remarkable era. The curtain has already been lifted and there are already signs of the new Day, and yet the great, mysterious ruler of this era is still very powerful. We are living between the „already" and the „not-yet", and this basic truth determines the character of our missionwork. It is very enlightening how this idea plays a part in St Paul's thinking. In his epistles we find that intriguing shift from the perfect time to the future. See Col. 3 : 9—Eph. 4 : 22; Rom. 6 : 4—Eph. 2 : 5, 6.

If this is true, than there are various important points with regard to our missionary task, which come to the fore.

1) It is clear that it is not possible just to preach the gospel. The preaching of the gospel always necessarily implies certain kingdom-elements. There is always in that preaching something of a glorious announcement that we are "new Creations", and that "the old has passed away, behold, the new has come." (2 Cor. 5 : 17) St Paul once describes the final aim of missionwork in these solemn words, that God is going "to unite all things — our agriculture and our medical help and our social relationships and everything — in Him, things in heaven and things on earth." (Eph. 1 : 10). Indeed, God is making for a new and better world and in that immense work of God we are "his hands".

2) On the other hand, we are not entitled to treat Western civilization with its immense possiblities as if it were identical with the blessing of the Kingdom. Western civilization has indeed certain rescuing and very helpful elements in it, but it is a complex whole and nobody, who has really made an attempt to assess the impact of this civilization, can do as if it is worthy to be regarded as a fruit

of the Kingdom. In its science and technical accomplishments it is inclined to forget about God, to leave God out of the picture. That means that missionwork necessarily involves a very critical evaluation of the various features in Western civilization in the light of the gospel. Arithmetic and science have a certain place in the gospel, but it is not easy to find out where and in which form they come in.

3) The history of missions has shown, that we are always in danger either to overemphasize the "already" or to lay too much stress upon the "not yet". If we are doing the first, we forget that the whole of life, "al things" are to be united "in Him". If these last words are left out, the whole thing is distorted. In that case we act as if this world, this modern world with all its gadgets and facilities is the world which God had in his mind as his final goal. On the other hand, when we overemphasize the "not-yet" we are in danger to do work in an eschatological hurry, without paying sufficient attention to the fact that the new day has already begun and that the whole of life has to be put under the renewing power of the victorious Christ.

Therefore, we can go to the missionfield, we can build hospitals and schools, we can teach those peoples everything, but we should do all these things in the strong desire to "unite all things in Christ." And we have to make it perfectly clear that this is nothing but a beginning, that the real thing is still behind the horizon of our capacities, but that God himself will take care of that in that Day when He will show his majesty.

CONSERVATISM AND PROGRESSIVENESS IN MANAGEMENT

BY

H. THIERRY *

In the following I will try to describe to you a business manager of the old type, as was to be met with some 25 or 50 years ago and who is even at the present day not yet extinct. He is the leader of a generally small business; not only the leader, however, but also the owner (a fact that he is fully aware of). With legitimate pride he looks back on the business which he has made prosperous and great by working hard through good and bad years.

He is aware of his capacities as a leader. You can't be trained for that and for this reason he is somewhat sceptical about "book learning". Leadership is especially founded upon experience and intuition. Leaders are born, not made. You must have it "in you".

His position also entails that, being the owner, he aims at more or less absolute authority. That's why he also demands strict obedience to his orders. What in his eyes is best for the business, has got to be done. As a rule he does not think fit to consult the "ordinary worker" about changes that are to be introduced. This consultation is held with the senior members of the staff, who for instance are invited to call upon the Director on a Sunday afternoon and are rewarded with a meal.

But at the same time he also treats his men well. He is greeted respectfully (read: submissively: hats off!). He knows his subordinates personally. In case of serious illness he will go and see them and has strengthening food sent to them. If necessary, he will occasionally leave a banknote. Sometimes he cannot help feeling that he is not such a bad Christian after all.

However, the staff must not meddle with things that are not their business. They get their wages and perhaps something extra at

* Prof. Dr. H. Thierry lectures in the Faculty of Economics of the Free University.

Christmas, but they are kept in the dark about the progress of the operations of the concern. If they were to inquire about the extent of the profits with a view to a rise in wages, he would perhaps get into a temper. Moreover, in the concern there prevails a certain atmosphere of mystery. Many things are considered trade secrets not to be revealed inside or outside the business.

When his people loyally served him for many years, he won't leave them out in the cold in their old age. They will get a small pension — though he is of course under no obligation to do so — for which they have to be thankful — and naturally only when finances permit.

I emphasize that this picture is not meant to be a caricature. I may have over-stressed a few points here and there.

What strikes one in this leader of the old stamp?

- The leader is the owner and furnisher of capital. He derives his authority from his ownership.
- Leaders are born, not made. A training, also a University training, only has a relative value.
- Leadership is making followers obey. Hence leadership mainly means domination, the exercise of authority.
- The leader knows most subordinates personally. The number of workers and the numbers of hierarchic levels is not great.
- The subordinates are on the whole not consulted in framing the business policy of the concern. They do not participate, not in the sense of receiving a share in the profits, but in the spiritual participation in certain activities.
- A certain amount of secrecy is maintained, not seldom a camouflage for arbitrariness or for matters that are not quite what they should be.
- The best among these leaders often assume a patriarchal attitude. I have some hesitation in condemning it, because it sometimes has been considered an attitude characteristic of the Christian employer. The question is whether it is correct. There is often an element in it of condescension, bringing oneself down from a higher to a lower level. What fits into this attitude is charity, not an admission of rights. In the same way relief fits into it rather than insurance.

Are we now to condemn such an old-style business manager and shake our heads in disapproval? Is this now conservative?

It is not. A thing is not wrong, conservative, because it is old, no

more than it is good, progressive, because it is modern.. The above-sketched pattern of thought and behaviour was understandable 25 or 50 years ago in connection with trade, industry and society, and the views prevailing in those days. Many employers meant well, although their attitude was perhaps not so christianlike as (at least outside the church) they may have thought.

The matter becomes more serious if the above view of leadership should occur unchanged at the present day, in the year 1961. Great changes have taken place in the scientific views on business management and in the structure of industry and society.

The old-fashioned manager will only become a „conservative" manager when he is ignoring these changes and the possibly meaningful progressiveness manifested in it.

Before entering more fully into these changes, a few observations must be made, naturally incomplete, about this conservatism.

In general conservatism, especially in the political sphere, is an attitude which has more faith in existing conditions than in a change which has been proposed or is being accomplished.

It may be based merely on a desire to keep things as they are or on the interest one has in preserving the existing situation. By the change one feels oneself menaced in one's spiritual or material existence. It may also be founded upon a definite view concerning the value of what has historically grown or the social function of man. I will not enter into this further. I will restrict myself to a few remarks of a psychological nature which would seem to me to be of importance for my subject.

Conservatism often proceeds from a lack of openness, from having so to say been drilled. It is not only dogs that can be trained! This is frequently attended with an inadequate adaptiveness, which is undesirable, particularly in the case of dynamic business relations.

The reality is always seen through more or less coloured spectacles (tendentious apperception). The reality is observed and interpreted tendentiously and selectively. The conservative man does not wish to change the view thus obtained and hence he debars himself also from meaningful changes.

Psychologically conservatism is often based upon definite drills, i.e. on opinions, patterns of behaviour, habits, which are the deposits of the tendentious apperceptions just mentioned. The intention is to preserve, from whatever motive, a definite image desired by the conservative person, of reality. Usually certain affects are connected with it, which

appears from the strongly emotional reaction when these opinions are opposed.

Thus the conservative man may hold definite, "established" views, opinions on the business, the management, the position of the owner, the position of the worker and the manner in which he has to behave. And — this is the important thing — he shuts himself off from another viewpoint which is more in agreement with scientific or social developments or with changed relations in general.

It should not be thought that conservatism is mainly found outside student life. Perhaps there is not a community more conservative than that of students. It always runs the risk of making a "liturgy" of meaningless forms, fossilized traditions, practices suited to a by-gone social structure.

Progressiveness does not mean following straight away all that is "modern" (progressiveness implies gradual development). Progressiveness requires open-mindedness to that which changes in science, in industrial relations, etc. so as to distinguish in it that which is meaningful and of real value.

Open-mindedness alone is not sufficient, it must be attended with reverence (at the end of this essay I hope to revert to this). Reverence for a living, meaningful tradition and for valuable and meaningful progressiveness.

Herein lies the connection between conservatism and progressiveness. It is perhaps better to speak here of integration. Only thus we can reach real maturity. One who is practically exclusively conservative or practically exclusively progressive gives the impression of immaturity.

In the progressive attitude, however, all-important, essential things are in question. What is, for instance, involved in business management is: the views held about man and his part played in production; man and his response in all manner of business relationships or the connection between productivity and human relations.

An example of the struggle between conservatism and progressiveness is found in the life of Frederick Winslow Taylor, the "Father of scientific management".

He is a much-abused, little understood, in many respects tragic figure. His zest for work, his courageous fight for his new ideas to which his social conscience impelled him, roused among both employers and workers much opposition, which his inborn kind-heartedness and aversion to quarrel and discord could hardly bear. The fact that he

made numerous tactical mistakes can easily be explained. In the last years of his life he was probably a tormented and disillusioned man.

The application of his ideas would in his own opinion necessitate a spiritual revolution. Neither employers nor workers were willing to accept this. That Taylor roused strong feeling among his opponents, is evident from the wilfully one-sided misrepresentation of Taylor's ideas, their unfair reflections on these views and their unfair opposition of them.

He antagonized the employes among other things by:

- his war against "soldiering", i.e. the systematic restriction of production by the workers;
- his wage-system, based upon scientific timestudy, which implied a strong stimulus to achievement.

He became the butt of bitter attacks by the "American Federation of Labour", which cast suspicion on him and accused him of slave-hunting and of being an enemy of the ideals of the workers. By this they did Taylor wrong, and it is right that also non-economists should see this, for such views are rather wide-spread, even at the present time. What they overlooked was that Taylor

- wished to further co-operation to attain a common aim;
- wanted productivity to be raised so as to come to higher wages;
- considered the "techniques" to be of secondary importance (the tragedy is that it is exactly these that have been most adopted);
- likewise saw the character-building of chiefs and of subordinates as a common object.

He also roused the opposition of the entrepreneur:

- by openly declaring that they could exercise a much better leadership;
- because he wished to replace or supplement experience and intuition by scientific research;
- by insisting on a fair, even high remuneration of labour (the employers who were too greedy to meet these obligations he simply called "blackguards");
- by the stress laid by him on the co-operation of employers and workers.

They ignored the different mental attitude which Taylor thought necessary and the improvement of the industrial climate which could be the result of a complete realization of his ideas. They were willing

to accept the raising of productivity and the reduction of cost, but without accepting the necessary conditions. That this was bound to result in failure must be clear.

In spite of all opposition the idea of scientific management is now spread throughout the industrial world.

What are the changes that have taken place or are taking place, which are of essential influence on the character of business management and the manner in which it is exercised?

1. Enterprises and concerns have become larger and more complicated.

- The number of employees has strongly increased. The question suggests itself in how far automation brings an opposite tendency with it. So much is certain that automation has its repercussion upon business management. The progressive manager will have to have an open eye for it.
- The importance and influence of the expert has increased. The specialist for market research, labour analysis, problems of personnel, the industrial psychologist and sociologist are obtaining more and more influence in modern enterprise.
- The immediate contact between leader and performer is largely lost. Between top management and performance a series of specialized and differentiated functions is developing, ("middle management"). This makes communication within the enterprise a difficult problem.
- It need hardly be stated that all this has made relations more impersonal.
- It will be clear that this makes it difficult to preserve the unity of direction. This problem cannot be solved by domination, but by integration.

2. The leader-owner of the enterprise is more and more replaced by the "manager".

It is difficult to give a definition of a manager. He is the actually responsible leader performing the "administrative" function of Fayol (prévoir, organiser, commander, coördonner, controler). A number of factors contribute to this change.

- The rise of the public Limited Liability Company brings with it
- the separation between the furnisher of capital and the leader. This has gone so far already that many no longer speak of

"capital" and labour, but of "management" and labour or of the "manager" of capital and labour.

- The provider of capital becomes more and more estranged from the business, whereas the worker becomes more and more familiar with it, because he has a more important share in it. This entails not unimportant consequences for the responsibility.

3. The coming to the fore of the interest of the enterprise as such.
   - The interest of the enterprise is often different from or is sometimes even at variance with the interest of shareholders. We might mention for instance the desire of shareholders to receive a high dividend and on the other hand the need of financing the enterprise with the profits made.
   - Shareholders are more and more considered (also in legal circles) to be owners of the shares and no longer as owners of the enterprise.
4. (Re)discovery of man in industrial relationships.
   - The emancipated "ordinary workman" becomes a worker. He becomes conscious of his rights (now and then perhaps too little of his duties). This emancipated workman desires no charity or favours. He does not wish to receive relief, but looks upon social provisions as insurance.
   - Human relations in business prove to have an ever increasing importance for the results of production.

Under the influence of these changes the character of management and the views about the demands which modern management should satisfy, have changed, too.

The leaders, but the science of business economy as well, should be keenly alive to it. Unfortunately this is not nearly the case everywhere. In the larger enterprises there is as a rule more openness than in the smaller ones. The ranger — particularly for science — is clinging to definite thought drills.

I will consider only a few facets of the changes taking place in the domain of business management.

1. The methods of leadership have become more scientific and can be learned for a considerable part.

- Formerly leadership was based especially upon intuition and experience. At present research, scientific analysis and planning occupy a prominent position. It is clear that this involves the necessity of having a staff of experts as advisers.

- The training for leadership is taking an important place. It is saying something that about 1900 there was in America one university with a well-developed faculty for "business management". At present there are about 175 universities with such faculties. In business, too, more and more attention is given to the so-called "management development". Of late years the training for organisational experts has been taking an increasingly great place in the Netherlands as well, academically and post-academically.
  By the side of universities and colleges a number of institutions providing this training have come into existence.

2. There is a growing consciousness that leadership mainly consists in leading people, individuals.

- There is an increasing awareness of the importance of the interrelations, the interaction between individuals and between groups. Naturally the development of industrial psychology and industrial sociology has something to do with it.
- There is also a better understanding of the important rôle of the foreman in the production process and the difficult position he is often placed in. Although usually sprung from labour circles he finds himself on the side of the management. And if top management does not really support him, his position is often a difficult one.
- All this also means, that not only training, but also the necessity of education (that is continued schooling for life) is of great importance for industry. It is a matter of the total man as an indivisible unity. And with great emphasis the question may be asked: Who leads the leaders?
- All this shows the necessity of a well thought-out anthropology, if at least not everything will hang in the air. In this connection the important task of a Christian University will be obvious.

3. Leadership is not domination, but integration.

The object is not to impose one's will, but to find a synthesis on a higher level. A good organization, good communication, and good participation are needed. Above all it will be necessary for higher management to find time to maintain and to cultivate personal contact with their co-operators and sub-ordinates. This is of prime importance for the morale in the concern. An article could be written on each of these subjects. We will restrict ourselves to a few remarks with regard to participation.

By participation we mean taking part in, sharing and being consulted in the operations of the company. This should not be confused with the question of shared control. Nor should it be thought that it is directly concerned with the problem of co-decision.

a. We should make a difference between the process of decision-making and the final decision. This difference was less clear in business conditions as they existed formerly.

- The process of arriving at a decision is the most important. Most decisions are the result of the co-operation of a number of persons and groups. At all levels of the business hierarchy decisions are prepared and taken. There is consequently a relatively great number of responsible persons. The staff-specialist who has indeed only advisory power, in real fact often exercises a great influence on the decision.
- The question with whom rests power to decide is less important than is usually thought. Barring urgent cases the decision is often the end of a long process. The final decision will usually have to be taken by top management. About this there is little difference of opinion.

Where so many persons, interests, fields of knowledge and standpoints are concerned in the process of decision-making, the most important task of the management is co-ordination and integration.

b. In progressive business management the participation concept plays an important rôle.

Modern business management is seeking — and has actually found here and there — forms to make employees at every level participate more than used to be the case, in the decision-making process. I sometimes have the impression that outside industrial life less progress has been made in this respect. Broadly-speaking this can be realized in two ways.

- In the first place by discussions within the concern. Consultations take place in committees, study groups constituted horizontally and/or vertically and sometimes in problem groups. In several concerns in the Netherlands this has been realized.
- Another way may be more decentralisation so that a certain freedom may be granted to smaller units (departments) and the workers have a greater share in the responsibility for what is going on in the enterprise.

Elements of either method may naturally be combined. Here again

the preservation of unity of direction is one of the main problems (integrating task of management).

4. Is modern progressive business management slack, too lax ("soft")?

Is the enterprise a community in which love ought to be the predominating principle?

Here we are faced with fatal misconceptions!

- In business only few elements of a community are present. In a relatively slight degree it is a living-community; it is pre-eminently a community pursuing definite tasks. Let us beware of romanticizing business!
- The enterprise remains first of all an organisation. Essential elements are: realisation of objectives; hierarchy; authority and discipline.
- Next to the realisation of clearly defined objectives one of the most important conditions for a smooth working organization is the preparedness to serve.
- Dr. Chester Barnard, president of the Rockefeller Foundation, says in one of his books, that for a good organization three things are indispensable: a clear statement of its objectives; good communication and the willingness to serve. Is this "slack", "soft"? It means subordinating the private interests to the business interest. This is not such a simple matter.

In the foregoing we have found again and again that integration is the most important task of modern business management. It is obvious therefore, that we ask ourselves the question: what are the necessary conditions for this integration? I restrict myself to a few points.

- Adequate knowledge can hardly be dispensed with. This means in this case naturally professional knowledge in the widest sense of the word, specialized or non-specialized, at university level or a lower level. But it also — and certainly not in the last place — means: knowledge of men.
- In addition a sufficiently long and sufficiently digested and assimilated experience in the concern will be essential. Although leadership may be learned, experience, intuition and feeling will be necessary.
- Integration will have to originate from the acceptance of a spiri-

tual authority. Without it unity, harmony and integration are not very well possible.

- Indispensable also is — I say the word hesitatingly — the attitude of the disciple, the learner. The further elaboration of this point brings me to the close of my essay.

How can science, or rather, the man of science, and the modern business manager arrive at the proper and balanced attitude towards conservatism and progressiveness? This implies a true appreciation of what has historically grown and of a living, meaningful tradition, combined with an openness to meaningful progress.

It seems to me that one of the most important elements of it is the humble attitude of the disciple. It is characterized as well by trust as by reverence.

The attitude of reverence is of great importance for the scientific investigator, the student, the man of practice.

Reverence for what has been created brings a man into an attitude of openness to what God has to tell him in and through reality. This attitude of reverence, however, involves the whole personality of man. It will have to reveal itself in thought, feeling, volition.

As regards thought: man is naturally inclined to „undisciplined" (this concerns the disciple) thought. Here the attitude of reverence manifests itself in the attention and the interest which make a man open to marvelling at things being as they are.

In the sphere of emotional life, that is consequently the field of the reactions to events and happenings, there is likewise the inclination to undisciplined reaction. The attitude of reverence in this case will be meekness. What can this event, this situation, this man have to tell me?

In the domain of volition and action the attitude of reverence consists in the willingness to serve, as I mentioned already in the foregoing. This attitude of reverence cannot be realized, however, unless man in the three spheres mentioned, is prepared to give up his own wisdom (thought). his own worthiness (feeling) and his own will (volition).

This attitude of reverence, going hand in hand with trust, is the hallmark of the true learner, the true disciple. I may say now: the disciple of Jesus Christ, for it is in my opinion the only right attitude of the man of science and the business manager, to integrate conservatism and progressiveness into a consistent whole.

A NEW RESPONSIBILITY IN A SCIENTIFIC AGE

BY

R. HOOYKAAS *

The World Alliance of Young Men's Christian Associations organized a conference in Vienna, July 8-14, 1961, with the purpose of enabling YMCA-leaders from all parts of the world to take counsel together on the main concerns which should occupy the Movement during the next years. The theme of the conference was "New Horizons". The Standing Committee on Programme and Leadership invited me to introduce one of the four subjects (A New Responsibility in a Scientific Age), concentrating on the relations between modern science and the christian faith as developed in my address to the University Teachers' Conference on "Technology and Purpose in Higher Education", held at Oxford, April 2-9, 1959, under the auspices of the Education Department of the British Council of Churches. This lecture, which sought to answer the question "Can the Teaching of Science be put on a Christian Basis?", has since then been published for the Research Scientists' Christian Fellowship under the title "The Christian Approach in Teaching Science" [1].

As a copy of this booklet had been sent by the organizing committee to all participants of the Vienna Conference, my lecture there could take the form of an elucidation and elaboration of some points of the earlier address. Consequently, the present article (which contains the slightly extended text of the lecture delivered in July 1961 in Vienna) should be considered as a sequel to that brochure.

1. *Science denounced*

Science and technology loom large in the admonitions of the modern prophets of disaster. The humanistic optimism, now and again, about the increase of scientific control of nature suddenly collapses and fear for its consequences creeps in. Shortly after the expansion of nuclear knowledge a technical paradise seemed near at hand, in which almost no work would have to be done. Life and thought would become completely renewed: a certain American professor even triumphantly declared that our ideas about God needed a complete revision in the light of the discoveries in nuclear physics. But next, man is frightened by the idols he has made by his own hands and mind; science and technology are seen as independent powers, threatening to crush our body and to dehumanize our spirit.

The majority of men may perhaps thoughtlessly go on to toy with

* Prof. Dr. R. Hooykaas teaches the History of Science in the Faculty of Science of the Free University.

[1] The Tyndale Press, 39 Bedford Square, London W.C. 1; 1960.

their TV's, motorcars and planes, among the more reflective kind of people a nostalgic longing is often felt for the good old days when no nuclear war lurked round the corner, when the deafening noise of the jet planes did not rend the air asunder and when the maddening traffic did not yet endanger the pedestrian's life. Then the buzzing of the bees, the chirping of the cricket and the whetting of the scythe was heard in the sunny fields of a mellow countryside, not yet blotted by advertisements; the noise of the towns consisted in the melodious clanging of hammers on anvils and horsehoofs on cobbles; the harbours were smelling of tar and pitch and they were full of gay clippers and schooners instead of tankers and destroyers. All was patriarchal and rural, calm and quiet, more natural and less artificial than it is now.

Of course this romantic picture is seen in the rosy colours that past events usually assume when compared with the colourless present: the adults too crave for fairy tales. Yet, though one may have some misgivings as to how the panegyrists of times gone by would appreciate sharing the rural life of a Spanish village not as tourists but as permanent residents, it cannot be denied that there is *some* truth in the denouncements of so many accusers of "modern times". The machine takes away from man a lot of drudgery and hard labour but — on the other hand — it brings many people into a more dependent state. More knowledge to preserve life inevitably gives more skill in destroying it. The improvement of the crop by fertilizers and insecticides leads to a disturbance of the proper balance in nature; the waste of factories (especially when radioactive) poisons rivers, lakes and fields. Too easily it is taken for granted that all the progress technology brings to the socalled underdeveloped countries and to rural areas in Europe makes people really more happy: it creates on the other hand new problems, e.g. that of overpopulation, and it uproots old cultures without giving new ones in their stead. Uncertainty and dissatisfaction often are the immediate results.

Technical development tends to make us uniform, and in the end it often seems to strengthen precisely those evils it purports to lessen. The emancipation of the individuals of all classes is sometimes considered as the prerogative of modern civilization over the ancient; we see, however, that in a technological society the health and duration of the human body may increase, but it enables a small group of oppressors to establish a collectivised state with possibilities to mould the thoughts and actions of its members in no less degree than a tribal community.

The enormous successes of scientific method had already seduced the late 18th century philosophers to extend it to other realms of life; if science could find strict laws predicting future events in nature, it must be able to do the same for the development of human society. Social, economical and historical phenomena were considered to be just as "natural" and just as much governed by inexorable laws as those of physics and biology. Statistical laws (of economics as well as crime and disease) were regarded by the positivistic engineers of the early 19th century as determining the inevitable situation of society. Since the middle of the 19th century the doctrine of biological evolution has been extended to social evolution. What politically inclined biologists deemed to be the right development of society was backed up by arguments borrowed from science. The scientific society of the future would be intolerant, as it was based on the allegedly *absolute* truth of science; people should be *forced* to live according to the dictates of the unchangeable and objective laws of nature or of history. Science was now the new gospel and everything had to be moulded according to the pattern of science, to work according to the methods of science, fully to become science. And today economics and sociology investigate human behaviour and enounce statistical laws dealing with individuals as if they were atoms, and indeed "human *material*" is a standard term in these disciplines. Social engineering is the fashion: towns, universities, economic policy are scientifically planned and in this huge machinery individual man is just a grain in a heap of sand. The expectation that we would be able to handle the new situation in a sovereign way, has proved a fallacy; we sometimes feel ourselves not the lieutenants of the God who created us, but the slaves of the god *we* created. The more power we have won over nature and human life, the more powerless we feel towards the Moloch we have made ourselves.

The novelists who write about the brave new world stress the dehumanizing and levelling influence of technological development. At the bottom of their horrible pictures of the future is not only the fear of the abuse of technological power, but also the dislike of the scientific attitude inherent in the romantic spirit which accuses the scientists of presenting a materialistic view of a soul-less world. A century ago already, one of the greatest Portuguese romantic authors, Almeida Garrett, exclaimed: "Oh generation of steam and dust, macadamize roads, construct railways and Icarus-birds in order to go faster through . . . a wholly material life; . . . reducing everything

to numbers . . . you made the life we live now so coarse and so different from that which God gave us . . .". „Modern Science is a great folly, and as such presumptuous and full of the pride of the ignorant" [2].

In the early 18th century Pope wrote his well-known epitaph of Newton: "Nature and Nature's laws lay hidden in night; God said "Let Newton be", and all was light", but at the end of that century the poet William Blake said: "the end of Epicurean or Newtonian philosophy . . . is atheism". The great villain, however, in the eyes of the romantic thinkers is Francis Bacon, the prophet of the Kingdom of Man, founded upon Science and Technology: "Bacon's philosophy has ruined England", "The great Bacon he is called; I call him the little Bacon . . . he says that Everything must be done by Experiment; his first principle is unbelief"; "Bacon's philosophy has destroyed Art and Science" (Blake).

Among modern authors the English scholar C. S. Lewis (of Screwtape fame) raised a vigorous protest against Baconian technology. "There is something which unites magic and applied science while separating both from the "wisdom" of earlier ages. For the wise men of old the cardinal problem has been how to conform the soul to reality, and the solution had been knowledge, self-discipline and virtue. For magic and applied science alike the problem is how to subdue reality to the wishes of men: the solution is "technique" ".

Here the difference is aptly expressed by this well-known christian apologist. The ancient "wisdom" of conforming to nature is praised, though this is a wisdom of the Stoics rather than of the Christians (professor Lewis himself refers in this connection to another pagan system, Tao, and to Goethe and Steiner's anthroposophy), whereas power over nature is condemned as hubris. In Prof. Lewis' opinion there is a striking similarity between Bacon, "the chief trumpeter of the new era", and Marlowe's Faust who said "a sound magician is a mighty god" and "all things that move between the quiet poles, shall be at his command". Bacon's true object, so Lewis says, is to extend Man's power to the performance of all things possible, and therefore modern science "was born in an unhealthy neighbourhood and at an inauspicious hour" [3].

From the above it becomes evident that not only humanists but also Christians condemn the modern technological and scientific movement inaugurated by such convinced Christians as Bacon and Newton.

---

[2] Almeida Garrett, Viagens na minha terra; capítulo III; Lisboa 1846.
[3] C. S. Lewis, The Abolition of Man, New York 1947, pp. 48—49.

Romanticism feels one with nature, (it even deifies nature), and when it protests against the idea of a godless mechanical universe, Christians are easily tempted to follow it.

But is this protest a *Christian* protest?

In order to answer this question we would start from the following two statements:

1°. *Christianity is co-responsible for the rise of modern science.*

2°. *Christianity is co-responsible for the rise of modern technology.*

This means that, consequently, science and technology being to a large extent fruits of christianity, the latter has a responsibility for their further development.

But is Christianity also to be held responsible for the evil elements that have been a consequence of the growth of science and technology?

Perhaps, in fact, many Christians have not sufficiently recognized the dangers inherent in this development of science — perhaps, on the other hand, they have recognized these dangers to an extent which caused them to withdraw from the struggle and let the world go to the devil. However this may be, after expounding in what way Science can degenerate into Scientism, we would lay down some further statements:

3°. *The abuses of modern science and technology are not essential to them, but they are consequences of a general tendency to idolatry in* a l l *men, christians as well as non-christians.*

4°. *The remedy, i.e. the restoration of the right attitude to science and technology may, in principle, be found in a truly* C h r i s t i a n t e a c h i n g *of these disciplines,* that is in a „free science", free from the prejudices of philosophical systems, and in a technology elaborated by men who are lords over nature in responsibility to God, and who are not the tools of their own tools.

2. *Christianity and the rise of modern science*[4]

Our conception of natural science depends on our view of the object of science, viz. "nature", nature including the whole of creation, even the human mind. Again, our conception of nature depends on

[4] Documentation of the points raised in the paragraphs 2, 3, and 4, may be found in some of our earlier publications, especially: *Robert Boyle,* Loosduinen (1943); *Rede en Ervaring in de Natuurwetenschap der XVIIIe eeuw.* Inaug address Free University 1946; *Pascal, his science and his religion.* Free Univ. Qu. 2 (1952), nr 2, pp. 106—137; *Science and Theology in the Middle Ages,* F.U.Q. 3 (1954), nr 2, pp. 77—163; *Theologie und Naturwissenschaft,* in: Der mathematische und naturwissenschaftliche Unterricht 9 (1956), H. 2, pp. 49—57; *Science and Refor-*

what is believed about the cause of nature, that is ultimately God or the gods, or whatever substitutes may have taken the place of God.

The Greek-Roman conception of nature was thoroughly pagan. By immanent forces out of Chaos, gods, men and animals sprang into being; „all things are full of Jupiter" says Vergil. Nature is a vast organism, self-supporting, self-generating and self-regenerating. Individuals may perish, but the species remain always. The Greeks have deified nature as an eternal self-generating rational god; their view of nature is *organic* as well as *rationalistic*.

The *organic* aspect implies the unchangeable character of nature: essentially there is no change, but an eternal repetitive cycle. Moreover, the organic aspect excludes the possibility that human hands will ever be able artificially to produce *natural compounds:* all things in nature are generated from similar things, of their own kind, and therefore man cannot make a natural compound in an artificial way.

The *rationalistic* aspect implies that the mind of man can decide beforehand what is possible or what is impossible in nature, e.g. there *cannot* be any change in heavenly bodies (as these are divine, immortal, unalterable), there cannot be but circular and uniform movements in heavenly bodies. That which is not comprehensible is hardly real and what is not logically necessary but contingent, is considered a defect in nature, hardly worth while to be studied.

According to the pagan prejudice Man not only *could* not do what nature does, but he *should* not do it either, as this would be a violation of divine prerogative, an intrusion into a domain the gods have reserved for themselves, an arrogant and impious hubris.

The deification of nature in pagan religion and Greek philosophy is the very contrast of the secularization of nature in the Bible. The God of Israel is no immanent principle but a personal Ruler, who creates the world out of nothing according to His own free will. Matter as well as design of the world are his "creatures"; they cannot exist for one moment apart from His will.

Genisis I teaches us that *all* things (even the main gods of the ancient Babylonians: sun and moon) are His works. The divine attri-

mation. J. World Hist. 3 (1956), nr 1, pp. 109—139 and 781—784; *Philosophia Libera, Christian Faith and the Freedom of Science.* London, The Tyndale Press, 1957; *Humanisme, Science et Réforme.* Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1958; *Natural Law and Divine Miracle,* a historical-critical study on the Principle of Uniformity in Geology, Biology and Theology. Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1959, and *„De Baconiaanse Traditie in de Natuurwetenschappen".* Algemeen Nederl. Tijdschr. v. Wijsbegeerte 53 (1961), pp. 181—201.

butes of incorruptibility and eternity belong to God alone. The central message of the Old Testament is a warning against idolatry and the New Testament again proclaims that "all things were made by Him". The Bible does not recognize a wholly or semi-independent nature; the powers of so-called nature have lost here their divine or demoniacal character. They are man's fellow-creatures, occupying even a lower place in the hierarchy of creation (Ps 8 : 4—7). Man is made the lord of the creatures (Gen. 1 : 26—28).

Whereas in the pagan world-view Man stands over against the gods and nature (as in the romantic picture he is standing over against God and Nature), in the christian conception God and Man as his fellow-worker, stand over against nature.

Modern science arose when the consequences of the biblical conception were fully accepted. In the 16th and 17th centuries science was led out of the blind alley into which it had got through the philosophy of Antiquity and the Middle Ages. New horizons were opened. The picture of the world as an organism was replaced by that of the world as a mechanism. It is not generated but *made;* it is not selfsupporting, but it needs maintenance.

This world picture, of course, is not borrowed from the Bible, but to a large extent it fits in with the biblical conception of a world wholly dependent on God. The innate final causes of the organic world-view are discarded; the only final cause is the design of the Creator. The so-called efficient causes, however, the immanent principles of activity which God is said to have laid into matter, are retained and this implies that the world machine possesses a kind of semi-independence. These efficient causes are the last remnant of a non-biblical view of nature. The early 18th century bishop George Berkeley, however, pointed out (like Malebranche before him) that science only describes the regular sequence of phenomena the impressions of which the only real Cause works in our mind: no thing exists in itself, but only through God's will; no thing works by its own force, but only through God's power; there is no efficiency in anything, God's will is the only efficient cause.

Similarly the Christian physicists of the 17th century, Pascal, Boyle and Newton, did not recognize an intrinsic necessity of physical events. In their opinion regularity of the sequence of events wholly depends on the will of God. Berkeley's philosophy of nature implies a continuous creation; he takes the apostolic words that Christ "upholds all

things by the word of His power" (Hebr. 1 : 3) in their fullest sense.

The 20th century physicist will recognize that Berkeley's views of the "laws of nature" and of "causes" are at the root of the positivist and empiricist approach of modern science, albeit in a secularized version (God is not mentioned as the only Cause, but the concept of cause has been abolished, either as a point of method, or dogmatically).

The biblical conception inevitably leads to a rational empiricism, which is fundamentally the modern scientific attitude. Man cannot fully understand God's free acts; he has to accept things as it pleased God to make them. Consequently, the contingency of nature is not a defect (as it was in the eyes of the Greek Platonists), but rather an addition, by which *creation* is more than mere manufacture. The world has been rationally created, and therefore we find order in it and Man, being made in the image of God, can understand something of it. But, as only the maker fully understands his own work, it is not fully perspicuous to human reason: man being made only in the *image* of God cannot *fully* understand God's work.

When modern science arose, then, it was closely allied with christianity in its basic thought.

Newton, in whom the empiristic scientific attitude found its highest triumph, wrote his "Principia" with a view to strengthening the belief in an ever-active Deity, and though in the course of the 18th century christian faith tended to be more and more overruled by "scientism", it should be borne in mind that even in the 19th century, when the antireligious bias of scientists was in its heydays, a large proportion of the outstanding scientists were believers. The five most eminent British physicists of that century according to the marxist writer J. G. Crowther, were Davy, Faraday, Joule, Kelvin and Maxwell, all of whom were devout Christians.

3. *Christianity and technology*

If we now direct our attention to technology, we see that in Antiquity technical progress was slow. According to Aristotle techniques had reached a final stage. The great Greek philosophers, Plato and Aristotle and also the Stoics, deemed manual labour inferior and therefore unworthy of a philosopher's attention. In the Middle Ages, on the contrary, there was greater technical progress, though man conquered nature with a not wholly good conscience. Remnants of pagan nature worship lingered on and it was considered impossible

and illicit to try to emulate the products of nature by means of art.

A new horizon was opened when Renaissance and Reformation inspired self-confidence in opposition to ancient authorities. The biblical assertion of the right to rule over the earth was taken in its full implication that to no part of the world the entrance was forbidden. In a courageous and enterprising spirit man now tackled the task of investigating nature unhindered by philosophical and theological authorities. Instead of the old "no farther" Bacon posited the "still further" of the new era, the epoch when man at last would accept his lawful heritage as son and fellow-worker of God.

Mankind lived an unprotected life, by far not so idyllic as the pessimistic prophets of our own time would make us believe. Disease and pestilence, war and famine, tempests and inundations, were considered almost irresistible "natural" disasters. Man was under the dominion of nature, of circumstances, of the stars. In Bacon's opinion, however, the Kingdom of Man over nature would be restored because Man humbly recognized that God was the Sovereign who made the world according to His will and not according to what seemed best to human fancy. The Idols must be renounced and the understanding thoroughly freed and cleansed, says Bacon, for "the entrance into the Kingdom of Man founded on the sciences is not much other than the entrance into the Kingdom of Heaven, whereinto none may enter except as a little child". Then the true knowledge of nature and also the power to direct her would be acquired, for "nature to be commanded must be obeyed". Then it would be possible to do things which had seemed impossible and magical to our forebears: the improvement of fruit and vegetables and cattle, the preparation of artificial metals and compounds, the change of climate, etc. In Bacon's opinion the new approach to nature and technology is not a purely human but a divinely inspired work: "The beginning is from God . . . the Father of Lights" (James 1 : 17).

Bacon does not want to awaken the lust of power of the magician or the hubris of the speculative philosopher; he does not want to be "a mighty god". On the contrary, he impresses upon his readers the necessity to alleviate the needs and sorrows of mankind, to invent machines to lighten the burden of labour, to find remedies against disease by chemical experiment, to ward off the menace of hunger by control of the growth of plants and making it less dependent on soil and climate. This Kingdom of Man is not opposite to the Kingdom of God, it is the consequence of it, as the second Table of the Law

is the necessary complement of the first: thou shalt love the Lord thy God and thy neighbour as thyself (Luke X : 27). It is the consequence of the law of charity, for charity is, according to Bacon, the "corrective spice" against the venom swelling our mind by proud knowledge, a "knowledge that bloweth up, whereas charity buildeth up". In apostolic language Bacon entreats his readers to fulfil the duty of love in conquering the afflictions of mankind, to abandon outworn beliefs and artificial despair and to join him in the crusade against superstition, disease and disasters: "If therefore there be any humility towards the Creator, any reverence for or disposition to magnify His works, any charity for man and anxiety to relieve his sorrows and necessities, any love of truth in nature, any hatred of darkness, any desire for the purification of the understanding, we must entreat men again and again to discard . . . these . . . preposterous philosophies, which have . . . led experience captive, and triumphed over the works of God; and to approach with humility and veneration to unroll the volume of Creation". And he concludes the preface of the Historia Naturalis et Experimentalis (3d part of the Instauratio Magna) with the wish: "May God, the Founder, Preserver, and Renewer of the universe, in His love and compassion to men, protect the work both in its ascent to His glory and in its descent to the good of Man, through His only Son, God with us".

Thus modern technology, that is technology closely connected with science, found its most eloquent advocate in a man, who placed it on a decidedly Christian basis and it is quite understandable that the Puritans of the Commonwealth, who expected to establish the Kingdom of God on earth saw Bacon's Kingdom of Man as an integral part of it. Comenius, Hartlieb, John Hall, Milton and others demanded not only political and ecclesiastical reform, but also reform of education and the introduction of the teaching of science in the universities as a part of the New Light that Christ would shed on the world. And later on the founders of the Royal Society as well as Christiaan Huygens, who made a plan for the Académie des Sciences, also openly declared that they accepted Bacon's heritage and started their work "to the glory of God and the benefit of mankind".

In a secularized version Bacon's ideals were taken over by the 18th century Enlightenment, which really believed that the Kingdom of Man had almost been fully established. The Kingdom of Man was now no longer considered a complement to the Kingdom of God but it became a substitute for it. Such a situation Bacon, in his

optimism, never foresaw, though another possible consequence of the triumph of science and technology presented itself to his mind. Would not mankind, when it had acquired the technical dominion over the world, misuse it "for wickedness, luxury and the like"? Bacon rightly answers that the same may be said of all earthly goods, of wit, strength, wealth and so on. Though this response justifies our continuing scientific research in spite of the abuses that may be connected with it, it does not justify his optimistic conclusion: "Only let the human race recover that right over nature which belongs to it by divine bequest, and let power be given it; the exercise thereof will be governed by sound reason and true religion".

If that were true, everything would be all right; we had only to found schools and churches. This expectation, however, has some affinity with the facile optimism shown by the 18th century Enlightenment, e.g. when Jan Ingenhousz said that "science mellows the hearts of men by teaching them" or when Lavoisier made an urgent appeal to the National Convention for better teaching of science in order to better humankind. And did not a Unesco-official, travelling through Holland, declare recently that by founding schools in Africa there would be no wars at least in that continent?

4. *The scientistic delusion*

We now come to our third point: the degeneration of science into scientism by which it becomes a tyrannical power instead of the servant of man. This often unconscious scientism of our time is an enemy within the gates, the fifth column undermining christian faith. Very often "nature" is confounded with the picture science has made of it. The world is full of colour and sound, but they have no place in the scientific world picture; the latter is a system of laws, rules, images and models. It is an abstraction from the world we know in our experience, but — this should be stressed — it is a *human* abstraction from a humanly experienced world. In this physical world picture, colours e.g. have been replaced first by wavelengths of a hypothetical colourless, tasteless, weightless "aether". Next, this aether lost its material character and became, according to the well-known physicist James Jeans, a "pure abstraction". Nevertheless, the mathematical formulas, the wavelengths, continue their useful function in physical science. It is no longer a matter for discussion whether light consists of particles or waves, we can think of it as either particles or waves

according to our mood and the convenience of the occasion, "we know all there is to be known about it if we have found a mathematical formula which accurately describes its behaviour".

Science, then, translates some aspects of reality into a special code, makes some manipulations on that level and finally translates the results thereof back into the language of the world of phenomena.

We should realize that physics cannot say more about a fugue of Bach than that it is a certain sequence of combinations of vibrations of the air of such and such frequency numbers, and about a picture of Rembrandt that it is a piece of linen of which so many square centimeters have been besmeared with an emulsion of mercuric sulphide in linseed oil and so many with an emulsion of basic lead carbonate, etc. In the world picture of physics aesthetical, or religious emotions have no place, however much this world picture may be related to religion and ethics. It is the physicist's task to find the rules of the sequence of phenomena; he has a passion for laws and if phenomena do not behave according to laws of physics, he will either revise the laws or critically reconsider his observations and experiments or disregard the phenomena as not being "physical". He who looks at the world through coloured spectacles, sees the world in a definite colour; the physicist, eager to discover law, cannot but discover law, for everything else is sifted out. As a physicist he does not consider anything as unpleasant, or beautiful. The scientist creates a mathematical world which gains in objectivity at the cost of immediate reality and life.

A sensible man will recognize all this, but even he is liable, in practice, to forget the limitations of the physical world picture, because he is so much engaged in building it. To many people beauty and love, ethics and religion become whimsical epiphenomena, which do not really count in their world view which is mainly shaped by science. Those who are the best part of their time occupied with a certain subject will look at everything from the point of view of that particular subject: a cattle breeder thinks the weather good when it makes the animals prosper, he considers *that* government good which furthers and protects his trade; he looks at physical, economical and political circumstances through cattlebreeder's spectacles. Similarly the physicist's habit to evaluate everything from the physical point of view may become a second nature before he realizes it. His custom of registering laws closes his mind to anything not fitting in with laws (sometimes even to anything not fitting in with the laws of a *false* system). His professional attitude of not admitting miracles

psychologically stuns his sense of the miraculous, as Darwin's lifelong custom of looking for laws made his mind, according to his own confession, a machine for grinding laws, incapable of enjoying a beautiful landscape or a good novel.

But not only to scientists science may become their religion. To those who have had no scientific education at all, and perhaps even more to those who are half-educated in science, the enormous successes of science and technology are there to prove the correctness of the "scientific" pretentions. Our life depends on technology (in the widest sense): the simple peasant in some remote district may believe that a good crop depends only on God who gives rain and sunshine in due time, the modern agriculturist attributes these to meteorological and geological, that is purely "natural" and therefore in principle scientifically predictable, causes; he only relies on proper tillage, drainage and the use of fertilizers and insecticides. Similarly, for our safety we seem to have more confidence in aeroplanes, rockets and A-bombs than in the Lord of Hosts, and for our health we rely only on a good medical and health service.

Of course, not only scientists, engineers and technicians, but everybody else too is imbibed with "what 's in the air". People read a vast amount of popular and semi-popular literature in connection with their job; in digests and weeklies, through radio, television and schools scientific information is presented in a way less critical than in purely scientific articles. One just gets "results" and conclusions in a dogmatic form, without critical discussion. These things unconsciously penetrate into current thought, which is really soaked with an extremely diluted version of scientific ideas.

As a rule even a religious physicist or technician will never give one moment's thought to God's activity in what happens in the physical laboratory or the mechanic's workshop, though he easily switches over to the faith of childhood when in church, where it is taken for granted that no hair falls from the head without the will of our heavenly Father. People who during 6 days adore Nature and Art, Science and Technology, relax on the 7th day and worship God, just like many African Christians and Mohammedans on some occasions revert to ancestor worship.

The enormous upheavals of the last quarter of a century have established a solidarity of the whole world. Asia and Africa more and more share the problems of Europe and America, and maybe these will even become more acute there in the near future. Modern

science is a European product; the European body has had ample time to form its own antitoxins against their misuse, although it must be admitted that the rapid growth of science and technology has not been met by an equally rapid development of these antidotes. Therefore we are fundamentally in the same predicament: we have to cope with the same problems of dehumanization, mechanization, disequilibrium. Let no European or American think that the difference is essential. Whereas the new and subtle scientific and technological idolatry penetrates Asia and Africa, the more primitive fetishistic kind, which has never completely disappeared from the West, is spreading here unashamedly. Astrology, the rule of the planets, has its advertisements and separate columns in the popular press. In Eindhoven, the hypermodern Philipstown in Holland, many simple souls pilgrimaged to a nearby village some years ago where "Mary was in a tree". The reporter in the National Geographic Magazine of a visit to the American nuclear submarine "Seawolf" wrote under the heading "Buddha Brings Luck to Seawolf": "I noticed a small bronze statuette in the middle of the reactor cap. 'A little Buddha, put there by a retired Navy captain', explained Commander . . . , 'He predicted it would bring us good luck'" [5].

5. *Christianity and the teaching of science.*

Fortunately we need not wind up in a pessimistic tone. The remedy is there; Christian faith opens again new horizons.

First of all, it should be emphasized that no way back is possible. From the christian point of view (which, as we have seen, is not *every* christian's point of view) technological progress is no evil; it was precisely christianity which gave it the religious sanction indispensable in a religious age. If we believe in Christ's kingship, in His power to make all things new, we need not lament about the good old time, but we will try to make science and technology what they ought to be: not all but supernatural, irresistible powers of a progress towards hell or paradise on earth, but tools in the hands of man for the benefit of our earthly life.

This may be done in the way Christianity has always followed, the way of teaching and education [6]. Teaching has to be taken, not

---

[5] Nat. Geographic Mag. 114 (1958) nr 3, p. 336.

[6] This had been lucidly expounded in one of the background papers of this conference: "In favour of an Intelligent Church" by Prof. M. Philibert.

in the sense of secular enlightenment, but in that of biblical enlightenment, stressing the simple, but none the less fundamental, truth that Christ is the Lord of every department of life. He claims all areas of life, science and technology included, and therefore no contradiction between our religious and our scientific attitudes can be tolerated.

Science, as we said above, is an abstract system, helping us to get control over nature. This system is the same for christians and non-christians, for believers and atheists, as two and two make four with all people. Evidently some aspects of truth are recognized by practically all human beings. It would be wrong to call these truths unchristian and it would cause misunderstanding if we called them christian. But these abstractions cannot be isolated on a purely technical level; they must be integrated in the whole of our view of life as they always are in relation with it, whether we like it or not. Here the differences arise: scientism and technocracy want to have science and technology reign supreme; extreme conservatives as well as humanists want to subjugate them to their theological or philosophical prejudices; the christian attitude rejects both these tendencies.

Now the technical pursuit of science is not the same as the teaching of science, and it is by the *teaching* that the equilibrium may be restored. The teaching of science is *more* than technical training. Even when it pretends to be only technical training in a neutral way, it is already overstepping neutrality, for, intentionally or not, the psychological effect will be: that the scientific picture is taken to be the real one, presenting hard facts, giving all that can be said with objectivity and certainty about the universe and mankind. Along with such a well-meant, but nevertheless scientistic education, a corrective in the form of an hour of religious instruction per week, or a Sunday morning service seem to be a pleasant ornament or a venerable survival of the past. Moreover, its corrective value is problematical, as the religious teacher of today is not as a rule equipped for the task of confronting science with religion [7].

Our students should recognize what is the real scope of scientific thought; they should see that the world of science is not the whole and not even the most important aspect of the world in which we live. That science, blind to anything but order and law, presents a

---

[7] Where are the good old days when the fathers of the Free Church of Scotland, who were keenly aware of the challenge of the industrial and scientific revolution to christian leadership, established a Chair of Natural Philosophy in their Theological College in Edinburgh?

godless, colourless, soundless universe, which ought to become alive again not by science herself but by quite another approach, which is only possible when we recognize that order and miracle exist side by side. As the early 17th century Netherlands scientist Isaac Beeckman put it; "Natural science goes from wonder to non-wonder; religion from non-wonder to wonder".

It goes then without saying that, whereas scientific publications may bear the stamp of the methodological separation of science from the rest of human activities and thereby become so impersonal that to an outsider they are as dead as a doornail and as dry as dust, our *teaching* of science, which is part of education, has to address itself to the whole personality of the student. The good teacher of whichever subject has this constantly in mind. To the christian teacher this means that his teaching of science is pervaded by christian faith, also when he teaches future scientists. The fathers of the Reformation wanted first of all universities in order to train good ministers of the church. Our modern world, however, is not inclined to listen to the clergy; the scientists are the priests and interpreters of secular culture. We may regret this, but *should not we devote more attention to a christian training of people who have no less influence in shaping our modern world than the ministers of religion had in the 16th century?*

Furthermore, the teaching of science may open the eyes to the fact that an unlimited exercise of our technological power leads to disaster, so that restraint is necessary, not because God reserves certain parts of creation for Himself but because man bears the responsibility of having to be a good steward over his fellow-creatures and is not allowed, for ethical reasons, to do with them what he likes.

The teaching of science thus has a task, negatively in rejecting idolatry and dehumanization, and positively in awakening our aesthetic and religious feeling.

Perhaps the situation is best in the physical sciences. Here tradition seems to count heavily. The mathematical-physical sciences (physics, mechanics, chemistry, astronomy) were largely founded by convinced christians, some of them men of an exceptionally ardent faith (Kepler, Pascal, Newton, Boyle, Faraday, Maxwell, Mayer). Other, less exact, disciplines mainly arose in the epoch of the secular Enlightenment (the late 18th and the 19th century): economics, anthropology, sociology. They have not yet reached maturity; they probably will never reach the same degree of mathematical exactness as the physical sciences, as personal conviction plays a large role in them. The vast majority

of their cultivators are indifferent or hostile towards christianity, and they regard religious faith as something that can be explained but never be believed. As these disciplines will take a large part in the education of people in government offices, it would be of great importance if deliberate attempts were made that the voice of christianity might be heard on these subjects too. In an age of planning, it would not be superfluous if christianity did some counter-planning.

The christian teacher's duty then is to introduce christian influences and values into his teaching of the natural and social sciences. This is necessary, also for those students who intend to become professional scientists, for the scientist in the broadest sense wants more than is required for being good at an engineer's or physician's job: to the "complete scientist" (as a report to the British Association for the Advancement of Science puts it) history, music, painting, — and we would add christian belief too — are as good as science. One may be a good scientist in the technical sense without this, but not a complete one. Man shall not live by bread alone.

But will not this teaching in a christian spirit burden our mind with religious prejudice, detrimental to a free exercise of the scientific spirit?

We do not think so: if christian religion is a "prejudice", it is a healthy one for science. Truth is undivided and if we know Him who is the Truth and the Way of Light, we cannot be hindered in the study of the way He chooses when He upholds His creation. It was precisely the freedom with which Christ made them free from the bondage of human authority and of the idolatry of nature that inspired the 17th century scientists in their „free science", which opened new vistas never dreamt of before.

We need not fear as a result a bigoted approach to nature. The christian virtues are scientific virtues par excellence. An independent and inquiring mind, intellectual honesty, perseverance, humility in regard to facta and data, are developed through christianity and science. Science, if cultivated in the right way, may widen our outlook on the whole world of experience, teach us our limitations, nourish our feeling of beauty and inculcate a sense of awe and wonder and thus confirm in the souls of those that have got eyes to see, the love and veneration of the Creator.

Science has been encouraged by the belief of Christians as well as the Greeks of classical Antiquity, that the universe is the work

of a rational, designing mind, but it has really *thriven* because in addition to this it was guided by the christian belief that this Divine Mind is infinitely higher than ours, that is by recognizing that Revelation is necessary. "If the revealed truths are a burden to reason, they are but such a burden as feathers are to a hawk, — instead of hindering its flight by their weight, they enable it to soar toward heaven, and take a larger prospect of things, than, if it had no feathers, is could possibly do" (Boyle).

Thus there is no necessity to christianize science: this has already happened. We may consider it a product of the human mind which has been enabled to find its right method and its highest purity by being christianized in the 17th century. In spite of the then following dechristianization of much of Western thought, the basis and method have remained the same.

However, our good methodological custom of separating science from other human activities, often causes the misunderstanding that science has nothing to do with them and it deforms scientists into technical barbarians. The next step inevitably is that the scientific view is regarded as the *only* approach to reality that counts for something and the end is that all departments of life are made subject to the scientistic conception. Christian education in science, if rightly understood, could clear the mist of confusion and lay bare the delusions of modern scientism. The *christian* secularization made science free from the dominion of theology and philosophy; the *modern* secularization makes science into a new philosophy and a new theology. It may undermine pagan indigenous cults, but it puts a new idolatry in their place and the end may well be worse than the beginning.

Therefore, the teaching of science is part of our christian mission. While vindicating the right of science not to be built upon philosophical, political or religious assumptions, but to investigate nature in methodological independence, we advocate a renewed integration of science into the whole of our world view. That is, we are not satisfied with its technical results and with statements about the regularities of nature; we want to see the philosophical meaning, the ethical implications and the religious value of all that has been found or is believed to have been found. The founders of modern science were in a sense philosophers and theologians as well; they could not acquiesce in being such abstract beings as "pure scientists"; they were living men. On one hand the Royal Society was founded, as Hooke wrote, to improve the knowledge of natural things and all useful

arts . . . not meddling with Divinity, Metaphysics, Morals, Politics . . . But on the other hand, as the case of Pascal, Hooke, Boyle, Newton clearly shows, the individual scientist was not able not to meddle with divinity, etc. And this is even more so in modern times when the scientist has willy nilly become a most powerful intervener in human affairs; the consequences of his work inevitably make him a meddler in divinity, metaphysics and morals.

What then is necessary, in Europe and America as well as in Asia and Africa? General education should not neglect science, even for pupils concentrating on the humanities: science is a *human* achievement, an essential part of modern life, and every educational system which leaves it out altogether is onesided and backward. There are still people who confound "humanistic" education with archaistic education. As science shapes a large part of human thought (for worse or for better) a critical evaluation of its verdicts, results and pretentions ought to be given and its hidden influences ought to be made evident to all would-be "educated persons".

In the second place, the education of *scientists* and *technologists* should be humanized and christianized. The world is in need of scientists who do no suffer from a hypertrophy of one side of their mind, but who are harmoniously developed. In the long run this will pay, even from a purely technical and economical point of view.

Of course we share this ideal with the humanists. The essence of christian education, however, is not only to develop "humanity" but to educate free people, free because they recognize that our Lord Jesus Christ has made them new beings. Surely, when this happens all the other things will be added unto us.

Radio, television, the school and the press spread much nonsense about the relations between science and christian religion. In the name of science and religion both, we have to be armed against it and to engage in the spiritual battle. In this respect, however, the christian community is an underdeveloped group. Marxists understand their "mission" much better. Therefore, our fellow-believers, not only in Europe and America, but also in Asia and Africa, now have a duty of studying for themselves and of teaching each other.

We do not want to stimulate anybody into a christian activism in which the heart is lacking, but neither would it be right to acquiesce in a christian quietism which lets things take their own course. Let us take up our christian task of the moment and build as if we could fulfil it, at the same time humbly acknowledging that except the Lord

build the house, they labour in vain that build it (Psalm 127 : 1).

The opportunities we still have in the greater part of the world ought to be used, but we fully realize that all organized christian action has become impossible in other parts. There, particularly, Christ's church can stand only if the socalled laity understands its task. There the Reformers' stress on the priesthood of all believers gets new meaning. When public testimony of the faith is forbidden, the Mosaic wish of the old dissenters becomes urgently up-to-date: "would God that all the Lord's people were prophets" (Numbers XI : 29). When all official teaching is unchristian or antichristian, every christian should be a teacher according to his talents to his own children and his friends. So, go ye therefore, and teach all nations and He will be with you, even unto the end of the world.

PHYSICAL KNOWLEDGE AND CREATION

BY

G. J. SIZOO *

The English word *nature* is derived from the Latin word *natura*, which is related to the word *nasci*. This word nasci was used in the sense of 'to be born', or 'sprout out' or 'grow out of'. In accordance with this is the use of the concept nature to indicate the being, the character and the structure of a person or thing, as they flow from birth, descent and origin and are determined by it.

The English word *physical* has its origin in the Greek idea *phusis*, to which the notion *phuesthai* is related, which means to grow. The Greek idea accordingly had a content corresponding to that of natura. It referred to the whole of the properties and behaviours which were considered to be characteristic of a being or structure and which naturally and necessarily sprang from it.

We do not deviate therefore from this meaning of the words natura and phusis, when we define physical knowledge as "knowledge about the nature of things and phenomena".

It is, however, more usual to say that physical knowledge is: knowledge about Nature.

In doing this we assign to the idea Nature an independent meaning and it points to the world of things and phenomena itself in that the latter, in spite of the multiplicity and diversity, which is perceptible in it, is nevertheless seen as one coherent whole and as a unity. In classical antiquity, too, the ideas phusis and natura were already used in this independent meaning, becoming more or less synonymous with universe or cosmos.

In this meaning Nature is by some Greek philosophers held to be a living Being and is by Spinoza identified with God.

This personification of the concept nature is also met with in medieval

---

* Prof. Dr. G. J. Sizoo lectures on Physics in the Faculty of Science of the Free University.

natural philosophy and found expression in various statements which were to serve as an explanation of the phenomena observed, such as: Nature does nothing in vain; Nature abhors a vacuum; Nature makes no leaps, etc.

Boyle already criticized this use of the idea Nature[1].

He is of opinion that it is the task of the scientist to observe the phenomena closely, and to intelligibly describe and interpret them.

From a scientific point of view nothing is added to this interpretation by attributing all sorts of properties to a kind of being, or demi-god, designated by philosophers as Nature.

Boyle was a Christian scholar, and his criticism of personification and even deification of the concept Nature is accordingly based among other things, on his recognition of the truth revealed in the Bible about the creation and the preservation of all things created.

Indeed, the Bible nowhere speaks about 'Nature'. But it does tell us about all things and phenomena which we perceive around us, unambiguously and emphatically, that they have been created by God and are absolutely dependent upon Him, and that also the order and uniformity which we discover in it, have been and are determined by His will.

When in common as well as in scientific parlance we comprise all these perceptible things and phenomena in their mutual coherence and uniformity, in the one collective idea: Nature, there is no objection to doing this, provided that we should always bear in mind that all 'nature' is in origin and being 'creature'.

The Bible does not hesitate to attribute in the most concrete terms the phenomena of nature to divine action. The story of the creation is not the beginning of a natural philosophy, but the foundation of the story of our salvation: only the God "who created heaven and earth, and all that is therein", can deliver man from sin and guilt. For also man forms part of the creation. It is true, in contradistinction to all other creatures he 'has been made after God's image and likeness', and he was given the special instruction to dominate the earth; but nevertheless both in his bodily and in his spiritual existence he fully remains part of the creation. This view — taken from the Bible — is significant for the question how it is possible that by sense perception and reflective assimilation of impressions obtained, man succeeds in

---

[1] R. Hooykaas, *Robert Boyle. A study on Natural Science and Christianity* [Een studie over Natuurwetenschap en Christendom] p. 76.

acquiring a knowledge and insight into nature in such a manner that he arrives at its interpretation and domination.

The existence of this possibility is the postulate, the presupposition from which all research of natural science starts; this research itself can, indeed, by experience confirm the correctness of this starting-point step by step, but state no grounds for it. It cannot answer the question how it is, that the phenomena, impressions of which man receives by means of his senses, are precisely of such a nature that they can be understood by the human mind and can be comprehended by his understanding.

Research and argument will likewise result in failure when the problem is approached reversely: how is it that man is precisely of such a nature that he can understand the phenomena with his mind and can comprehend them with his understanding.

Religious faith in God, the Creator of all things, also of man, does shed light on these questions. If we accept by faith that God created man in His image and after His likeness, and in this created world gave him the unique instruction to have dominion over the earth, this will also engender the faith that both the intellectual faculties of man as well as the world in which he is placed, have been created in such a way that they are adjusted to one another 'after their nature'.

This faith does not *explain* the possibility that man is able to acquire significant and valuable knowledge about nature, in a logical sense, but it *does* recognise it in a religious sense as a datum given in the creation, and thus also clarifies it to human understanding.

Following this line of thought physical knowledge will always be knowledge created man has about the created world. It is acquired when man actualizes his innate cognitive faculty by directing it to the world around him in order to discover and formulate — by observation, experimentation, abstraction, logical induction and deduction, as well as by intuitive combinative thought — unity, order and constant uniformity in the multiplicity, mutability and diversity of phenomena.

In this activity of acquiring knowledge man himself is restrained by his own nature which is determined by his createdness, but just as much by the nature (which is independent of him) of the world which he examines.

The knowledge obtained in this two-fold bond to the norms and laws laid down by God for His creation, can rightly be called real knowledge and be of great value to man in carrying out his cultural charge.

This does not mean that the knowledge formulated in a certain phase of the investigation, could not be imperfect and incomplete and even incorrect. The building-up of the knowledge relation between man and his environment, is a continuous process, in which the formulation constantly needs correction, supplementation and even thorough revision, because the abundance of the phenomena will always prove to be far in excess of what was already found and surmised.

For the progress of research it is essential that scientific reflection should extrapolate and generalize the conclusions which can be deduced from the observations, whereby rules, laws, conceptions can be formulated which are of much wider scope than the facts which have already become known in the course of the investigation.

We should not blame scientific thought for that. On the contrary, exactly this combinative, penetrating and comprehensive intuitive thought, produces the directives for further investigations.

It is not permissible, however, to give these directives such an absolute formulation that the possibility of revision is ruled out beforehand.

When in the course of many experiments with different substances, it has been found that a certain measurable quantity which we call 'mass', remains constant during many changes, it is certainly permissible to deduce from this the 'law of the conservation of mass'' and take it as a guide for further investigations and keep to it, so long as there is no evidence to the contrary. If, however, from this law the inference is drawn that matter is 'eternal and imperishable', this is the formulation of a philosophical conception, which wrongly pretends to be the expression of the result of the physical investigation. Although this nineteenth-century materialist interpretation of the law of the conservation of mass is no longer even tenable in the twentieth century by the knowledge obtained about the variability of mass, it has nevertheless undeniably done harm to the Christian view of life.

On the other hand it must not be inferred from our modern insight into the variability of mass that the old law of the conservation of mass did not contain 'real' knowledge. For a very large field of phenomena it can certainly still be applied without any objection. Only, our knowledge has been enriched to such an extent that we know now under what circumstances and with what quantitative amount of exactness this law holds good, while we know also by what rules it has to be replaced, when these conditions are not valid and the boundaries of this exactness are overstepped.

In the history of physics it has frequently occurred that views and ideas that science had operated with for years and even for centuries and which seemed almost to have become unshakable truths, had to be given up or revised in order to do justice to new observations.

At such times people will soon speak of a crisis or a revolution in physical thought. However, it is always seen then that such a crisis will indeed clear physical thought of pre-judgements based upon non-physical grounds or extrapolations not justified by observations, but that the revolution never goes so far that all the old views lose their value. The theory of relativity has indeed replaced Newton's conception of absolute space by that of 'time-space, dependent upon the movement of the observer', but this has not degraded Newtonian mechanics to 'false knowledge'. This is another case of the enrichment of our knowledge, by which we know under what conditions the old theory, cleared of not justified, redundant elements may be held to be approximation of the new view, and therefore does contain 'real knowledge'.

The development of physical knowledge may be seen as an ever increasing opening up of the possibilities lying within the uniformities which by virtue of the order of creation, hold both for the logical activity of man and for the events in nature.

In physical research man is therefore engaged in actualizing a relationship, potentially present in creation, between himself and his environment.

Of course the nature and content of this relationship is determined by the two poles between which it extends, i.e. by the knowing subject: man, on the one hand and the object that is known: nature, on the other. It is, however, remarkable that in the formulation of physical knowledge this character of the subject-object relation generally does not find expression.

In discussions on the nature of this knowledge not seldom all emphasis is laid on its objective character, the suggestion being given then that its content is exclusively determined by the object.

Now it is undoubtedly true that in approaching the different phenomena physics makes a point of leaving out of consideration all those aspects which have in the ordinary sense of the word a subjective character, i.e. which for one individual may be different than for another. These are accordingly first of all those aspects involving a personal appreciation. A physicist is as much interested in the crystalline structure of diamond as in that of graphite, but leaves the

difference in aesthetic and economic value between these two substances out of consideration, however great his interest may be on other counts.

The reason why the crystalline structure *is* given attention, lies just in the fact that pronouncements can be made about it, concerning relationships of number and space which can be communicated to other physicists, can be understood by them and checked, which therefore in this sense have an objective value.

The objectivation by elimination of elements which bear upon the subject, goes still further, however.

Eventually all physical knowledge is based upon perception and in this the human senses are concerned. We *feel* whether a body is cold or warm, *hear* whether it produces sound and *see* if it is light or dark.

In elementary books on physics this correlation between the human senses and certain natural phenomena is still found in the division of the subject matter in the chapters on heat, sound and light.

But by availing himself of suitable aids the physicist is able to deduce everything he wants to find out about these phenomena from the readings on dial instruments, so that only the eye is concerned in it, and if he would, he could arrange it in such a way that he would be able also to make his observations by hearing or feeling.

The correlation of certain phenomena with special senses is consequently eliminated, neither is it to be recognized in the modern physical description of the phenomena: heat is movement of molecules; sound a vibration in matter; light is an undulatory movement in the electromagnetic field.

But although in the formulation of physical knowledge the sensory seems to have been completely eliminated, what cannot be eliminated is the fact that ultimately it is based on human perception and the mental digestion of such perceptions by man and that for this reason it can never be objective in the absolute sense that it can be dissociated from man as the knowing subject.

A physical statement such as: "In an atom of the element hydrogen the electron makes a uniform circular movement" seems to be, indeed, a perfectly objective statement which, independently of man, has absolute validity, or at least purports to have it.

The ideas used in this sentence (element; hydrogen; atom; electron; circular movement; uniform) only have a meaning, however, in the whole of human language, and even only in the very special language physicists have construed to express what they can by observation

conclude from the various natural phenomena and can verify by experiment.

Now as regards the latter: about the year 1920 physicists themselves thought that a sentence like the above really was a meaningful statement, because it could be deduced from certain theoretical considerations. Afterwards it was seen that it could not be upheld, because it states more than can in any way be tested, directly or indirectly.

This criticism was connected with one of the most recent 'revolutions' in physical thought, which was directed precisely against the worn-out idea of the complete objectifiability of physical knowledge, and which inter alia finds expression in the formulation of quantum mechanics.

When we see physical knowledge as the actualization and development of a possible relationship between created man and the created cosmos, we reject with it both its underestimation and its overestimation.

There really is question of overestimation in the idea just mentioned of the absolute objectivity of physical knowledge, which was predominant in the nineteenth century, for it anchors this knowledge after having been detached from its one anchorage — the knowing subject — with both anchors in the object itself — the phenomena or Nature. It then looks as if in physical knowledge man has only registered what Nature herself had told him in her own terms about herself. The content of this knowledge thus has the appearance of the absolute truth about what nature taken in itself is and how it works.

The uniformities in the phenomena observed formulated in physical knowledge assume by it the character of the 'laws of nature', which have an existence of their own, of the same order as the existence of nature itself. Since this trend of thought is fundamentally based on a negation of the inter-creaturely character of physical knowledge, it can easily entail making nature itself absolute, whether it is based on a materialist conception or is obtained by identifying the concept of nature with the concept of God.

The pronouncement 'matter is eternal and imperishable', as the interpretation of the law of the conservation of mass, fits into this trend of thought just as much as the statement: 'Surely God does not gamble", as an objection to quantum mechanics.

Such statements misjudge the essential difference in character between the knowledge about things created which man can acquire by observation and thought, and the knowledge of eternal and imperishable things. of God Himself, which he can only receive by faith and revelation.

The overestimation of physical knowledge may also be the consequence of a view, which one-sidedly emphasizes the subjective, i.e. human element in this knowledge; owing to the most recent development of physical thought, this view is now again rapidly gaining ground.

According to this view physical knowledge does not refer to an order which is present in the phenomena independently of man, but to an order which man himself creates in the chaos of phenomena according to the rules of his thought and in accordance with his deliberate intentions.

This denial of the order — founded in creation — in the phenomena of nature must necessarily lead to a misjudgement of the order — likewise founded in creation — in the relationship between man and the phenomena, on which according to Christian views, the possibility of physical knowledge rests.

If for the interpretation of this possibility, which on grounds of experience cannot be denied, we nevertheless wish to choose a fixed point of departure, it can naturally only be found in man himself which opens the way to making human reason, and consequently also physical knowledge, absolute.

The scientific modesty which may be appreciated in the criticism of the objectivist interpretation of physical knowledge, thereby runs the risk of turning into the arrogance of philosophic rationalism.

The view that physical knowledge means the realization of a possibility present in the creation, in the relationship between man and the cosmos, also rejects, however, its being underestimated.

Such an underestimation is found in an argumentation, sometimes put forward, also by believing scientists, saying of physical knowledge that it *only* refers to nature as it presents itself to us, whereas 'that which is behind the phenomena', which is 'the real essence' of things, must always remain hidden from us.

As the final conclusion of a discussion about the nature of physical knowledge, such a statement may sound very modest and may leave the impression of a mystic, religious state of mind.

In this conclusion, too, the essential difference is not fully observed between the knowledge which can be obtained by examining the phenomena which are perceptible by the senses and the knowledge which can be obtained about timeless things by revelation.

What the Bible reveals to us clearly and unambiguously about the whole cosmos, inclusive of man, is: that it has been created by God; that everything that happens, takes place by His will; that there is

nothing whatsoever, which in an absolute sense is not subject to His control. There is no other means of knowing this but revelation and faith. This knowledge finds expression in human language and may be called knowledge about nature, provided that it is borne in mind that it is a knowledge which follows from the relationship between man and his Creator.

The statement that physical knowledge on the other hand flows from an inter-creaturely relationship, does not degrade it to a knowledge of an inferior order, but recognizes it in its own nature and value.

If we are really in earnest about this recognition, there is no reason to close a discussion about physical knowledge with the negative conclusion that after all it is *only* human knowledge and that we shall never be able to penetrate to the real essence of things.

The question may even arise whether in such a conclusion, however modest it may sound at first and may possibly be meant, there is nevertheless a touch of human arrogance, the arrogance of man who is really keen on overstepping the limits of his state of being creature, although he is prepared to see the impossibility of doing this.

The Christian discussion about the nature and value of physical knowledge will always have to find its norm and its conclusion in the confession: 'Thou art worthy, O Lord, to receive glory and honour and power: for thou hast created all things, and for thy pleasure they are and were created' (Rev. 4 : 11).

COMMUNICATION AND ANTITHESIS

BY

S. U. ZUIDEMA *

I. Also outside the circle of those occupying themselves with contemporary philosophy it is widely known that Karl Jaspers is one of those existentialist philosophers who is continuously asking attention for the problem of communication. To him communication is a problem, nay more than a problem, a task which we find ourselves confronted with and urgently calling for an answer. Not just a scientific answer of the specializing scholar; that would in his opinion even be impossible. No, but an answer born above and beyond the arid fields of rational intellect, born in the depth of man's real, existential mode of being, from where testimony and appeal only are possible, but which itself remains hidden and inaccessible to all intellectual knowledge and power.

Apart from all these problems centring in the idea of communication and in its realization, of which Jaspers is himself fully aware, and with which he is philosophically concerned, it must be said that with this term communication Jaspers handles a kind of magic word with which he succeeds in awaking what aspirations, impulses and desires there live in the hearts and minds of thousands and thousands in our days. Those who might not yet be convinced of it, will find it no longer possible to resist it when they are informed that certain theologians consider themselves called upon to notify the people that unlike the previous century and the period before the first world war, our century is no longer dominated by antitheses, but by communication, and rightly so.

We communicate. We want to communicate. We ought to communicate. We are communicating beings, and we dehumanize according as we withdraw from the openness of communication and seek salvation in isolating ourselves.

---

* Prof. Dr. S. U. Zuidema lectures on Philosophy in the Faculty of Arts of the Free University.

Only *after* this confession has been declared to be the truth about man, room is made for the problems of this communication. But the problems do not precede and must not make the ontological, anthropological and "deontological" truth of communication questionable; they are only there to be overcome and as a call to battle for the sake of a progressive communication and in order to progress in communication.

Closely connected with communication and also closely related to it is the dialogue, the "discourse" which must on no account be unilateral, and certainly not degenerate into series of monologues.

We *are* a dialogue, a "discourse". We are having a "discourse". We ought to be engaged in "discourse". We are dialogizing creatures. In an essentially existential manner we are having a discourse with ourselves and essentially existentially we are in "discourse" with our fellow-man.

We dehumanize according as we shirk the "discourse" and escape from the situation of "discourse" into aggression, approaching our fellow-man, not as a partner in the "discourse" but as our opponent.

One of the aims of communication and discourse is to deliver us from the "spasmodic" attitude of isolation, aggression, self-defence, fanaticism and proselytization. All these attitudes are formally condemned, especially on the strength of the anthropological idea of communication: they derogate from the humanity of man and fellow-man and debase man in the very essence of his being.

II. All this sounds fine enough and who would not like to listen for a while to a charming conversationalist who conjures up a world and a society in which we are said to live and which is declared to rest on the inescapable experience of "being man" as a "being together with others", in which man is seen as communication and in which among the aspects of man's "being with others" mention is made of the following items: "Intersubjective hope and belief. I believe in you through you. I hope for you through you. I accept you" [1].

But what about actual practice. The Dutch speaking area was offered a sample of it in a "dialogue" between Dr. H. Kraemer and Dr. F. Sierksma, which appeared in the periodical "Wending". In a sanguine mood and with high expectations in his fellow-man, Dr. H. Kraemer opens the round with an article entitled: "On the possibility of dialogue

[1] Dr. M. G. Plattel, *Sociale Wijsbegeerte I. De mens en het medemenselijke*, Het Spectrum, Utrecht-Antwerpen, 1960, p. 148, 149.

with the "unbeliever"" [2]. In the climate of the "communication-and-dialogue" concepts, Kraemer here states that the dialogue as over against isolation is a mutually open and unreserved discourse proceeding from a sense of humanity and cultural responsibility. It is the beginning of an encounter and perhaps also of the happy end. But at any rate the dialogue with the "unbeliever" is absolutely necessary. For the sake of Christianity and for the sake of the world. Kraemer then proceeds to "discuss" the conceptions of Dr. Sierksma and of the Dutch author Vestdijk. A "discussion" which claims to be an attempt at a "dialogue" with Sierksma and Vestdijk, be it that neither of them had asked for such a dialogue, and this colloquy was sprung upon each of them and caught them by surprise.

Sierksma publishes a reply. In his article "Possibilities and difficulties about Dialogue" [3] he draws inter alia attention to the fact that Kraemer has forced a discussion and that Kraemer in his lengthy article in no way deals only with the possibility of a "dialogue". After a response by Kraemer Sierksma writes a second article under the significant title "Fish nor Fowl" [4] remarking about the "dialogue" which had "arisen" between him and Kraemer (Kraemer rather forcing matters), that it was "an exchange of thoughts which was neither fish nor fowl, dialogue nor polemic, scientific discussion nor literary duel"; he also speaks of the "dialogue as Kraemer has used it in the present barren discussion". And what to say about this statement: "My opponent and I have at bottom nothing to say to each other" (p. 735)?

By which Dr. Sierksma on his part demonstrates that this communication and this dialogue as far as he is concerned and so far as he sees it and can see it, is worthless and if, to use Kraemer's words, it should have been the beginning of a contact, then Kraemer's first sermon was for him at the same time a farewell sermon, something quite different indeed from what Kraemer made himself and his readers believe: "the beginning of a contact and perhaps also the happy end". No, a fiasco. In future Sierksma will deny himself to Kraemer, since in his opinion they have nothing to say to each other.

III. Now it is doubtful if Kraemer has really lost an illusion and will have no illusions left on this point. Serious charges were made against him, such as the accusation that he ignores the real problems

---

[2] *Wending* 13 (1958/1959) p. 724—766.
[3] *Wending* 14 (1959/1960) p. 76—104.
[4] *Wending* 14, p. 735—742.

an "unbeliever" suffers under, and ascribes to the unbeliever problems which may severely torment the believer, but which do not trouble the "unbeliever" at all.

But will he have learned his lesson one might ask, in order to answer this question we should not forget that his attempt at communication rests upon his "faith" in the possibility of communication, and like all faith this too defies all experience, including all shipwreck experience. The acceptance of the inevitability of shipwreck would mean nothing less than accepting the antithesis. But this would mean a denial of the whole of his past in writing and in practice. And moreover a breach with his numerous sympathizers, if not all partners in the Oecumenical Movement. And a breach with the faith of them all.

A typical proof of this faith is furnished already by the fact that Kraemer's first article is entitled: "On the possibility of dialogue with the "unbeliever"". Why should the word "unbeliever" be placed between quotation marks? Why not omit the word, or, if used, employ it in all its simplicity, without "double bottom"? Why? Because in this article Kraemer proceeds, and wishes to proceed, ambiguously. The fact is that he himself distinguishes between the viewpoint of the sense of human and cultural responsibility [5] and between the religous view.

That is: Kraemer in old-fashioned manner thinks as dialectically as possible. On the one hand he distinguishes Christian religion, Scripture Revelation, and especially the meeting of the person of Jesus Christ and of God in Jesus Christ, and in connexion with it also Christian theology. And on the other he distinguishes the human science of religion, phenomenology of religion, psychology of religion within the still wider scope of human and socio-cultural reality. But this distinction is one made by dialectics, so that it is also an intertwinement in which the last word is with the "supernatural", "superhuman" revelation and theology of revelation.

In these two articles he embroiders with his communication concept the theme of human and socio-cultural reality and responsibility, where the "contact" may take place with the "unbeliever", not in his quality of unbelieving person, (now without quotation-marks), but as man and as fellowman in one and the same socio-cultural reality and responsibility.

All this becomes pretty clear when Kraemer writes the following: "The suggestiveness radiating from the illumination (Erhellung)

---

[5] *Op. cit.* p. 733.

through depthpsychology of the human consciousness is immense, and will no doubt become more so. A sense of responsibility, honesty and concern about truth, demand that this challenge should not be made light of. This is a cultural, if not a religious duty. This should not be understood in the first place as a call to meet "opponents", although it is a fact that e.g. Vestdijk and Sierksma are certainly opponents of, in this case, Christianity, and although it is permissible and even necessary that this point whenever it is pertinent should frankly be raised. But within the frame of culture as a whole the sense of such a dialogue is that there is a willingness to meet one another as partners in the dialogue for the sake of a Good which as a beacon guiding and lightening us stands above us all" [6].

The consequence of this dialectic is that the "unbeliever" finds himself between two stools, or rather that both stools are drawn away from under him, and that he would fall over backwards, if Kraemer's dialectic did not mercifully uphold him.

In this "dialogue" Sierksma has not been disposed to accept this line of thought. It is either the one or the other: Kraemer meets in him an unbeliever or no unbeliever, A third category, the "unbeliever" is non-existent. But it is precisely this "unbeliever" that is Kraemer's find. The quotation marks signify that Kraemer really does not want to approach Sierksma from the religious zone, as a Christian; oh no, he is going "to meet him as partner in the dialogue for the sake of a Good which stands above us all", within the framework of culture as a whole. But at the same time the word "unbeliever", which was placed between these quotation marks, reminds us of that other zone, the religious zone, and of the contrast, nay the opponent, and the opposition, which is real and plays an active part: the antithesis.

As was said, Sierksma is not disposed to accept all this. And he informs Kraemer that as a student of the psychology of religion, he does not want to have anything to do with theology, and that the reason for it is not that he is an "unbeliever", but only and exclusively, that he is a student of the psychology of religion and as such a man of science. Psychology of religion is a piece of anthropology, and that is that. As a student of the psychology of religion he won't be bothered with theology. Without mincing his words Sierksma then declares that theological concepts are abracadabra to him [7], and that what stands between Kraemer and himself is not belief or unbelief, but the

[6] *Op. cit.* p. 728.
[7] *Art. cit.* p. 101.

fact that each of them holds diametrically opposed views of science [8].

In my opinion Sierksma is right there. For him there is no "unbeliever" that half-and-half creature which is neither wholly "fellow-man" and purely human (in the immanentist sense of the word), nor wholly unbelieving and as unbeliever an opponent of the Christian faith. Hence he cannot follow Kraemer when the latter thinks that he can give phenomenology of religion under a double and ambiguous aspect, namely, as Kraemer stated it himself: "that the most scientific and fruitful manner of obtaining an insight into the inner dialectic both of religion and the various religions is to place them in the light of Jesus Christ, *the* Revelation of God and the only lawful "kritikos" of religion, thereby fully appreciating the application of the methods and results of the "official" science of religion" [9]. It may seem a painful thing to Kraemer that Sierksma cannot accept Kraemer's statement that he simply avails himself of "the methods and results of the "official" science of religion", because he, Kraemer, accepts these methods and results only dialectically and for that reason in the last and final resort violates them and uses them illegitimately. But this painful reaction is to be expected of every one who seriously seeks the basis of science in science itself and who does not allow any bargaining with this scientific method of truth and the results thereof, but considers them unassailable and sacrosanct. No old-fashioned or newfashioned, Thomistic-dialectic or neo-orthodox protestant dialectic scholasticism, trying as it does to combine the science of religion and a "Christian" theology of Revelation, can be made to harmonize with it. Here there is absolute incompatibility. And however affable Kraemer may be in his reply, it is this very affability which Sierksma radically turns down and which causes him to answer in a manner admitting of no room for interpretation: "My opponent and I have at bottom nothing to say to each other".

It seems to me that Kraemer really had nothing further to say when in the title he spoke of the "unbeliever". This term: the "unbeliever" is flesh nor fowl, communication nor antithesis, dialogue nor monologue, testimony nor scientific analysis.

When Kraemer calls communication a distressing contemporary question, let him consider that this distressing question will not meet with any true attempt at an answer, if we will not in plain terms speak

---

[8] *Art. cit.* p. 82.
[9] *Art. cit.* p. 735.

about our fellowman as being an unbeliever, and yet cannot on the other hand drop the word "unbeliever" (and what the word stands for) for the sake of a universal brotherhood of mankind and fellowship within which the difference between him who believes in Christ and him who does not, can ultimately be considered irrelevant.

Thus Kraemer stumbled over Sierksma. He will in our opinion continue to do so, so long as he writes about the "unbeliever". And his "dialogue" with the "unbeliever" will essentially and in effect not differ from a sermon addressed to his own parishioners, who deem themselves so urbane that in common responsibility they place themselves in communication with the "unbelievers" and in any case dream of the possibility of such an efficient communication, even if it signally fails in practice and they are even greatly blamed for such an attempt at communication as being a misleading occupation. Primarily as self-delusion against their better judgement.

IV. The manner in which Jaspers speaks and thinks about communication and communicative dialogue is different from that of Kraemer. With Jaspers there is no question of a dialectic between the supernatural revelation of God in Christ Jesus and human culture, which as such and also as religious culture, falls outside this Revelation of God. But to Jaspers the communication concept is of a philosophical-religious nature, spanning a horizon of totality excluding nothing and nobody, no movement and no revelation.

Hence it is that Jaspers is a syncretistic philosopher, who in his syncretism thinks he can in principle comprise all world religions, is able to "translate" them all and by his power of translation can assign to them all a place within the one, growing unity-world of communicative world humanity and world fellowship.

No doubt he will encounter on his way men and forces forming an obstacle for his communicative thought and endeavours, who will not allow themselves to be transformed, re-interpreted or brought to a better understanding of themselves, by his communicative syncretistical work of translation. But their intolerance which prevents the advance towards the unification of mankind on the path of reason, is at any rate not Jaspers' fault, but their own. Rather is Jaspers — at least in his own eyes — pure innocence, for he desires no strife, but peace; no discord, but co-operation; no antithesis, but communication; no "a-gainst", but "with"; no factions, but a unity movement which will ultimately cancel all boundaries and restrictions. On his way towards

the fraternization of this universal humanity he finds himself seriously thwarted, unfortunately, by these intolerant people, and in the end even induced — be it with a bleeding heart — to return their intolerance with intolerance. But if at any time and anywhere the end could rightly have sanctified the means, it is here: for he is intolerant of intolerance for the sake of tolerance, and surely nobody can on good grounds blame the tolerant for not tolerating intolerance?

And thus Jaspers remains pure innocence, sancta simplicitas, at least in his own eyes.

So strongly is he convinced of this that a statement made by John Hennig gave him quite a start. In a collective work on Karl Jaspers, edited by P. A. Schilpp, Hennig published an article on Jaspers' attitude towards history [10]. In it he made the remark that Jaspers cuts off communication with "at least 1500 years of our spiritual tradition and with some hundreds of millions of contemporaries".

To this Jaspers replies in the same work by Schilpp: "I must emphatically deny this" [11]. He who wants to do full justice to this statement, may conclude and cannot but conclude from it that in his own view and in accordance with his intention Jaspers also wants to retain the bond with the (orthodox) believers in Christ, and that they need expect no antithesis from him. But the remarkable thing is that in what immediately follows, he puts forward a few essential requirements which in his opinion every faith has to satisfy, if it is to claim respect. But these same requirements are of a nature that would involve the total undoing of the Christian faith. No genuine faith can in his opinion be at variance with experience, can demand a sacrificium intellectus, or require unmoral actions [12].

But it so happens that according to Jaspers it is at variance with experience and with scientific thought if one were e.g. to believe that "a man may be God" or "that a dead body can rise from the dead" [13]; and this is continued throughout Jaspers' work: none of the great central facts of Christianity is left standing.

With this Jaspers ex-communicates every one from the communicative dialogue of modern man that is not willing to comply with these "rational moral" requirements as a foundation for the dialogue. Mate-

---

[10] P. A. Schilpp, *Karl Jaspers*, Kohlhammer Verlag, Stuttgart, S. 556—583, S. 574.
[11] *Op. cit.* p. 762.
[12] *Op. cit.* p. 763.
[13] *Op. cit.* pp. 726, 764.

rially his passionate denial of Hennig's words only means that he considers himself infinitely tolerant and open-minded and wishes every one to see him so, too — he jealously watches his own name and fame — but in the mean time he cannot omit excommunicating all who do not live under his "open sky".

If no frontal attack is made upon this excommunication he does not omit practising it without restriction. Thus in his book *Von der Wahrheit* (About Truth) he devotes a good deal of attention to what he thinks as a radical contrast which cannot be bridged, viz. that between Reason and Catholicity[14]. Between these two he sees no gradations; choosing for what he considers to be "reason", he sides at the same time deliberately and passionately against any catholicity which is sustained from another source than Jaspers' rational philosophy. This rational philosophy claims for itself the aureole of infinite openness and preparedness for communication, but the necessary vigilance would have been forgotten if one did not at the same time remember that he excommunicates antithetically all those who do not in his manner participate with him in this rational religion.

In this respect the twentieth century has nothing new to show as compared with the nineteenth. Then, too, synthesis was the order of the day. Then, too, tolerance was in vogue. Then, too, it was a matter of common experience that in the name of tolerance a crusade of intolerance was proclaimed against the intolerance of the narrow-minded; then, too, Christian faith had to deny its nature if it wished to get into the good graces of the new community builders; and then, too, it was of common occurrence among Christians to push and advance one's own faith as much as possible under cover of contemporary ideas so as to make oneself acceptable. Antithesis was the last thing that was considered. To one's own detriment.

With regard to Jaspers we shall do well to engrave firmly within our minds the picture of a man who loudly protests when he is told that he cuts off communication with millions of comtemporaries and at the same time promulgates the "antithesis" against "Catholicity", to which also belongs the whole Christian orthodox faith in God's history of revelation and salvation in Christ Jesus, our Lord.

---

[14] *Op. cit.*, especially p. 832 ff.

THE DEAD SEA SCROLLS

BY

W. H. GISPEN *

In 1945 a bedouin, Mohammed ed-Dēb of the Taᶜmire tribe, in search of a lost goat, happened to find in a cave to the north-west of the Dead Sea, eleven leather and parchment scrolls, wrapped in linen and packed in jars which were part of them smashed.

Only in 1947 did the bedouin show them to a Bethlehem antiquary through a middleman.

The antiquary, a Moslem, thought the price which was demanded, 20 English pounds, too high.

Now the bedouin with some of his tribesmen turned to a Syrian merchant. The latter spoke about it with a colleague at Jerusalem and thus Athanasius Ješue Samuel, the metropolitan of the Syrian monastery of St. Mark at Jerusalem came to hear about it.

According to his own communication the metropolitan thought they were Syrian documents and in July, 1947 he bought 4 scrolls and some fragments from the bedouins. But he discovered that the scrolls were written in Hebrew. Therefore he called in the help of several friends. One of these friends was Dr. J. van der Ploeg, professor in the Roman Catholic University of Nijmegen (Holland).

The latter himself tells about it that in July 1947 he inspected the rolls for a few minutes at most and at once identified the larger scroll as a synagogue scroll of the book of Isaiah, while in another scroll he recognized texts from one of the minor prophets. The whole affair looked very suspicious to him. He thought they were medieval texts. As the earthenware, which the bishop had promised to send to the École biblique, never arrived there, he unfortunately decided erroneously — as he writes himself — to pay no further attention to the matter.

In the spring of 1948 the bishop turned to the American School of

* Prof. Dr. W. H. Gispen lectures in the Faculty of Theology of the Free University.

Oriental Research at Jerusalem, The Deputy Director Dr. J. C. Trever realized the significance of the scrolls and consulted Professor W. F. Albright in America, who spoke of "the greatest manuscript discovery of modern times".

The bishop gave The American School of Oriental Research the right to photograph and publish the scrolls that were in his possession, and thus in 1950 the first volume appeared of "The Dead Sea Scrolls of St. Mark's Monastery", containing the manuscript of Isaiah and the Commentary on Habakkuk. The editors were Millar Burrows, John C. Trever and William H. Brownlee. Besides the scrolls of Isaiah and Habakkuk there were among the documents in possession of the Syrian monastery two scrolls containing something like a set of rules for a religious community; and an additional scroll which was thought to contain a Lamech-apocalypse written in Aramaic, but which on being deciphered by scholars of the Hebrew University at Jerusalem in 1956, proved to be an Aramaic 'Midrash' on Genesis, an Aramaic translation of the book of Genesis, with all kinds of expansions. Perhaps this manuscript dates from the end of the first century before or from the first half of the first century after Christ, that is to say from the time of Jesus Himself. The book itself may be older. Yadin, one of the editors, proposes to call it "The Book of the Revelations and Legends from Genesis". Almost the whole of this scroll proved to be in such an extremely poor condition, that the text must be considered to be lost. Only 4 columns are fully preserved. The remainder merely consists of a few pieces and fragments. The complete columns deal with Gen. 12; 13; 14 and 15. The book has been edited by N. Avigad and Y. Yadin under the name: "A Genesis Apocryphon", in 1956.

But with these communications concerning this "Genesis Apocryphon" we are anticipating. So four of the eleven scrolls were bought by the metropolitan of the Syrian monastery of St. Mark at Jerusalem. The other part (that is to say six) of the eleven scrolls found, came into possession of the Hebrew University at Jerusalem. Afterwards it was found that four of these scrolls were fragments of *one* scroll, so that this group practically consists of three scrolls.

They had been purchased by the Hebrew University by Professor E. L. Smelik in November, 1947. He likewise bought two jars which were still whole. In January, 1948 through a Syrian antiquary at Jerusalem, the scrolls which were in possession of the Syrian monastery, were also offered for sale to Sukenik. Three of the scrolls Sukenik had on loan. He then copied some parts from the book of Isaiah and

from "The Manual of Discipline". But he had to return the scrolls to the antiquary and nothing more was heard from the Syrian monastery until at the end of February the news came that the metropolitan had decided to postpone the sale until conditions were normal again. Conditions of war made communications difficult. As we saw, the metropolitan then turned to the Americans.

The scrolls which came into possession of the Hebrew University are: (1) The Book of Hymns or Psalms of Thanksgiving (which borrow much from the Biblical Psalms); (2) The Book of the War of the Sons of Light and the Sons of Darkness; (3) an Isaiah scroll, which means therefore a second scroll of the book of the prophecies of Isaiah which is damaged however, and omits many parts; especially the first forty chapters are preserved in fragmentary condition.

Sukenik published parts of these texts in 1948. In this first part of his publication he also reproduced a few chapters of the Isaiah-scroll that was in the possession of the Syrian monastery. In 1950 a second volume of texts and fragments appeared. In 1954 the collected edition of the Dead Sea scrolls which were in possession of the Hebrew University was published at Jerusalem, edited by Sukenik, who had died in 1953.

The scrolls in possession of the Syrian monastery, also came into possession of the Hebrew University in 1954.

They were purchased in behalf of the state of Israel in America, for, it is said, 250,000 dollars.

An important rôle in the negotiations was played by the eldest son of Sukenik, general Yigal Yadin, the former commander-in-chief of the Israeli army, who made himself a name by his excavations at Hazor.

A Jewish journalist saw a small advertisement in 'Wallstreet Journal' under the heading "For sale-sundries" and called the attention of Yadin, who happened to be in America at the time, to it. Through middlemen the sale was effected. The bishop now lives in a residential village near New York.

In Israel a national foundation has been formed, under the name 'Keren Hechal Hasefer' 'The Shrine of the Book'. It will hold this and other manuscripts of Biblical and related literature in perpetual trust and exhibit them to the public for inspection. The seven Dead Sea scrolls will be exhibited in a special room of the new building of the Hebrew University.

Meanwhile more discoveries were made.

A Belgian lieutenant, Philippe Lippens, in the service of the United

Nations, persuaded the Arab legion to send two officers to the cave. These officers, the English colonel Ashton and the Arab captain Akash Bey arrived in the cave on 28 January, 1949. An Arab military post was stationed at the cave to guard it. In Amman, the capital of the kingdom of Jordan, Lippens came in contact with G. L. Harding, Director of Antiquities of Jordan. Harding and R. de Vaux, Director of l'Ecole biblique in the Jordan part of Jerusalem, systematically examined the cave in February and March, 1949. They took many potsherds of earthenware with them. They had to dig out the cave in a primitive manner, chiefly with knives. Only two men could work together in the place. It was found that in November, 1948 there had been clandestine visitors in the cave. The cave is difficult of access and is situated in a steep rock. In addition to the sherds mentioned already Harding and De Vaux found a fragment of a scroll and hundreds of snippets. Much tissue, too, was found by them. The sherds date from the Late Hellenist period, at least from the second century. A Roman lamp and a Roman boiling-pot were also found, probably left behind by a visitor of the cave.

The fragments are from Genesis, Leviticus, Deuteronomy and Judges.

As to Leviticus, they are parts of Lev. 19 : 31—34; 20 : 20—23; 21 : 24—22 : 3; 22 : 4, 5. Apart from minor differences of spelling, they agree with the traditional text. It is remarkable that these parts from Leviticus all belong to the so-called Law of holiness. But they shed no light on its supposed separate existence neither on its age.

In November and December, 1951 Harding and De Vaux made new discoveries. In Chirbet Qumrān, not far from the cave, they discovered the ruins of a building in which they found coins dating from the time of Augustus until the Jewish war of 66/70. Near the building a cemetery was discovered.

Harding and De Vaux think that this building was a monastery of the Essenes and that the manuscripts found in the cave belonged to the library of this Essene monastery. The rules of discipline found there would then be the rules of this sect.

Hitherto our knowledge of this sect of the Essenes was obtained from references to them in the works of Philo and Flavius Josephus. According to these writers the Essenes despised wealth, lived in community of goods and practised asceticism.

It is especially Dupont Sommer who in his publications about the Dead Sea scrolls associated the Essenes with the rise of Christianity.

Towards the end of 1951 a second cave with fragments of manuscripts was found by bedouins in the neighbourhood of Qumrān.

Then the Palestine Museum, the French School of Archaeology and the American Schools of Oriental Research decided to organize a systematic search of the whole region of Qumrān.

This examination began on 10 March, 1952 and lasted four weeks. Twenty-five caves yielded earthenware of the same type as had been found in the first cave and in the ruins of the monastery. A third cave was discovered which with the second yielded fragments of Leviticus, Exodus, Isaiah, Jeremiah, the Psalms, Ruth and of non-biblical texts in Hebrew and in Aramaic. In the third cave a leather manuscript was found with a set of rules which had probably hung in the monastery of Qumrān.

A copper scroll contains a collection of traditions about the places where treasures lie hidden. Mowinckel supposes that this is an inventory of the treasures of the first temple at Jerusalem, destroyed by Nebuchadnezzar.

Bedouins discovered another cave (VI), containing some fragments and also a passage from the so-called "Damascus document" or 'Damascus book' or 'The Zadokite Work'. This document was discovered in 1896 in the Genizah (lumberroom; a depository of sacred scrolls which were no longer used and were destined to be buried) in Cairo and published by Schechter in 1910.

The book was composed by a writer who emigrated from Jerusalem to Damascus. This man had established a religious community in Judea, which had to take refuge in Damascus.

This book contains in the Hebrew language the story of the origin of this sect, its separation from the Jews in Judea and its emigration to the territory of Damascus; its organization and the laws under which it lived. This sect held several views deviating from traditional Judaism. Eduard Meyer placed the document before the time of the Maccabees. F. F. Bruce thinks it possible that it is a generation later than the Qumrān Commentary on Habakkuk. Some are of opinion that we have to take "Damascus" as a designation of the area of the Dead Sea, to which in their view the sect had withdrawn.

Now as to the newly found scrolls, P. E. Kahle takes it that cave I is not, as Susenik thought, a real Genizah, but he makes the following supposition. At one time in the history of Judaism it was forbidden to have in one's possession sectarian literature or certain non-canonical books of the Old Testament. Now there were some readers or owners

of such texts who could not bring themselves to dispose of them altogether. They hid them in isolated places, carefully packed so that some time they might be able to get them out again and re-read them. What according to Seeligmann speaks for Kahle's theory is 'the careful wrapping as well as the sectarian character of the texts' [1].

Close to cave VI the bedouins found a new cave with manuscripts (cave IV). The Antiquities Department at once put a stop to this clandestine excavation and, assisted by the French School of Archaeology and the Palestine Museum, it began a methodical excavation itself, lasting from 22 to 29 September, 1952. Complete scrolls were not found; but what *was* found were innumerable fragments of Bible books in Hebrew, of the apocryphical book of Tobia in Hebrew and in Aramaic, Bible fragments in Greek, fragments of apocryphal and pseudepigraphical writings, of books of the sect, phylacteries, etc.

The phylacteries contain the passages: Deut. 5 : 1—6 : 9; 10 : 12—11 : 21; Ex. 13 : 1—10; 11—16. This is, therefore, more than the phylacteries of the orthodox Jews contain according to rabbinic rules, for these are only: Ex. 13 : 1—10, 11—16; Deut. 6 : 4—9; 11 : 13—21. Besides, the order in which the passages occur, differs on the phylacteries found in Qumrān, whereas the order of the phylacteria that are known, is fixed. K. G. Kuhn, who has made a special study of these phylacteria, calls attention to the Papyrus Nash which was already known and about which some further remarks will be made below.

Near cave IV the expedition, moreover, discovered another cave (V) containing fragments of manuscripts in bad condition.

Outside the Qumrān area, in various other places in the desert of Juda, bedouins discovered in the course of 1952 other caves which contained all possible kinds of Nabataean, Jewish, Christian and Arabic manuscripts.

And thus things have gone on: at present there are already as many as 11 caves in which something has been found.

In the caves of Murabba^{c}at 2 letters have been found of Bar Kochba and 11 of his letters have been found in a cave near Nachbal Chefer on the west coast of the Dead Sea on Israeli territory.

Bar Kochba was the pseudo Messiah from the Jewish revolt of 132—135. These letters show that he calls himself Simon ben Kosiba.

---

[1] *BiOr* 6, 1949, page 3.

The opinion that this name was connected with kazab (to lie) is therefore incorrect.

One letter addressed to a military commander, Jeshua ben Gilgola, refers to Galilaeans. It has been suggested that by these Galilaeans Christians may have been meant (Cf. Acts 1 : 10).

Many bedouins and scholars are now searching the rocks in Juda for manuscripts. Every now and then spectacular discoveries are announced.

In the cave at Nachal Chefer, where in 1960 the above-mentioned letters of Bar Kochba were found, an expedition of the Hebrew University found in 1961 about 60 papyri. They are written in Hebrew, Aramaic and Greek and date from the time of the Emperor Hadrian. A parchment scroll of the book of Jonah was also found. It contains the text in Greek. According to the reports this text shows differences from that in LXX, but marked points of agreement with the Massoretic text.

In the same cave skeletons were found, probably of partisans of Bar Kochba.

There are sound reasons to suspect that bedouins have also visited these caves in Israeli territory and that some of scrolls found by them there, have also found their way to Jordan.

From newspaper reports it appears that the Jordan government, which also has many scrolls in its possession, is now applying another method than formerly.

At first it presented scrolls, among others to the Mc Gill-University at Montreal, and to the Vatican, which made financial contributions to the archaeological department of the Jordan government. Afterwards it changed this procedure and adopted another method.

Dutch newspapers of March, 1961 described how the Jordan government sold the exclusive right to the study and publication of a Dead Sea scroll to the Netherlands Organization for Pure Scientific Research ("Z.W.O."). The scroll in question is a Targum on Job, found in cave XI of Qumrān. The Royal Netherlands Academy will nominate some scholars to study the document. After publication the scroll will remain in Jerusalem as a Dutch donation, since these documents may not leave Jordan.

This mode of procedure has been criticized. It has been called 'shameless traffic' and it has been pointed out that there are limits

to what the standing of the Western scholar can endure in this field.

The Mc Gill-University, the Vatican Library, the University of Manchester and other institutions are trying by means of diplomatic and legal actions to compel Jordan to deliver the scrolls and fragments which have been purchased and for the greater part paid for by them.

For science it is a most regrettable situation that the present political troubles are also playing a part in the matter of the publication of the scrolls.

The find of the Dead Sea Scrolls has revived the memory of Wilhelm Schapira, a Jewish antiquary in Jerusalem, who used to buy up many antiquities from the bedouins; in 1882 he was in possession of a leather scroll containing the Hebrew text of the book of Deuteronomy with deviations from the Massoretic text. Schapira offered this scroll for sale in London to the British Museum, but then he was unmasked as a forger by the French scholar Clermont-Ganneau. On 12 March, 1884 Schapira probably committed suicide at Rotterdam. No wonder that some curiosity is felt, if after all the so-called 'Schapira scroll' is genuine. According to the Jewish scholar Goshen the Schapira scroll is certainly a falsification. This statement is based by him on a study he made of some facsimiles that were made at the time of fragments of the Schapira scroll. The script of the scroll is entirely different from that of the Dead Sea scrolls. Schapira used characters which otherwise are only employed in carving in stone, and not for writing on leather, papyrus, etc. According to Goshen this is due to the fact that Schapira copied the characters of the Mesha inscription.

The number of publications about the finds is legion and increases day by day. A bibliography by C. Burchhard, published in 1957 and extending till 31 December, 1955 with additions up to May, 1956 and some months more, mentions: 1556 independent publications and 352 reviews by 616 authors in 22 languages.

Several theological periodicals have a column specially devoted to the Dead Sea scrolls.

Thus in 1961 the "Zeitschrift für die alttestamentliche Wissenschaft" started a column 'Spätjudentum und Qumrān' as part of the "Bücherschau".

There is a separate periodical "Revue de Qumrān".

There are several series giving translations of scrolls.

No doubt there lurks a danger here that some will only exclusively

occupy themselves with the Dead Sea scrolls. I read already somewhere that there are young scholars who after all would like to do something else instead of only working day in day out at joining bits and fragments and at attempts to decipher them. And this is understandable. Nevertheless, here, too, only specialization will prove effective. The field is even now already boundless.

The Jewish scholar Solomon Zeitlin is of opinion that the whole affair is a fraud, put up by the Syrians and that the famous Isaiah scroll belongs to the synagogue at Hebron which was destroyed by the Arabs in 1929. Zeitlin lives in America and writes articles on these discoveries in the Jewish Quarterly Review. He thinks it an appalling proof of dilettantism in science that medieval manuscripts are considered to date from the centuries round the beginning of the Christian era. Zeitlin has also defended his views at the congresses of orientalists held at Munich (1957) and at Moscow (1960). He has not received much support and he complains that his arguments are ignored.

With all due respect for the great knowledge which Zeitlin has of rabbinic Judaism, it must be observed that it is very unlikely indeed that we have to do with manuscripts from the middle ages. As researches in laboratories prove, the earthenware, the linen point to the Hellenist period, the time roundabout the beginning of the Christian era and prior to it. Moreover, the discovery of the monastery at Qumrān does not support Zeitlin's standpoint. And then there are also the letters of Bar Kochba. It is out of the question that it should be a fraud. We see from this that the Dead Sea scrolls are creating quite a stir. And this is likely to continue for some time.

It is time we said something about the significance of the discoveries. It lies both in the field of Old Testament Science and that of the New Testament.

We now have a great deal of material available for the manner in which the Hebrew script was written, and for the knowledge of the grammar of Hebrew.

Rudolf Meyer, who revised a Hebrew grammar in which he had also taken into account the Qumrān finds, points to their importance for our knowledge of the history of the Hebrew language. In these texts different dialectal forms are found side by side. We now have, as he calls them, "vormasoretische biblische und ausserbiblische Texte".

Pre-Massoretic texts ares those texts dating from a time when the

great traditionalists or Massoretes had not yet fixed the text of the Hebrew Bible as we know it.

Bearing in mind that the Hebrew Bible which we use nowadays is the rendering of a manuscript of the year 1008 or 1009, we understand how important it is that now we have at our disposal much older material for comparison, going back to the time of a century before or a century after Christ, perhaps even older. Before the discovery of the Dead Sea Scrolls we only had the Papyrus Nash, which was already mentioned above. On this papyrus a liturgical text is found consisting of the Decalogue (Ex. 20 : 2—17) and the so-called šema^{c} (Deut. 6 : 4 ff.). This text differs in some respects from the traditional or Masoretic text, e.g. in the order of the commandments. Besides it contains an introductory formula to Deut. 6 : 4, also preserved in LXX. The Papyrus Nash dates back to the first century after Christ; some even place it in the second century before Christ. And now we have since 1947 manuscripts and fragments, among which the scrolls of Isaiah, which are for a large part older than the Papyrus Nash. We can compare now. And it is not only the Isaiah scrolls that are available to us. It is for instance remarkable that a fragment of Exodus has been found, the text of which corresponds with that of the Samaritan codex of the Pentateuch. The latter must have been fixed about 400 B.C. Now I must immediately add that on the whole the text of the Samaritan codex is in my opinion inferior to that of the Massoretes. It makes the impression of giving a later redaction and elucidation. And it is probable that the Massoretes drew upon a better tradition.

In any case the Qumrān discoveries present many opportunities for the textual criticism of the Old Testament. Let me give you a few instances.

Isaiah 43 : 19 reads: "Behold, I will do a new thing; now it shall spring forth; shall ye not know it? I shall even make a way in the desert, rivers in the wilderness".

The word "rivers" made a strange impression.

One of the exegetes of Isaiah proposed to read instead of nēhārot (rivers): netībōt (paths). And the first scroll of Isaiah has: netībīm which also means: paths. Then we obtain the reading: "I shall even make a way in the desert and paths in the wilderness". The reading 'rivers' may have been caused by the eye wandering to the following verse, which reads: "because I give water in the desert, rivers in the wilderness to give drink to my people, my chosen".

A second example is furnished by Isaiah 53 : 11.

At the beginning of this verse stands a sentence that we can translate by: "Because of the travail of his soul he shall see." What he will see, it does not say. The first Isaiah scroll adds after "he shall see", "light". The sentence would then run: "because of the travail of his soul he shall see light". This reading is supported by LXX. It is possible that in this case we have to do with an attempt to solve the difficulty presented by the traditional text.

Another case concerns II Kings 20 : 7.

II Kings 20 : 1—11 deals with Hezekiah's disease and recovery, and the seventh verse reads: "And Isaiah said: "Take a cake of figs. And they took and laid it on the boil; and he recovered."

A German scholar, August Klostermann in his Commentary on the books of Samuel and Kings, which appeared in 1887, has a remark about Isaiah 38 : 21, 22. These two verses follow quite at the end of the story, after the song of thanksgiving by Hezekiah, which is absent in II Kings. In translation they read. "For Isaiah had said: Let them take a cake of figs, and lay it on the boil, and he shall recover. [22] And Hezekiah had said: What is the sign that I shall go up to the house of the Lord?" The last verse corresponds with II Kings 20 : 8.

Klostermann now makes the supposition that in Isaiah 38 verses 21 and 22 were reminiscences of the text in the book of Kings, which were added in the margin. Now the first Isaiah scroll has Isaiah 38 : 21, 22 in the margin, at least for the greater part. The second scroll, however, simply has these verses in the text. It is clear, therefore, that Klostermann made a remark which was not entirely without some foundation.

For the interpretation of the Old Testament it is not only "the Commentaries", such as the one on Habakkuk, but also the other books that have been found, which contain much that is of importance. Of this we will also give a few instances.

About the words in Habakkuk 2 : 4b ("but the just shall live by his faith") the Commentary observes: "The exegesis of these words refers to all who perform the law in the house of Juda, whom God shall deliver from the house of judgment because of their trouble and their faith in the Teacher of Righteousness."

We do not know who this 'Teacher of Righteousness' is. His enemy is 'the wicked Priest'.

Numbers 24 : 17 and 24 are often quoted in the Qumrān scrolls.

Verse 17 is Balaam's well-known prophecy of 'a star from Jacob' and 'a sceptre out of Israel'. Verse 24 contains Balaam's word about 'ships from the coast of the Kittites'. On the strength of verse 17 the above-mentioned Bar Kosiba, the leader of the Jewish revolt against the Romans (132—135) was considered by Rabbi Akiba to be the Messiah and called Bar Kochba ('Son of the Star') by early Christian writers.

Verses 17—19 are cited in 'the war of the sons of light and the sons of darkness'.

This is another proof that this prophecy of Balaam about the star 'from Jacob' was highly in favour among the Jews in the beginning of our era, although it must be admitted that we cannot very well speak of a Messianic view, since the prophecy refers to the power exercised, thanks to God, by Israel itself. A. S. van der Woude, who wrote a thesis on: "Die messianischen Vorstellungen der Gemeinde von Qumrân" [2] points out that in this passage of the Dead Sea scroll referred to, the power of God is decisive, not the power of His church.

In connexion with the public ministry of Jesus it is in my opinion of real importance that from the fact that this prophecy of Balaam was so much beloved, also in the circles of the Qumrān community, we can draw the conclusion that in this community, too, the deliverance from earthly enemies and from the oppression by these enemies, played a great rôle. That Jesus came to deliver His people from their sins, was something that did not find a congenial climate in the world of thought of His contemporaries or His immediate predecessors.

In the interpretation of Numbers 24 : 24 the Dead Sea scrolls cannot be ignored nowadays.

One of the new exegetes, H. Schneider, in his Commentary of 1952, accordingly refers to "The war of the sons of light and the sons of darkness" and the Habakkuk scroll. By the Kittites mentioned there, he understands as far as former document is concerned, the Hellenist Seleucids and Ptolemies. In the Habakkuk scroll they stand in his opinion for the Syrian Seleucids.

Others, e.g. H. H. Rowley are of the same opinion.

But there are also scholars who think that the Romans are meant.

---

[2] Assen, 1957.

Thus van der Woude holds the view that at any rate in the Habakkuk scroll the reference is to the Romans. F. F. Bruce, too, is inclined to give preference to the Romans. H. Mulder considers the statements of the Commentary on Habakkuk to be so vague that his description of the Kittites can refer both to the Romans and to the Seleucids. According to Edelkoort the Seleucids and the Ptolemies are meant in the scroll of the war; he takes it that in the Habakkuk scroll the Romans are meant. Van der Ploeg holds the view that the Kittites of Assur represent the Syria of the Seleucids. In van der Ploeg's view, the writer of the Commentary on Habakkuk speaks about the Romans in after years. And more authors could be mentioned.

It is clear that as yet there is no certainty about the interpretation of the Dead Sea Scrolls. And also, that the exegesis of the Old Testament should on no account ignore the new discoveries.

As far as the Old Testament is concerned, a few more things could be said. Thus it is a remarkable fact that the Commentary on Habakkuk does not go further than chapter 2 : 20. It is also a fact that fragments of the book of Samuel dating from the first century B. C. agree with the text of LXX, which accordingly apparently translated from a Hebrew text other than the Massoretic text. For the translation of Joel 2 : 23: "for He gives you the teacher of righteousness" a stronger case can be made out, in my opinion, after these discoveries than for the translation advocated by many: "for He gives you the former rain of righteousness".

But we must guard against entering into the questions in detail.

What we have to consider is the fact that for the Old Testament exegesis there will be many things which are curious, but not of great value, e.g. for Christian preaching. This will become clear when we read, for instance, the fragment that has been found of the apocryphal book of Genesis, which can be looked upon as a midrash on the Biblical text.

The discoveries are of great importance for New Testament Science. The sect in question (probably the Essenes) can be studied more fully. The circumstances under which Jesus performed his ministry, now become clearer, as far as the Jewish nation of his days is concerned. We understand better a character like John the Baptist. The Messianic hope of Simeon and Anna, also evident from the hymns of Zacharias and Mary, is placed against a larger background. At the Free Univer-

sity a thesis [3] was devoted to the question whether in the Epistle to the Hebrews we are concerned with a book which, like the commentator in the Habakkuk scroll, for instance, applied the midrash method of interpretation.

The famous German scholar J. Jeremias pointed out the significance of the scrolls for the study of the New Testament [4]. Although fully recognising this importance particularly from a philological point of view, he emphasizes the fact that the scrolls present a clear contrast to the teaching of Jesus. The Essenes, from whom the scrolls in his opinion originate, insisted on the Old Testament Church showing that it fulfilled the law; Jesus called sinners to a world of unfathomable love and joy.

We should express this differently, but we can agree with the view that we have to do here with two different worlds, i.e. with the world of Judaism and that of Christianity, which are both unthinkable without the Old Testament.

Unfortunately the problem of the relationship between the Dead Sea Scrolls and the New Testament has been drawn within the sphere of the sensational. A. Dupont Sommer and the journalist E. Wilson have asserted that the scrolls reveal a pre-Christian Christianity. A great similarity is said to exist between Jesus and the Teacher of Righteousness. In this connexion the name of J. Allegro should be mentioned.

In Great Britain and America this created quite a commotion and both Christian and Jewish scholars were accused of a lack of courage to face the truth with which the Dead Sea scrolls confronted them. Now this is absolutely untrue and many scholars have challenged these views [5].

But as is frequently the case: once a sensational assertion has been made, something of it will always linger on.

A decidedly spectacular statement was made by Moscow Radio declaring that the scrolls are new proofs of the fact that Jesus Christ never existed. They have had their share in revealing to us how legends about a non-existent saviour arose. The writers of the Gospel used the tenets of the pre-Christian Essenes about a Teacher of Righteousness and expanded them with eastern myths about dying

---

[3] S. Kistemaker, *The Psalm Citations in the Epistle to the Hebrews* (Amsterdam, 1961).

[4] See J. Jeremias, *The Qumrān Texts and the New Testament* (in Expository Times 60, 1958/59, pp. 68, 69).

[5] e.g. van der Ploeg, Gaster, Rowley and others.

gods who afterwards again rose from the dead, and wrote the story of the birth, preaching and death of a man called Jesus Christ, who never existed.

Thus we see that this matter, too, centres round the answer to the question: "What think ye of Christ?" [6]

It is possible to read and supplement and interpret the Dead Sea Scrolls in such a way that they say what they cannot say, because they do not treat of Jesus and of Christianity.

The object of this article was merely to rouse interest in these finds and to point out that they are among the most important discoveries ever made in the field of Oriental science. And since the discoveries go on and continue to be deciphered, everything that is written and read about them, is soon out of date.

---

[6] Matth. 22 : 42.

NEWS ABOUT THE UNIVERSITY

DISSERTATIONS

In the course of the Academic year 1960/61 the following dissertations were defended.

In the Faculty of Theology:

J. H. SCHEEPERS, *Die gees van God en die gees van die mens in die Ou Testament*. Kampen, J. H. Kok N.V., 1960 (345 p.).
(*The spirit of God and the spirit of man in the Old Testament*).
(The thesis is in Afrikaans, with an extensive English summary).

This thesis deals with the question as to the meaning of the word "spirit" (Hebrew: ruah) in the Old Testament. In the English translation this Hebrew word is rendered *inter alia* by wind, breath, courage, spirit, Spirit. This raises several problems, e.g. why is the same word used for the wind, the spirit and the Spirit of God? What is the basic idea why "ruah" is used of man? In the Old Testament the word is used to render the contrast between the ideas flesh and spirit? The author's conclusions are that in Gen. 1:2, "ruah" should have been translated by "wind" and not by "spirit"; that the working of the spirit in the old dispensation was not only temporary and of a transitory nature and that in the Old Testament, in contradistinction to the New Testament, the spirit was not considered a personal being.

J. J. F. DURAND, *Una sancta catholica in sendingsperspektief*. Amsterdam, W. ten Have N.V., 1961 (287 p.).
(*Una sancta catholica in missionary perspective*).
(In Afrikaans with an English Summary).

The writer gives a short survey of the data of Scriptura concerning the unity of the church; then follows a discussion of the problems of unity and diversity as they present themselves in the various mission fields, particularly as a result of so-called "non-theological" factors. The disunity in the mission field is naturally caused by the circumstance that different missionary bodies and churches have worked there, so that the disunity of the Western churches was imported there. The discussion of the ecumenical effort in the missions leads to a treatment of the integration of the International Missionary Council in the World Council of Churches. A detailed treatment

follows of the movements for reunion in the mission fields (the rise of the United Church of South India and the Kyodan in Japan). In the author's opinion it has become clear that in these movements this union was not brought about by a quantitative reduction of the confession, but much more by a concentration of it.

J. M. E. CRUVELLIER, *L'exégèse de Romains 7 et le mouvement de Keswick*. 's-Gravenhage, Pasmans, 1961 (215 p.).

R. H. BREMMER, *Herman Bavinck als dogmaticus*. Kampen, J. H. Kok N.V., 1961 (472 p.).
(*Herman Bavinck as dogmatic theologian*).

The writer describes the person of Bavinck both on the strength of data furnished by unpublished letters and by printed documents. In the first part Bavinck's personal contacts with Abraham Kuyper and the "ethical" and "modernist" theologians of his time are discussed. The author duly relates the personal correspondence and Bavinck's public reactions to the theologians he discusses and attacks among others J. H. Gunning; P. D. Chantepie de la Saussaye; T. E. Daubanton; A. M. Brouwer and also Abraham Kuyper.

In the second part ("Analysis") a systematic survey is given of Bavinck's dogmatic views. By a comparison of the various editions of Bavinck's "Dogmatics" he is able to outline the growth of his dogmatic ideas.

Philosophers (Plato and Aristotle) and theologians (Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, Calvin and Kuyper) prove to have infuenced Bavinck's mode of thought.

The third part (Retrospect and Prospect) describes the development of Reformed theology in the Netherlands after the death of the great pioneers Kuyper and Bavinck. Karl Barth's message inspired renewed reflection in all sections of dogmatics. According to the author there is in spite of all kinds of differences between the various churches more agreement among the Reformation theologians of the last few decads than is generally thought, and Bavinck's views could contribute to further reflection and study. The writer finally discusses the growth and development of Bavinck's ideas, availing himself of biographical data and gives an estimate of Bavinck's future significance for church and theology. Two lengthy appendices (the correspondence between Bavinck and Rev. T. M. ten Hoor in 1895 and a detailed bibliography) conclude the book.

S. KISTEMAKER, *The psalm citations in the epistle to the Hebrews*. Amsterdam, Wed. G. van Soest N.V., 1961 (167 p.).

The author successively discusses the citations from a liturgical, hermeneutic, exegetical and theological angle. He comes to the conclusion that the Epistle to the Hebrews is based upon four citations from the Psalms. This is proved by the fact that it is precisely these four citations which are interpreted and applied. The writer has studied the Epistle to the Hebrews

in the light of the working-method — the midrasj presjer — followed in the commentaries on the Scriptures, found at the Dead Sea.

In the Faculty of Law:

M. B. VAN DER HOEVEN, *De schoolstrijd in Frankrijk, in het bijzonder tijdens de derde republiek.* Amsterdam, J. M. Meulenhoff, 1960 (136 p.).
(*The struggle for the free school in France, in particular during the Third Republic*).

In the Middle Ages already there existed a school conflict, between the State and the Church. After the Reformation this turned into a conflict between the Church and the Huguenots. During the ancien régime there was the monopoly of the church. The French revolution and also the University of Napoleon weakened indeed the position of the Church, but during the Restoration the Church dominated the University, and this situation was legalized by the Falloux act. The third Republic witnessed the struggle for a free school which ended in the lay school (Ferry; Combes). The laicized stateschool is a monopoly school. It is true that the Barangé Act and the Debré Act in January 1960, brought the beginning of state aid, but the struggle for the free school in France rages on.

H. J. HOMMES, *Een nieuwe herleving van het natuurrecht.* Zwolle, W. E. J. Tjeenk Willink, 1961 (257 p.).
(*A new revival of natural law*).

The writer compares the various theories of natural law, particularly those developed in Western Germany since the second world war and examines the rôle natural law played in the constitutions and jurisprudence of Western Germany.

In order to arrive at as clear and distinct a sketch as possible of the views of natural law in question, they have been placed against the background of the traditional concept of natural law, which in this study is outlined on the basis of a general survey of the development of the West European views of natural law from Greek antiquity down to the nineteenth century.

In his investigation the writer follows the transcendental-critical method as it has been developed by Professor H. Dooyeweerd.

G. WESTERINK, *Doornspijk en Elburg,* rechtshistorisch onderzoek naar de ontwikkeling van de gebruiks- en eigendomsrechten op de grond. Assen, Van Gorcum & Comp. N.V., 1961 (264 p.).
(*Doornspijk and Elburg,* a study of the development of the rights of use and ownership of landed property).

This study, based on an examination of public records, deals with the development of the rights of use and ownership of landed property in Doornspijk and Elburg, and is a contribution to a better knowledge of the

pre-feudal manorial estates which existed in the area of investigation. Further the thesis contains detailed description of the rise and growth of the town of Elburg.

It is also of topical importance in that it criticizes the statutory provisions concerning the rights of use and ownership, in the newly established "Mheen Foundation". From the point of view of law history the locally restricted investigation is the only satisfactory way to obtain a general insight into the legal history of the rights of use and ownership in landed property in the Netherlands.

A. C. DE RUITER *De grenzen van de overheidstaak in de antirevolutionaire staatsleer*. Kampen, J. H. Kok N.V., 1961 (100 p.).
(*The limits of the duty of the government in the anti-revolutionary theory of the state*).

The greater part of this study consists of a historical-critical survey dealing with the views on the duty of the state held by Groen van Prinsterer, Kuyper, De Savornin Lohman, Fabius, Colijn and others. Most attention has been given to the writings of Dr. Kuyper, who by positing the principle of the "sphere sovereignty" has greatly influenced anti-revolutionary thought and actions, also on the point of the activities of the State. The author denies that there are definite fields in which government interference is a priori inadmissible.

Following the steps of Professor Dooyeweerd, he sees the fundamental limitation of the duty of the government in the constant structure of the state which has public justice for its leading principle. He also considers a considerable limitation of government action to be the essential independence of the non-state communities and structures within society; an idea which from of old has played a significant rôle in the calvinist views on the state.

A. D. ROBINSON, *Dutch organized agriculture in international politics*. 's-Gravenhage, Martinus Nijhoff, 1961 (200 p.).

This is a case study in the political behaviours of pressure groups. It has for its subject the political activities of the Netherlands organized agriculture in the years 1945—1960 in connexion with international economic problems. These activities are a striking example of the ever growing significance of national pressure groups in the international political process. The author investigates the nature, i.e. the intensity, the ways and manners, and the effect, and the determinants of the political activities with regard to various important international questions which have presented themselves since the end of the second world war such as the problem in Benelux, the proposals for a West European agrarian integration, the negotiations and the approbation of the Treaty for establishing the European Economic Community, the carrying out of the above Treaty, the relationships between the countries of the European Economic Community and other West European countries, and the problems of the world trade in agricultural

products. These political activities were mainly directed to the Netherlands government and the States General, but they were also directed to various international organs of an inter-governmental or inter-parliamentary nature.

In the Faculty of Medicine:

T. BEIJER, *Chloorthiazide*. Haarlem, De Erven F. Bohn N.V., 1960 (234 p.). (*Chlorothiazide*).

In this thesis the results have been laid down of an investigation into the activity of a diuretic substance, chlorothiazide which unlike the formerly much used mercury compounds, need not be given by injection.

In the vast majority of the cases, in which there was an excessive accumulation of fluid in the body, chlorothiazide proved to expel this redundant quantity in the same efficient manner in which this was formerly only possible with injections.

Injurious side effects of the drug were seldom noticed.

J. J. COBBEN, *De opvattingen van Johannes Wier over bezetenheid, hekserij en magie*. Assen, Van Gorcum & Comp. N.V., 1960 (193 p.). (*The views of Johannes Wier on demoniacal possession, witchcraft and magic*).

Johannes Wier was one of the first to claim for medical man in certain cases the control over the human mind.

Especially in his principal work "De Praestigiis Daemonum et Incantationibus ac Veneficiis" he has expounded his views.

In this study a survey is given of Wier's views on the human mind. After a short sketch of his life and a schematic conspectus of the 16th century medicine and world of thought (especially concerning the witch-cult and witch trial) an analytical extract is given of Wier's main book. After a brief discussion of his other works attention is given to his influence in his own time and shortly after. In an appendix a bibliography is given of Wier's works.

C. VAN DER MEER, *De totale hoeveelheid lichaamswater bij decompensatio cordis*. Assen, Van Gorcum & Comp. N.V., 1960 (147 p.). (*Total body water in congestive heart failure*).

Patients suffering from congestive heart failure show an accumulation of fluid in the body (oedema). This is attended with a simultaneous accumulation of sodium. By means of the so-called dilution technique whereby heavy water and radio-active sodium were used, total body water and total exchangeable sodium were ascertained, both during the disease and after recovery. From the data obtained the conclusion is drawn that such patients with congestive heart failure retained more sodium than water in relation to the extracellular composition. By means of other

experiments it is made plausible this excess of sodium enters the body cells, while potassium is lost, and that on the other hand the sodium is possibly bound to the polysaccharides of collagenous cement substance.

M. TIMMER, *Child mortality and population pressure in the D. I. Jogjakarta, Java, Indonesia.* Rotterdam, Bronder-Offset, 1961 (501 p.).

In the island of Java the population increases rapidly, chiefly on account of a high birth-rate. Over considerable areas the soil deteriorates in quality under the influence of erosion or is even totally lost.

The problem of a growing population and of decreasing harvests is shown among other things by a chronic starvation of great numbers of infants and babies and a lowering of the prosperity level. The problem described in this study is a vital one, not only in Java, but also for many other territories, such as India, Pakistan, China, Formosa, Hong Kong, Japan, Egypt and Puerto Rico. The development in Indonesia showed that little has come of a building-up of industry and a removal of inhabitants from Java to other areas of the country, while moreover for the near future little is to be expected. The greatest hindrance in finding a solution is apparently the fact that the Java population itself is not aware of the problem. In order to appeal to the sense of responsibility of those who can exercise an influence on this situation, in which tens of thousands of children are born every year without there being any food for them, a documentation of this infant misery seemed to be essential.

The author expresses the hope that the Javanese churches which have come into existence there also by the missionary work of the Reformed Churches (Gereformeerde Kerken), and the Netherlands' Reformed Church (Ned Hervormde Kerk) will feel called upon to reflect on the needs of their own people, for it is difficult to see that in the attempts at finding a solution, a realization of responsible parenthood and of the significance of marriage can be left out of it. The Javanese marriage is deeply influenced by Hinduism.

In the Faculty of Mathematics and Physics

W. KUYK, *Over het omkeerprobleem van de galoistheorie.* Amsterdam, Wed. G. van Soest N.V., 1960 (59 p.).
(*On the inverse problem of the Galois Theory*).

P. A. ROUKEMA, *Synthesis and biochemical properties of a series of substituted dimethylaminoethyl aryl (2-pyridyl) carbinol ethers.* Amsterdam, Wed. G. van Soest N.V., 1960 (68 p.).

Proceeding from alkyl-substituted phenyl-(2-pyridyl)-carbinols a series of β-dimethylamino ethyl-aryl-(2-pyridyl)-carbinol-ethers were synthetized. The U.V. spectra of the compounds were measured and an investigation was made how they influence the metabolism of the cortex of rat's brains

in vitro. The author examined the effect on the use of oxygen and the changes appearing in the amino acid pattern, especially of γ-amino butyric acid and L-glutaminic acid.

For the quantitative determination of amino acids one-dimensional paper chromatography was employed. The synthetized compounds in general retard the oxydative metabolism. Moreover during the metabolism the amino acids in the brain-tissue are shifting to the incubation medium. The effect on these shifts is the greater according as the alkylic substituents become larger and as their number increases. On the basis of the supposition that the supply of energy is disturbed, an explanation of the whole is given.

N. SPRONK, *Thyroid gland fractions of cockerels and radioiodine metabolism.* Groningen, J. B. Wolters, 1960 (44 p.).

By using radio-active iodine and by applying special fractionating and chromatographical techniques, an investigation was made as to the place of the hormonic synthesis in the thyroid glands of cockerels. It was found that the epithelial cells were able to effectuate the hormonic formation themselves. This observation shows that the view prevailing in present-day research, viz. that the whole formation of hormones takes place in the lumina of the thyroid gland follicles, is one-sided.

F. M. KLAASSEN, *Generation-recombination noie in semiconductors with traps and recombination centres.* Amsterdam, Broos. 1961 (95 p.).

The writer describes the connexion between the statistic process of the rise and disappearance of free electrons and the spontaneous fluctuations in the electric resistance of semi-conducting crystals. For three different types of semiconductors the average magnitude of the fluctuations has been calculated and compared with experiments made at —200 degrees C. and room temperature. It has been found that these kind of fluctuation phenomena are of fundamental importance for the development of physics of transistors and infra-red detectors.

H. VAN DUIN, *Bijdrage tot de vloeistof verdelingschromatografie der alifaten.* Rotterdam, 1961 (131 p.).
(Contribution to the liquid-liquid chromatography of aliphatic compounds) (with an English summary).

The investigation chiefly dealt with the examination of flavourings in dairy products by partition chromatography. In this connection an extensive study was made of the possibilities which are furnished by partition chromatography for the separation and identification of aliphatic compounds. The thesis contains a résumé of the fundamental part of this investigation. It consists of a number of theoretical discussions about the liquid-liquid selective chromatography of homologues and describes the experimental verification of the possibilities of analyzing aliphatic compounds resulting from it, in particular of aliphatic aldehydes and ketones.

J. P. BRANDS, *A preliminary investigation into some properties of α-β unsaturated aliphatic methyl esters by means of alkaline hydrolysis and gas-liquid chromatography*. Amsterdam, 1961 (63 p.).

In this thesis the synthesis is described of some methyl esters of unsaturated fatty acids. To control the purity the well-known gas-chromatographic technique was adopted, which was also used to separate some compounds from the mixtures obtained. The saponification velocity of the esters was registered continuously by means of a specially constructed apparatus.

In the Faculty of Literature and Philosophy

W. A. SMIT, *Pastoraal-psigologiese verkenning van die client-centred terapie van Carl R. Rogers*. Kampen, J. H. Kok N.V., 1960 (345 p.). *(Pastoral psychological reconnaissance of the client-centred therapy of Carl R. Rogers)*.
(In Afrikaans with an English summary).

In this study the 'client-centred therapy' of the American psychologist Rogers, Wisconsin University, is from a pastoral psychological angle examined as to its usefulness for the pastorate. An attempt is made to ascertain in how far this form of therapy is fundamentally and practically useful and necessary for the pastoral work of the minister. Pastoral psychology wishes to aid the pastor to do his work as fruitfully as possible. Although the author finds in Rogers' conception of man several aspects which he considers unacceptable by the pastor, yet the client-centred therapy is in many respects helpful for the pastor, giving hem directives for the pastoral contacts with individuals and groups.

R. TURKSMA, *De geschiedenis van de opleiding tot onderwijzer in Nederland aan de Openbare, Protestants-Christelijke en Bijzonder-Neutrale instellingen*. Groningen, J. B. Wolters. 1961 (260 p.).
(The history of the training of teachers in the Netherlands in State-schools, Protestant free schools and Non-denominational free schools).

In the Faculty of Economic Sciences:

J. VAN KLINKEN, *Kerk en gezinsmaatschappelijk werk*. Groningen, Jan Haan N.V., 1961 (205 p.).
(Church and family welfare work; some connections between form of organization and integration in the "Reformed Churches" (Gereformeerde Kerken) in the Netherlands).

The question is asked whether the integration of the family welfare work and the "Reformed Churches" taking part in it, is influenced by the form

of organization of this family social work. The concept family social work is developed by the author on theoretical and practical grounds. The study is based on questionnaires sent to 56 organizations for social work — some church, others interchurch and mixed. Sixty-five social workers are associated with them. An analysis is given of the administrative duties which are of importance for the integration investigated by the author. This investigation shows that frequency and nature of the contacts between the social workers and the diaconates are more favourable in the case of church organizations than of interchurch and mixed organizations. On the boards of church organizations the church is not proportionally represented, neither according to professional groups nor to sex. The middle-class groups and the male members strongly preponderate. In interchurch organizations the situation is similar. In the mixed organizations there is a particularly strong representation of 'intellectuals' on the board, the female element being very small here. Again and again the study shows the very special place taken by the church officers, who will frequently refer clients to the relief organizations.

H. J. ZUTHEM, *De integratie van de onderneming als sociologisch vraagstuk*. Assen, Van Gorcum & Comp. N.V., 1961 (265 p.).
(*The integration of the undertaking as sociological problem*).

In this thesis the integration of the undertaking as such as well as the integration in society are subjects of discussion.

As to the integration of the undertaking the conclusion is drawn that in general social integration has failed to keep up with normative integration. There is a shortage of trained executives able to take a leading part in achieving social integration. Since division of labour and specialization will steadily increase, greater social integration will have to be effected by communication and intervivium.

In this connexion the all-important question is the responsibility and accountability of man in the undertaking.

The last subject discussed by the writer is the importance of the social management of the undertaking for integration. This policy touches

(a) the consequences of a particular view of man for the social management aiming at integration;
(b) the problem of the power and accountability in the undertaking and in particular its institutionalization;
(c) the problems connected with the ownership of the undertaking and the building-up of income;
(d) the tension between organization and integration.

IN MEMORIAM PROFESSOR DR. R. VAN DIJK

On the sixteenth of June, 1962, Professor van Dijk lost his life in a motorcar accident. He attained the age of 55.

Professor van Dijk, who was one of the editors of this periodical, had taught sociology at our University since 1949, at first exclusively in the Economic Faculty, afterwards also in the interfaculty of sociology and politicology, which had meanwhile been founded. He was the first professor of sociology in the Free University and it is especially owing to his activities that this discipline could fully develop.

Professor van Dijk, who had studied Indology at the State University of Leyden, began his career as a civil servant in the former Netherlands Indies. After the second world war he was appointed Lecturer in Indonesian constitutional law at Leyden University. In that period he graduated on a thesis: "Samenleving en adatrechtsvorming" (society and growth of customary law). In this work his philosophical, anthropological and sociological interests clearly came to the fore.

When in 1949 the Free University invited him to occupy the new chair of sociology, he gave himself to the study of this subject heart and soul. As an adherent of Dooyeweerd's System of Philosophy he kept to his philosophic starting-point, on which all his scientific work is based. In his short life as sociologist Van Dijk naturally had not the opportunity of publishing much. In addition to a number of articles and reviews two books by him saw the light: Mens en Medemens (Man and Fellow-man) and: Vrijheid en Gebondenheid van de mens in de samenleving (Freedom and Responsibility of Man in Society).

As a teacher Van Dijk had a great influence on his students. He succeeded in inspiring them with a love of sociology as a discipline, both by his manner of teaching and by his personal contact with his students.

Moreover, Van Dijk exercised a great influence in Christian Reformed circles in the Netherlands, especially by making them open to sociology and sociological research. He took the initiative in 1954 for founding the Reformed Sociological Institute, which institute undertakes sociological research work in behalf of the churches of reformed confession.

In Memoriam Professor Dr. R. van Dijk

The Free University has suffered a great loss by the death of Professor van Dijk. We have lost in him a good friend and a good colleague, who never omitted seeking after the connexion between Christian faith and science, and always in his conversation stimulated others to do this.

F. DE ROOS

CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTIONS TO SOCIAL INSURANCE

BY

J. F. RANG *

§ 1. *Introduction.*

In the Netherlands social legislation, and also in the jurisprudence bearing upon it, a number of provisions and judgements occur which may be said to be, if not unique in the world, at any rate typically Dutch. The cause lies in the fact that the Netherlands labour law is more strongly infused with discussions about the underlying principle than is the case in any other country. A Dutchman will ask first of all after the legal ground which is connected with his fundamental view on certain social events as part of his philosophy of life, his religion [1]. The consequence of this attitude is that in the statutory rules divergent regulations are included in order to meet special (religious) objections. The following examples will show this:

In the Labour Act, containing a regulation for the weekly day of rest falling on the Sunday, a different rule is found for those belonging to a denomination observing the weekly rest-day on the Sabbath or 'the seventh day'.

In the Collective Agreement Act it is provided that a stipulation binding an employer not or exclusively to engage workers of a particular religious or political conviction or members of a particular association, is null and void.

Under the Workmen's Compensation laws a compensation can be paid for burial expenses. In executing them the relative regulation was interpreted in such a way that the compensation was also paid in case of cremation. The Central Board of Appeal considered this to be incorrect and adhered to the literal meaning of the word.

---

* Dr. J. F. Rang has studied law in the Faculty of Law at the Free University: he wrote his doctor's thesis on *Kernproblemen van de algemene ouderdomsverzekering* (Basic problems of the National Old-age Insurance Scheme), Amsterdam, 1960.

[1] Cf. M. G. Levenbach, *Het Nederlandse in onze arbeidswetgeving* (the Dutch character of our labour laws) in *Arbeidsrecht* (Labour law), Alphen aan den Rijn, 1951.

The Washington Convention of 1919 relating to the work of women before and after confinement, could not be ratified, because the maternity benefit under the Health Insurance Act was limited in 1929 to the married woman.

Our special aim is at present to discuss the regulations made in social insurance legislation in behalf of those who have conscientious objections to any kind of insurance. The regulation in question we meet with for the first time in the Act of 4 December, 1920 und which act the Disablement Insurance Act was altered. Since then it has also been applied to the other social insurance acts, either directly in the sense that the compulsorily insured are exempted from certain obligations, or indirectly — as is the case e.g. in the Act dealing with the compulsory participation in an industrial pension fund, in which act it is provided that a request to make this obligatory has to be refused by the Minister, if for instance the rules and regulations of the fund do not contain provisions concerning the manner in which conscientious objections are met.

The Legislature has found the following solution to this problem. He who has conscientious objections to the insurance regulated by law, can with due observance of rules and conditions to be laid down later, be exempted from the obligations to be stated in that measure, which have been imposed upon him under the act. This exemption can be granted when the person concerned has declared that he has preponderant conscientious objections to any kind of insurance whatsoever, and that consequently he has insured neither himself, nor anybody else, nor his property. Financially the conscientious objector cannot profit by it, because when the exemption is granted, he is assessed in income tax for an amount (at least) equal to the premium which is not levied.

§ 2. *Three forms of conscientious objections.*

In order to obtain a true insight into the nature of the conscientious objections to social insurance and into the problems confronting the Legislature in making it obligatory, it is desirable to state briefly what factors play a part here. It is generally held that human conscience is concerned with the judgment about good and evil [2], which judgment

[2] For a survey see: P. Prins: *Het geweten* (Conscience), Delft, 1937; W. J. Aalders, *Het geweten* (Conscience), Groningen, 1935; P. Kleene, *Wet en Geweten* (Law and Conscience), Roermond, 1926; J. Remmelink and D. van Eck, *Prae-*

is dependent on one's view of life and is based either on the acceptance of the judgment of other people or on the intellectual insight of man himself or on the acceptance of revealed divine authority. It is obvious that the Christian will have to start from the third source, unconditionally. The conscience of man in fact appeals to a higher knowledge. Hence conscience is not only connected with authority, but also with law (meant as a norm, a standard) [3] and freedom (freedom of conscience). These relations continually bring man into conflict situations which arise in applying in social life what the voice of conscience whispers to him to be good. We notice this, for instance, in the collisions between the judgment of the subject and that of the state. We can distinguish several varieties, three in number. First of all we meet with conscientious objections without any more. Thus the state may make specific rules with respect to divorce, which rules some Christians cannot harmonize with what God has revealed in the Bible on this subject. They have a conscientious scruple and on that ground they will reject every appeal to this rule as being unchristian.

The conscientious objection, however, may pass into an 'urge' of conscience, also named 'a call'. The rule imposed by the state has such an effect on the objector that he feels it his duty to do something to oppose it and to show that this rule when considered in the light of conscience (i.e. his conscience) must be held to be incorrect: e.g. distributing a manifesto making an appeal to refuse military service.

Finally there is the conscientious struggle, in which situation the objector may find himself when the state demands of him an act colliding with what is considered by his conscience to be right. In this case we can think e.g. of compulsory immunization, military service, social insurance, education, etc. Now it is this spiritual need which in some cases has induced the state to allow divergent regulations. To preclude misunderstanding we wish to point out emphatically that the distinctions made by us exclusively refer to the attitude of the subject towards a regulation made by the state,

---

adviezen voor de Nederlandse Juristenvereniging (Reports submitted to the Netherlands Association of Jurists), Zwolle, 1960; under the title: Should the legislator make further rules of a general or a special nature concerning the appeal to conscientious objections to the observance of norms sanctioned by criminal law?

[3] This relationship becomes clear e.g. in the legal ground. By this term we understand not the intellectual formulation of what is self-evident to the spontaneous sense of law (Levenbach, loc. cit. p. 300), but the concrete positivation of the legal principles for a particular regulation, the justification which follows from God's commandments. Conscience is naturally concerned with this.

irrespective of the question whether this regulation is directly applicable to him[4]. Another distinction is also possible, to wit: objections to the nature of the regulation made, to the possible consequences and the compulsory imposition of this rule. In our opinion the so-called 'political' objections can also be held to be conscientious objections, if and in so far there is at least question of a conflict situation in which conscience must find itself. The individual interest or the interest of the group can never be decisive. It also follows from what has been said that conscientious objections need not be exclusively of a religious character; a non-christian can just as well have conscientious objections.

Applying the results obtained to the regulation of the conscientious objections to social insurance, we see that here there are three groups of conscientious objections as well.

The first group (conscientious objections in a narrow sense) is formed by the objections to insurance itself. These objections are based on the consideration that insurance is fundamentally objectionable, because it is an unlawful attempt to intervene in divine providence. They flow directly from the nature of insurance.

In the second group (conscientious objections in a wide sense) we are concerned with those objections connected with the possible consequences of insurance as a means. The nature of insurance is secondary, because these consequences are largely determined by the mental or religious attitude of the person who has been or is being insured. The motives which have induced the insured to effect the insurance, play an important part. Both groups must be considered to belong to the traditional conscientious objections.

The third group is formed by the objections to the compulsory imposition of the insurance. Traditional conscientious objections need not play a part there. A case in point is the criticism urged by some Reformed Christians against the National Old-age Insurance Act. It is argued that in this act which imposes on all Netherlanders the obligation to pay a premium till the 65th year for old-age payment from the 65th year, the state acts outside its powers, because this act

---

[4] This *is* the case with the *conscientious struggle*. It is in our view incorrect to state that we can only speak of a conscientious objection when conscience judges that a particular *behaviour* which is proposed should not be demanded (Van Eck, loc. cit. p. 88). The relation between judgement and behaviour we deny, because conscience by itself is subject to the divine norm and can rebel against any rule, irrespective of the fact whether this rule demands a behaviour on the part of the person concerned.

also applies to ministers of religion: in real fact the church has to look after the office-bearers and not the 'fatherly' state. This is therefore a matter of political objections which are religiously founded.

§ 3. *Private insurance as the point of departure.*

The choice of private insurance as the starting-point for regulating the 'traditional' conscientious objections, is not surprising if we take into account the origin of social insurance and the elements common to both systems. It is of importance, therefore, to enter briefly into the characteristic features of these insurances.

In private insurance it is in reality a question of transfer of risk against a payment of premium on the basis of a contractual relationship. By the payment of premium the right of compensation is created; it deserves attention that the insurer will not proceed to a payment of compensation until the premium has been paid.

The accent in private insurance lies on the free will of the two parties. This does not alter the fact that the character of the insurance is maintained, if this freedom is set aside by a legal obligation (an example in point is the compulsory car-driver's indemnity). In such cases the act will contain the conditions which have to be fulfilled in the contract of insurance. In our opinion this does not affect the risk transfer, the contractual relationship and the connexion between premium and payment of compensation. The insured is also free to decide himself to what insurer he will apply, while by mutual agreement the other conditions can be arranged. The above also applies when by a judicial decision it is made a condition to effect a private insurance: this is by no means rare in convictions for road-traffic offences [5].

If we now consider social insurance, we shall find that in this type of insurance, too, the point is risk transfer against payment of premium [6], on the basis, however, of a relationship in regard to public law. The remarkable thing is, however, that in certain cases an insured

---

[5] See on this the Judgement of the National High Court, dated 10 November, 1959 in *Nederlandse Jurisprudentie*, 1960, pp. 517.

[6] A different view in M. G. Levenbach, *Sociale Verzekering* (Social Insurance), in: *Nederlands Bestuursrecht* (Netherlands administrative Law) vol. II, Alphen aan den Rijn, 1952.
We do not agree with it, for we can only speak of insurance, the right of payment must be based on an amount of money. Cf. Helmuth Thielicke, Theologische Ethik II/2, Tübingen, 1958, pp. 388—389: Um der Passivität eines bloss fürsorgerischen Empfangens und damit der personge fährdenden Objektstellung vorzubeugen, erscheint es wichtig Möglichkeiten zu schaffen, dass spätere Renten und sonstige Zuwendungen (Arztkosten, Arzneien, usw.) vorausverdient werden können, etwa

can nevertheless qualify for compensation, even if he has not (yet) fulfilled his duty of paying his premium. This scheme therefore deviates from what we found in the case of private insurance. In social insurance the idea that common risks should be borne in common, stands in the foreground.

Summarizing it may be stated that social insurance has sprung from private insurance. The common elements lie in transferring a personal risk against a payment of premium and in the connexion between the right of compensation and the duty to pay premium.

It is sometimes said that the difference between the two systems lies in the voluntariness and the obligation to insure. We have already seen that this is incorrect, because private insurance can be made obligatory. It must be added that at least in common parlance, not every social insurance must have an obligatory character. In this connexion we should remember the 1919 Old-age Insurance Act, which act regulates a voluntary insurance so as to encourage traders of the lower middle classes and others who are self-employed to effect an old-age insurance and to enable wage-earners to supplement their old-age pension.

It is better to give attention to the private and social aims: the well-being of the contracting parties and the group concerned. In the former the accent is on the individualistic character; in the latter on the character of solidarity [7]. This does not alter the fact, however, that in social insurance, too, individual acts may be required. In illustration we may point to the difference between the duty to insure oneself and compulsory insurance. In the former case one is obliged to give in one's name for a particular insurance, after which the insurance is effected. Then one is compulsorily insured (the so-called duty of personal application). In the latter case one is legally insured, that is without individual application, by operation of the law.

A special difficulty presents itself in the case of the compulsory national insurances which provisions are not recognized by some as (social) insurances. They will, consequently, not be allowed to make

---

durch Zahlung entsprechender Versicherungsprämien. Die regulierbare Höhe der Prämie und die entsprechende Verschiedengradigkeit der Gegenleistung wird das Bewusstzein für die eigene Mitverantwortung und den Rang der eigenen Leistung wachhalten und dem Eindruck einer automatisierten Wohlfahrt wehren.

[7] G. M. J. Veldkamp, *Individualistische karaktertrekken in de Nederlandse sociale arbeidsverzekering* (Individualistic characteristics in the Netherlands social labour insurance), Alphen aan den Rijn, 1949, p. 13.

an appeal to conscientious objections if there are any. About this we wish to say this. When private and social insurance are compared, it is usual sometimes to start from the idea that in private insurance the individual premium must be adequate for the individual payment. In our opinion an actuarial connexion is by no means essential, both because the probability of payment varies from case to case and because the collective connexion between premium and payment taken in all does not make the actuarial connexion in the individual case superfluous. From this it follows that this demand should accordingly not be made of social insurance.

Equally erroneous is the view that in social insurance there must be a connexion between labour performed and 'pension' (or any other kind of payment) earned. The consequence would be that social insurance would be limited to social labour insurance which is operative for all who support life by performing labour. Restriction is even possible to social workman's insurance, which exclusively operates for persons working under contract in the service of others. The cause of these limitations lies in the fact that the legal foundation is taken as a starting-point for defining the legal notion, which must be called a wrong method.

Comparing now once more private and social insurance, we find how closely the two systems are related. In spite of great differences in form and execution, they have so many points of contact and basic ideas in common, that in our view it is quite correct that in regulating traditional conscientious private insurance should be the starting-point. As we shall see later, the legal character of social insurance has no influence on the religious objections to making a statutory regulation obligatory.

§ 4. *Insurance and Providence.*

Some years ago the presbytery of Barneveld of the 'Gereformeerde Gemeenten in Nederland' * pronounced that a churchmember who of his own free will has effected a policy of insurance, cannot be admitted to any of the church offices. The arguments that led to this decision can briefly be described as follows. Considered from the church doctrine of divine providence, insurance must be rejected as an un-

---

* 'Reformed Congregations in the Netherlands', a denomination not to be confounded with the 'Reformed Churches in the Netherlands' (Gereformeerde Kerken).

lawful means, because insurance is an attempt to interfere in God's providential disposition. He who nevertheless makes use of insurance, acts contrary to the church's confession. In former years this standpoint was defended as well. In the 'Heraut', the weekly journal of the Reformed Churches (Gereformeerde Kerken) of 11 November, 1888 we read that insurance is a fruit of the spirit of the age, of the spirit that is not from God; that insurance is based on the laws of probability and the doctrine of chance, of fate; that insurance is a caricature of the fulfilment of the law of Christ: 'Bear ye one another's burden' and defies the doctrine of Providence.

From the above we may conclude that in discussing the question whether insurance may be resorted to, the point at issue centres round a specific view of Providence, with special emphasis on the lawfulness or the reverse of taking measures of precaution. Advocates and opponents of insurance take their starting-point in article XIII of the Netherlands Confession stating that after creating all things, God did not abandon them, nor left them to chance or fortune, but rules them according to His holy will in such a way that nothing happens in this world without His ordinances. They also refer to Sunday 10 of the Heidelberg Catechism. The difficulties arise when a dogmatic approach has to be made to Providence. The Reformed dogmatic theology generally distinguishes three aspects of Providence: the aspects of sustenance, government and concurrence (concursus). It is emphatically pointed out that this is a distinction, not a separation or division. For whatever differences there may be made in Providence, it is and remains one and the same matter, it is always concerned with Providence itself. The various aspects cannot be considered apart and dissociated from each other [8].

The aspects referred to play an important part in the controversy insurance v. Providence, because all issues can be reduced to them.

When the question has to be answered whether man is tempting God when he resorts to means of protecting himself against the extraordinary, against the sufferings and calamities of this life, it is in our view necessary first to examine what is meant by sustenance. For supposing the answer is in the affirmative — and the opponents of insurance *do* give an affirmative answer — are we not immediately to

---

[8] G. C. Berkouwer, *Dogmatische Studiën* (Dogmatic Studies) De voorzienigheid Gods (God's Providence), Kampen, 1950, p. 56. It should be mentioned that Berkouwer rejects this tripartition on grounds of principle. We shall revert to this in the following pages.

draw the conclusion then that in that case a large part of human life is placed outside divine sustenance? This is, however, completely at variance with what is understood by Providence. Owing to the fall of man God's judgements befall man, but nevertheless the Creator does not leave His creatures to themselves. The Bible, in which the word Providence does not occur — Scripture is in its entirety the book of God's sovereign will — teaches us indeed that by all manner of means, ordinary and extraordinary, He supports His handiwork without excluding anybody or anything whatsoever [9]. The sustenance, the upkeep of all things, is concerned with the existence of everything created as it is and remains dependent on God. Not in the sense of preservation [10], but of being concerned in the process of all things as they move on to the object aimed at by God. This purpose is also the cultural mission given by God to man, to develop the earth so that God's glory may also be manifest to those who do not believe in Him.

Unfortunately the discussion about these matters is rather confusing, because the opponents of insurance not only trample upon the difference *ordinary-extraordinary,* but also on the difference *lawful-unlawful.* It is not made quite clear why lightning belongs to what is extraordinary, but a flood does *not;* why the lightning conductor, vaccination and insurance are unlawful means, dykes and other sea-defence works lawful.

In distinguishing lawful and unlawful means the criterion is that the means to be applied must not clash with God's word and law [11]. This criterion can offer no solution however, because the practical effect is based on an interpretation of the special revelation of God's holy wrath, which is at variance with His word. The fault in our opinion lies in the fact that the manner in which the means is used, is confused with the means itself. We shall revert to this in the next section.

The second aspect of Providence is the government. It not only means God's sovereignty so that everything obeys God's will and laws, but also His leading and guidance of creation. Here, too, we see that God leads His creation to the purpose He has set for it. In connexion with God's sovereignty the question suggests itself, what to think about chance. This question is important, because insurance is connected

---

[9] K. Dijk, *De Voorzienigheid Gods* (God's Providence), Amsterdam, 1927, p. 155.
[10] Berkouwer, *op. cit.*, pp. 75/76.
[11] *De Saambinder,* church weekly of the 'Gereformeerde Gemeenten in Nederland en Noord-Amerika, vol. 30, no. 17.

with the relationship between Providence and chance. On this point we wish to make the following observations [12].

The phenomena which we observe daily and for which we employ the word chance may be divided on the one hand into those phenomena of which the result can be foreseen because the relative law of nature is known, and on the other those the result of which is more or less uncertain. It is obvious that the word chance is not to be used for the first group. At most we can do this when the law of nature is unknown. But even that is not correct, for even of the uncertain events it cannot be maintained that chance is at work. If the word chance is nevertheless coupled with what is uncertain, this is only done to obtain a simple mode of expression; we do not presuppose anything else. For chance in the sense that there is no power who guides and controls everything and no order to which everything conforms, but that events take place arbitrarily and are a product of fortuitous circumstances, clashes with the idea providence, because Providence cannot be differentiated into two spheres of action. Yet it could be maintained that the uncertain, precarious phenomena are without any regularity whatever; that the outcome is part of God's counsel so that it is fully determined by it. What argues in favour of this view is the fact that great emphasis is laid upon God's omnipotence; side by side with the existence of the laws of nature there remains room for God's intervention. The objection is, however, that from human perception the conclusion is drawn that there is in Providence a bipartition referred to above. It is therefore better to adopt the view that both uncertain and regularly recurrent events obey the divine order. Everything is subject to the rules laid down by God. We agree therefore with the opponents of insurance that it is a denial of Providence to attribute the happening of things to fortune, fate or chance [13]. But from the foregoing it has become clear that insurance is by no means coupled with this fortune, fate or chance. The advocates of insurance do no accept such a doctrine of chance which clashes with the dogma of Providence. Whether it is assumed that the uncertain events are determined just because no regularity can be observed, or take the view that all the same they have to conform to a divine order, in both cases there can be absolutely no question of anything accidental outside God's Providence.

---

[12] Here we follow J. P. van Rooyen, *Toeval en Voorzienigheid* (Chance and *Providence)* Assen, 1939.

[13] *De Saambinder*, loc. cit.

The third aspect of Providence is the concurrence which is connected with the work done by God's creatures.

In this connexion it should be borne in mind that man is in no way independent of God, but that within God's activity he receives a creaturely activity of his own. If we only mean by it the relationship existing between the activity of God and the activity of man and clearly state at the same time that God's activity is never circumscribed by human activity, there is no objection to distinguishing concurrence as an aspect of Providence, if we want to indicate by it that human activity becomes stronger as God's works manifest themselves to a fuller and richer degree [14]. But there is a tendency to extend this concurrence in the sense of: God works with man. Thus human activity is made the point of departure [15]. We agree with this criticism. The case should be stated just the other way about: within the frame of God's Providence man is allowed to co-operate in accomplishing His design to save the world. With good reason, however, the question may be asked why in the dogmatic exposition the concurrence is added to the sustenance and the government, because this idea is already contained in the sustenance and the government: man is and remains completely subjected to his Creator [16]. This does not alter the fact that in our view there is much to be said for doing this. From a dogmatic point of view it may not be necessary, from an ethical viewpoint it is most necessary, because it is desirable also to approach Providence from the angle of man having to fulfil a mission from his Creator. We fear that the dogmatic aspect — however much we may need it — will throw the ethical too much into the background. The fact which we are confronted with — and this is the practical effect of our standpoint — is that it is precisely the opponents of insurance who with regard to the 'extraordinary' in human life teach a certain *passivity* which in their view is demanded by faith. A suitable reply can be found by pointing out to them man's duty of being *actively* employed in total subordination and dependence on God. For this separation between active and passive is untenable, dogmatically as well as ethically.

§ 5. *Motives and consequences.*

In the foregoing we stated that it is highly important to make a clear

---

[14] H. Bavinck, *Gereformeerde Dogmatiek* (Reformed Dogmatics), Kampen, 1908, vol. II, p. 663. Cf. also Berkouwer, *op cit.*, p. 153.
[15] Berkouwer, *op cit.*, p. 156.
[16] Berkouwer, *op cit.*, p. 154.

distinction between the lawfulness of applying insurance as a means and the manner of applying it. Naturally the character and nature of the insurance is connected with the motives of taking out a policy of insurance and its possible consequences, but they are and remain different elements. The nature of the insurance has a direct bearing on Providence; the motives and the consequences on sinful man. And with sinful man the moral risk, that is his attitude towards insurance, plays an important part. Essentially it is a question about the lawful and unlawful use of precautionary means. In this it is of importance that the person availing himself of this means acts honestly and conscientiously in the conviction that the means is applied in the right way. It is not quite clear to us why insurance, as is often said, is a means which can only be used unlawfully. For a man who rejects insurance, because everything that may give rise to crime, fraud and the like is fundamentally objectionable, puts the accent in the wrong place. Not insurance, but man himself is the culprit. Naturally these problems are taken into account in the legislation and in administering the law, but there will always remain loopholes to evade it. In social insurance relatively small amounts are involved, so that there is hardly an incentive to act wrongly here. There *is* indeed an incentive in the fact that this is a domain of compulsory provision and care: the stimulation of a sense of responsibility can certainly not be reckoned among the beautiful and rich fruits yielded by social insurance[17]. But the organization of and the execution by the appropriate organs is of such a nature that abuse is restricted to a minimum. If it is added that the administration of justice serves in a high degree as a corrective, we think that the opponents of insurance can hardly uphold their objections or grievances against social insurance.

The position is different in the case of private insurance; here it is possible to insure high amounts and the circle of insured, in contradistinction to social insurance, is unlimited and difficult to canvass. In other words: the accent is to be on judging the moral risk. The leading principle is that the agreement has to be observed in good faith. Furthermore the insured is under the obligation not to make incorrect statements and not to conceal anything that may be important to the insurer in order to arrive at the conclusion of the contract. On the other hand the insurer is obliged to do his canvassing in such a way that a plea

[17] A. C. Drogendijk, *Sociale zekerheid en persoonlijke verantwoordelijkheid* (Social security and personal responsibility), Alphen aan den Rijn, 1956, p. 18 (report submitted to the Association for Labour Law).

of nullity of the contract in connexion with facts withheld by the insured occurs as little as possible. Nevertheless we are of opinion that fraud is apt to occur more frequently in private insurance and cannot easily be prevented.

It is important to examine now by what motives man may be led to effect an insurance, what 'fatal' consequences this may bring along. Although the need of an insurance is naturally in the first instance determined by individual, personal factors and will therefore for a group or a whole nation be very varied, we still think it is possible to mention a few characteristic motives, viz. that of rendering mutual aid; of speculating and of obtaining payment in money or kind in case of loss, damage and the like. Naturally these *personal* motives only hold for private insurance. In social insurance they do not play a part, because the state will not use coercive measures until in a certain section of the population or in the whole nation abuses arise or are about to arise. Some motives may indeed exercise an influence upon the ground of action for the interference of the state.

The objections put forward by the opponents of insurance are mainly confined to the possibility of insurance affecting the Christian's faith and religious life and to the opportunities it offers man to practise fraud and deceit [18].

In imitation of others we, too, wish to give prominence to *the mutual aid motive,* not only because more than in the others the nature of the insurance finds expression in it, but also because this motive in many cases forms the starting-point in insurance in its most primitive form.

We will admit at once that in the highly perfected form of insurance in which the services of companies and brokers are enlisted, this motive is nearly always not an end, but a means, because the insurer can only insure when there is a question of collectivity. In reality these insurances are not effected from such an altruistic motive; no sensible man will think that by taking out a policy he practises mutual aid, leave alone that he is led by such a motive. We will therefore only give attention to that method of insurance in which the motive *does* function well, which is the case in the mutual insurances.

Plenty of cases in the past are known that annually persons brought together moneys in a fund to pay benefits out of it if an untoward event

---

[18] Cf. M. van Haaften, *Verzekering en Voorzienigheid* (Insurance and Providence), Amsterdam, 1927, p. 17 and A. Kuyper, *De Gemeene Gratie* (Common Grace), Kampen, 4th exact reprint vol. II, p. 552.

should befall any of them. We may refer to the Widows' Foundation at Monnickendam, of 1754, participants moved by a Christian feeling of commiseration having taken counsel together under God's blessing to establish a Widows' Foundation [19]. At the present day this form of insurance occasionally occurs, witness the custom in rural districts, where farmers club together in order to assist a colleague in case of illness by engaging relief farm-labourers.

If now we ask ourselves the question whether by these insurances harm is done to personal faith, our answer is that this is of course possible, but that it need not necessarily be the case. Such an act may also have a stimulating effect. We are in fact confronted here with one of the consequences of the mission given to man by God.

The consequence of man having been created in God's image is that in his cultural mission man is personally called upon to serve God and his fellow-man [20]. This implies first of all that man has a responsibility towards his Creator for himself and his dependants; he has to make provision for the present and the future; the possibilities, however, for doing this will have to be there. In other words: there has to be social security. This striving after social security, however, is in many cases not realized, because one will not see one's responsibility. This brings us to man's responsibility towards his fellow-man, for the consequence of the commandment of neighbourly love is that man has got to be assisted in it. The law of God indeed demands of us to love Him above all and our neighbour like ourselves. The motive of mutual aid is, in fact, contained in this commandment.

The private or social insurance based upon it need not necessarily bring about the consequences mentioned.

That *speculation* may also be a motive appears already from the legal character of the contract of insurance; insurance must be assigned to the *aleatory* contracts. In the aleatory contract the party on the one part undertakes a specific obligation, whereas the obligation of the other party depends on the results of a future, uncertain happening. It is equally possible that both obligations are not predetermined. The speculation contract is therefore not an insurance according to the Netherlands Commercial Code, because payment is not obtained on

---

[19] Cited by Van Haaften, *op cit.*, p. 5. Van Haaften rightly points out that these foundations were not charitable institutions, but ordinary — be it inexpertly managed — insurance undertakings.

[20] See on this the observations of T. P. van der Kooy in *Om welvaart en gerechtigheid* (For prosperity and justice), Wageningen, 1954, p. 100 ff.

the ground of loss, damage or loss of expected profit. In life-insurance, however, the position is different because there these elements play no part. Speculation insurance in which there is a speculation on life or death, can for that reason be classed among the life-insurances.

Formerly it was usual to conclude these contracts. In the Middle Ages for instance, it occurred as a result of piracy, that policies were taken out against the payment of ransoms for prisoners; it was not long, however, before this degenerated into speculating on the life of sailors and later again on the life of others.

As this led to excesses these type of contracts, but also other life insurances were forbidden. The lust of speculation is clearly reflected in the so-called 'tontine', a find of the Neapolitan banker Lorenzo Tonti who in the 17th century was active in France. Those who participate in a tontine have, each of them, to pay an amount, once or periodically. The total falls to those participants who on a definite date, agreed upon beforehand, are still alive.

Essentially we find here the same objections as are met with in money speculations in general, as e.g. money-prize lotteries. For in such cases man is irrevocably confronted with conflicts of conscience. The commission and responsibility given to man is in fact closely connected with the disposal of money. The fact is, that what is profitable for one, is often loss to another, and inflicting a loss is as injurious to human dignity as suffering a loss oneself [21].

The remark that personal faith and religious life suffers because of speculation insurance, can accordingly by no means be called an exaggeration. It should be remembered what the Heidelberg Catechism says about this, when dealing with the eighth commandment. The use of insurances as a means applied to this end must consequently be rejected as unlawful. In this connexion it is moreover well to point out that the motive of speculation can hardly occur in social insurance, so that in our opinion in applying for an exemption this plea is not valid.

The most important motive to effect an insurance is in our opinion that of *obtaining a payment in money or kind.* In many cases the other motives, if present at all, will be thrown into the background.

Of the 'payment in money or kind' motive, the cover of the loss is the most important. It is natural therefore that the conscientious objections in a wider sense mainly centre round this point. The

---

[21] Van der Kooy, *op, cit.*, pp. 38/39.

indemnity insurance can never be a means to mitigate the sorrow, the misery and the distress. Man relies too much on insurance and attaches too great a value to it. Here an unchristian fear is manifested of an unknown dark future: insurance has its origin in 'taking thought for the morrow'[22]. We can understand and appreciate this line of thought. If, in faith or in unbelief, insurance is held to be *the* means, we are indeed on the wrong road. Insurance is and can never be more than an imperfect human aid to alleviate distress. Insurance is often overrated, but as a human aid — and this is the restriction — insurance can only bear upon damage or loss valuable in terms of money. We can do nothing with insurance where personal suffering is concerned; neither can insurance take over the love and sympathy shown in this suffering. If, however, insurance is resorted to in a christian belief of its limitations and imperfections, there is not a single objection to doing so.

The same applies to the *personal* insurances. If the 'loss' element is not present, the object of these kind of insurances may be a special way of investing and saving money. To these insurances, which are accordingly effected to provide for a future need of capital, we can raise no more objections than to saving a fixed annual sum of money. It should, however, be remembered that covering a future need of capital is a general expression, which may also comprise the cases that a need for capital arises from loss sustained and which therefore plays a rôle in discussions about the concept of insurance[23]. To such cases our observations apply on *indemnity* insurance. A somewhat more difficult matter is the case of the immediate and the deferred annuities. In the former of these, two motives may play a part. If the insurance is effected to make it easier to support life, this is generally a matter of provision, because the risk one incurs of being thrown on public relief in the long run, if one uses up one's capital is shifted on to the insurer. From the previous section the conclusion may be drawn that this provision can be called right, if one avails oneself of this means lawfully. If the insurance is effected to facilitate the administration of one's property, it concerns a motivation which has nothing to do with the critical observations made. The object is only to be relieved of the burden and inconveniences connected with the administration of one's property.

In the case of the deferred annuities, to which pensions, insurances

[22] *De Saambinder*, loc. cit.
[23] Van Haaften, *op. cit.*, p. 23. We follow the argumentation of this author.

belong, too, it is also a question of precautionary measures of which man is permitted, or better, has the duty to avail himself, if it is a consequence of the responsibility and mission entrusted to him by God.

§ 6. *Law and conscience.*

We now have to consider the question as to the attitude the state has to adopt to those persons who have religious objections to the insurance when making it compulsory. We will examine if a general policy can be drawn up for such a procedure. Taking a closer view of the Netherlands legislation, we shall find that various acts have reckoned with conscientious objections: The 1916 Oaths Act (conscientious objections to taking the oath); the Labour Act (conscientious objections to working on Saturdays, if the day of rest is observed on a Saturday); the Vaccination Act (conscientious objections to the vaccination of children); the Compulsory Education Act (preponderant objections to the instruction given at all schools within a radius of 4 to 6 kilometers, so that it is preferred to leave the child without instruction for the time being); the Meat Inspection Regulations (religious denomination prescribes ritually prepared meat); the Anti-tuberculosis Act (conscientious objections to joining the health service owing to forthcoming obligations in connexion with vaccination); The Conscientious Objection Act (conscientious objections to military service founded on the conviction that it is not allowed to kill a fellow-man); Immunization of military persons Act (conscientious objections to immunization); the Sosial Insurance Acts (conscientious objections to any kind of insurance) [24].

The tension between law and conscience is born, for the state as soon as the state has to determine its position towards the conscientious objection, and for the subject as soon as the state officially publishes a regulation against which conscience rebels. The difficulty is now that in such situations we are confronted with two 'judgements'. On the one hand the judgement of the state which prescribes a regulation in the positive conviction that this regulation is right; on the other the judgment of the subject-objector who maintains that the regulation is wrong. In such a situation the question is who will settle this dispute with binding authority [25]. It is worthy of note that these judgements are not comparable, because the judgement of the subject is based

[24] This survey is taken from Remmelink, *op. cit.*, pp. 58/59.
[25] Van Eck, *op. cit.*, p. 108.

upon conscience and the judgement of the state is not concerned with conscience. In our view the judgement of the state is based on the legal ground, the motivation of the regulations which, if necessary, can be enforced by a factual compulsive power of an authoritative machinery and which really give rise to the conscientious objections. We object to the construction that the state also has a conscience, for conscience is an individual human matter bearing upon the higher knowledge, and the latter is beyond the purview of the state. Another consequence would be that if the subject has an objection to a particular regulation, he has an erring conscience with respect to the so-called conscience of the state, and in that case the state need not yield to this erring conscience. The subject is too much in error, because his conscience in real fact deviates from the legal ground on which the regulation in question is based. And this deviation is of quite a different nature than erring in respect of another and better knowledge.

The question still remains whether the state never has to yield to the conscientious objection of a subject, or whether there is a definite sphere of human happenings to which this does not apply. We are of opinion that the conflict between authority and conscience must be made dependent on the maintenance of legal order; the state need not yield if this is necessary for maintaining this legal order. For the rest the state will have to reckon with the conscientious objections, for the very reason that these objections are of an order different from that of the judgement of the state. Therefore everything has to be done to prevent contrariety and to attain harmony. The state will have to examine whether the real cause of the conflict can be removed. If this is impossible, it will be advisable for the state in establishing a system of law, to proceed if possible in such a way that objectively there is no contrariety any longer between the rules of the law system and the conscientious objection [26]. This may be done by avoiding special regulations in the law system, by declaring these regulations not to apply to the objectors, with or without simultaneous substitution of other rules. The granting of such a dispensation may effect that the state meets the conscientious objectors without endangering the maintenance of legal order. As soon, however, as authority is interfered with, legal order itself is given up, because authority forms an essential element of legal order. And this would mean the undermining of the task and mission of the public authorities.

---

[26] Van Eck, *op. cit.*, p. 111.

It is of importance to examine now how matters stand as to the regulation of the conscientious objections to social insurance. This statutory regulation has been much criticized of recent years; no doubt the coming into operation of the compulsory national insurances had something to do with it. An examination of this criticism shows that too little attention is paid to the function of the legal ground and the necessary maintenance of legal order.

From the foregoing discussion it follows that for the problem law v. conscience in social insurance legislation there are in effect three solutions.

The first solution is that the state completely ignores the conscientious objections and by availing itself of its position of power, compels every one without exception to co-operate in the regulation prescribed. This co-operation refers mainly to the duty to pay the premium, for the state cannot oblige any one to receive the payment. An instance of this is the compulsory pensions insurance under the 1922 Pensions Act. As was stated before, the state will *have* to reckon with conscientious objections, if it can be harmonized with the maintenance of legal order. On this ground we think that this solution of ensuring social insurance must be dismissed. The authority of the state is not in the first instance at stake here, because the subject is asked for a contribution to promote a specific object of public interest, so that it must be possible to avail oneself of the possibility of granting and receiving dispensation.

The second solution is that the state *does* reckon with the conscientious objections by learning the objectors who are able to show this convincingly, altogether out of the scheme. There is a fundamental and a practical objection attached to such a regulation. The fundamental objection lies in the function of the legal ground which has naturally to be formulated differently for each regulation. Examining the different acts more closely , we find the following. For some statutory provisions, as e.g. the Workmen's Compensation Act, the Health Insurance Act and the Disablement Insurance Act the criterion is that the workman concerned, if something happens to him, needs a benefit as compensation for the non-earned wages. Here there may be a task for the employer, on the ground of the relationship between him and the man who is in his pay; but also for the worker, in view of his personal responsibility. The legal ground may be based on this and will in principle be effective for every one, nobody excepted.

For other provisions, as e.g. the compulsory national insurances, the position is different, because the relationship between employer and

worker plays no part in these insurances; the self-employed also come under the scheme. In the national insurances, more than in other provisions, the principle is in evidence that it is not only a question of one's 'own' responsibility, but also of the responsibility towards one's fellow-man. The former of these refers to the provision made for oneself with respect to the future, the latter to the solidarity in the group to render payments to others directly possible by means of the payment of a premium. The legal ground can be described therefore as follows: If in a particular section or in a whole nation abuses arise or are impending, so as to interfere with justice, it is the duty of the state to take action in such a way as to equal the situation in which neighbourly love would have been observed. For it is actually the lack of neighbourly love which is one of the causes of these abuses. Neighbourly love and justice belong indissolubly together. Since the commandment to love one another holds true for every one, the measure to be taken by the state will have to be effective for each member of the group. The scheme is therefore not based on neighbourly love, but rather on the lack of it. Naturally the conflict between statutory and moral obligations is inevitable here. The state should therefore leave as much room as possible for individual responsibility, which may among other things also find expression in the payment of premium.

Our conclusion must be, therefore, that an infringement of the legal ground means a certain justification of the abuses which have led to a statutory regulation.

The practical objection to exclude the objectors completely, lies in the fact that afterwards one can go back upon these objections. When no steps have been taken for one's own provision, this may have the consequence of being dependent upon others. *If* a payment has been made under one of the social insurance acts, this implies that in fact co-operation is given to undermine the personal responsibility, because against the payment there is no personal sacrifice. In other words: the objections are introduced to the provision schemes of the state which it is desired to avoid just by means of social insurance.

The third solution of the problem law v. conscience in social insurance is that the state reckons with conscientious objections, not by declaring the legal regulation inapplicable, but by removing the formal objections, without, however, altering the financial consequences. The objector pays no premium, but an extra tax; he is relieved from obligations imposed on him by law or under an act, but retains his rights. This special taxation is necessary for various reasons. First of all because

the legal ground of the provision applies to each member of the group, so that every one has to make his contribution. Next, because without payment it is difficult to know the *genuine* conscientious objections. It is, indeed, not inconceivable that ill-disposed persons will pretend conscientious objections only to dodge the financial obligations. Finally, because there must be a financial possibility of making a payment in case a person has given up his conscientious objections. In this connexion we will add that a few months ago the National Old-age Insurance Act was altered in this manner that the objector who has paid an increased tax, is entitled to a payment if and so long as he is entitled to old-age insurance under this act and does not wish to receive it on the ground of his conscientious objections; the total of the amounts paid to him is not to exceed the total of the amounts of increased tax that he has been charged. Thus the insurance has for the objectors been replaced with a kind of compulsory saving scheme.

In our opinion preference must be given to the third solution, because it harmonizes best with the legal ground without affecting the legal order.

Lastly we wish to draw attention to the so-called 'right of testing', the object being to find a method how to know the *genuine* conscientious objections. This testing is so important because the possibility of dispensation being used wrongly has to be prevented.

In social insurance legislation the objective or indirect test is mainly used, which means that the presence of objections is ascertained by indirect, external circumstances. In other words: there are no talks with the person concerned to examine whether his objections are well-founded. The authorities only check whether he really acts in accordance with his objections and has effected not a single insurance. To this end a statement has to be made. In this statement, as we saw already in the first section, the objector has to declare that he has conscientious objections to any and every insurance and that he has consequently insured neither himself, nor anybody else, nor his property.

It is clear that this test may give rise to difficulties. A difference of opinion as to the question whether a particular provision, e.g. the regulations under the National Widows' and Orphans' Insurance Act and the Pensions Act, are really insurances, whether one can help being insured (having the status of an official in the sense of the Pensions Act) will make the decision extremely difficult. This does not alter the fact that we prefer the indirect test to the subjective, direct test (by means inter alia of interrogation), because the law

should loyally reckon with genuine objections of conscience, without the authorities giving the impression of desiring to restrict the liberty of conscience, which in the case of the direct test can really happen.

§ 7. *Faith and practice.*

In the second section we pointed out that by the side of the traditional conscientious objections in a narrow sense, objections pure and simple, other conscientious objections are raised to social insurance, e.g. to the national insurances. Briefly these objections come to this. Under the national insurances every citizen has in principle to pay a premium. Now there are ministers of religion who have no general objections to insurance as such, but *do* have them to the compulsory national insurances because the state by making the insurance compulsory has entered the field of the church. In contradistinction to the traditional objections it is here therefore a dispute between state and church; the liberty of religion is at stake here. The objection that, to give an example, the regulation involves that the deaconate is discarded, is insuperable.

When the National Old-age Insurance Act was being considered in the Second Chamber of the States General, this problem came up for discussion particularly with regard to the ministers of religion. Several Free Reformed Churches (Vrijgemaakt Gereformeerde Kerken) presented petitions to the States General, pointing out that the consequence of the act will be, that the churches would no longer have to observe their duty as required of them under article 13 of the *Dordrecht Regulations for Church order and discipline* (founded on Scripture), in so far as a general regulation for all citizens would encroach upon the territory of the church; that from of old the position of the ministers of religion, both as regards their salary and their retiring allowance, has always been regulated by the Reformed Churches themselves and the state neither directly nor indirectly intervened; that the regulation of the conscientious objections which is proposed, does not meet them in the least, since it indirectly imposes heavier burdens on the church; that in this matter, which is of such essential importance for the church, it is not permissible to take a decision with technical arguments (intricate administration) [27]. In

[27] Quoted by L. Roeleveld in: *Rondom de ouderdomsvoorziening* (Round the Old-age Insurance Legislation), Rotterdam, 1957, pp. 53/54.

other words: by making the insurance obligatory, the state meddles with business which should exclusively be attended to by the church: the right of the church to put into practice certain religious views, as e.g. the support of the ministers of the Word by the local church, is violated.

One of the members of the Second Chamber paid attention to these petitions during the oral discussion of the bill, emphasizing the necessity that the churches should in freedom and independence be able to realize their own call to make full provision for the superannuation of the ministers of the church. The Act, this representative declared, compels the church to invest in a special manner, for in practice the churches will have to take the premium for their account. In his reply the Minister for Social Affairs pointed out that the state does not compel the churches at all; on this point the State has nothing to do with the churches, because the minister is insured and has to pay premium. How the churches wish to arrange this with their ministers is their affair.

The Minister's defence is not strong, because he does not go into a few particular fundamental points bearing upon the minister-church relationship. Formally the Minister of Social Affairs is right. In reality the question is, however, if the state by this obligation does not enter the field of operations of the church.

Some members of the Free Reformed Churches have, therefore, brought out emphatically that the financial bond between the church and her minister is dominated by the spiritual bond which Christ has made between these two. It was also pointed out that the altar service is the determining factor, for those who serve the altar will be supported by the altar and it is the church which brings together the gifts of the altar.

The characteristic feature of the provision made for retired pastors of the Reformed Churches is the freedom of the local church of Christ, Who in this matter has imposed on the church a duty of honour. Right and duty have both been prescribed by Christ. Therefore the church's provision of articles 11 and 13 of the Church Order is under Christ's sovereign protection. Hence it is that the Synod of Groningen, held in 1946, has ruled that the consistories are to have a free hand in this matter. If then for the sake of the honour of Christ and His church not even a Synod is allowed to give advice on a general scheme, is then the State allowed on this very same point to impose the compulsion of an insurance? For, the Synod declares, we are all of us agreed that

the state in its way is never allowed to do what is forbidden to a synod in respect of the local church. And as to the remark of the Minister of Social Affairs that the churches are not compelled to pay the premium, the Synod states that the churches are under this — if not legal — obligation in order to keep up the level of the salaries of the ministers of religion. Therefore there is no denying the fact that in effect every church is *compelled* to set aside part of the offerings of God's people for an old-age scheme that is forced upon them [28].

In view of these fundamental objections it is not surprising that the National High Court was twice already called upon to adjudicate in disputes between ministers of religion and the executives of the relative national insurance; in both cases the objections of the church ministers were dismissed [29].

The most important grievances of the church ministers were that the minister of religion is to be supported by the church, also when he is retired. The National Old-age Insurance Act therefore derogates from the financial and spiritual independence of the church; it is a question of unlawful interference in religious life. Hence this act is at variance with the Constitution on the point of freedom of religion; with the Act of 10 September, 1853 regulating the supervision of the various religious denominations [30] and with the Treaty of Rome protecting the rights of man and the fundamental liberties to profess and practise religion [31].

We wish to make some comments on this criticism of the provision made by the National Old-age Insurance Act, because in our opinion

---

[28] Cf. *inter alia* C. Trimp, *Bouwen wij een eigen gevangenis? De Kerken en de A.O.W.* (Are we building our own prison? The Churches and the National Old-age Insurance Act) in: De Reformatie, vol. XXXIV; D. van Houdt, *Groeiende dwang in de Nederlandse Rechtsstaat* (Increasing coercion in the constitutional state of the Netherlands) in: Geref. Gezinsblad, vol. 14.

[29] Judgements of the National High Court, dated 24 February, 1960 and 13 April, 1960, to be found in: *Sociaal Maandblad Arbeid* (Social Monthly Labour) 1961, pp. 150 ff. and 154 ff.

[30] Art. 1 of this Act provides that all church denominations are and remain at liberty to regulate everything concerning their religion and the practice of it among themselves.

[31] Especially art. 9: 1. Everybody has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, teaching, practice and observance. 2. Freedom to manifest one's religion or belief shall be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health and morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedom of others.

the starting-point is wrong, nor does it do justice to the legal ground of the act in question.

In the above we stated already that one of the most essential features of this act is that the premium has a two-fold aim: on the one hand the payment to the old-people of to-day; on the other the right of the insured of to-day to a payment afterwards. Relief and precaution belong together and seen in the light of the whole set-up of the provision they cannot be separated. Once more surveying the criticism under discussion we are struck by the fact that the critics have only thought of the precaution.

The question is now what the position of these members of the Free Reformed Churches is towards this 'aid'. The answer is that in preaching the Word it should be pointed out that the members of the church and the citizens have primarily the call to provide for themselves and their dependants, and the employers for their workmen. In the alternative the church has a call to furnish poor relief, which has priority over public poor relief, directly or indirectly [32].

We wonder, however, — the question is either not asked by them or not answered — how it is possible then that when the act came into force, more than half of the old people at that moment was actually in receipt of public relief. That is exactly an argument for the state to take compulsory measures in order to make a joint effort to fight this evil. Nobody need accuse the churches of having failed in their duty: the devaluation can hardly be combated by the churches; nor are, unfortunately, all members of the state members of the church. For us there is absolutely no doubt about it that here the state has a task. And is it not exactly the duty then of the churches and the church ministers to co-operate so as to enable the state to do something also for the non-members of the church? From the standpoint of these Free Reformed one could draw the conclusion that they do not consider the care of the now living old people an argument to justify the act. But then it is incorrect to stand up only and exclusively for the ministers of the church.

In our view the neglect of the motive of solidarity is to fail to appreciate the legal ground in which precisely this personal responsibility to provide for oneself, the dependants and the fellow-man is taken into account, which responsibility also finds expression in the payment of premium.

---

[32] L. Roeleveld, *review in: Ambt en plicht* (Office and duty) Vol. VII, p. 360.

From the foregoing the conclusion may be drawn, if there is at all question of infringement of the liberty of religion, this is only upheld by them with regard to the ministers of religion. But this, too, is open to doubt.

The argument takes its starting-point in the first epistle of the apostle St. Paul to the Corinthians, the ninth chapter, verses 13 and 14: "Know ye not that they which minister about sacred things eat of the things of the temple, and they which wait upon the altar, have their portion with the altar? Even so did the Lord ordain that they which proclaim the gospel should live of the gospel". On these verses the articles 11 and 13 of the Dordrecht Church Order are based. Art. 11 provides that the consistory as representing the church, is under obligation to provide a reasonable maintenance for its ministers. Art. 13 prescribes that the ministers will also receive this maintenance when by reason of old age, illness or any other cause they will be incapable of exercising their office. In other words: the local church has the duty to support its own minister. In proof of this further references are given: 1 Cor. 9 : 7; 2 Tim. 2 : 4; Luke 10 : 7; Matthew 10 : 10; Gal. 6 : 6; and 1 Tim. 5 : 17, 18. The minister need not avail himself of his right, however. It is important to examine if it is correct to read in 1 Cor. 9, that the local church has this duty in total exclusion of others, e.g. the state. On further examination of 1 Cor. 9 it is found that Paul only posits his right and power to receive support from the church and does not declare at all that this is the only manner of support and that another way of being supported is not allowed [33]. Also an apostle has the right to eat and to drink (v. 4), to marry a woman (v. 5), to forbear working (v. 6). "What soldier ever serveth at his own charges? Who planteth a vineyard, and eateth not the fruit thereof? Or who feedeth a flock and eateth not of the milk of the flock?" (v. 7). Paul also refers to the law of Moses: "Thou shalt not muzzle the ox when he treadeth out the corn" (v. 9). This is not written in the law for nothing, Paul declares, this is at any rate written for our sakes: "Because, he that ploweth ought to plow in hope, and he that thresheth, to thresh in hope of partaking" (v. 10). "If we sowed unto you spiritual things, is it a great matter if we shall reap your carnal things?" (v. 11). For God's commandment which also applies to oxen, applies first of all to man. But, St. Paul says in verse 12, we

---

[33] Here we follow the argumentation of H. D. van Wijk, *Geen A.O.W. voor dominee?* (No National Old-age Insurance for our parson?) in: Opbouw, vol. II.

did not use this right; but we bear all things, that we may cause no hindrance to the gospel of Christ".

He does not raise the subject, however, in order to ask the church as yet for support. His aim is only to point out that the church has to fulfil a duty with regard to the ministers of the altar: this is the general policy. St. Paul's whole argument leads up to the task of the church and certainly not to the duty of the apostle only to receive support from the church.

What can be deduced from it is a right of the apostle. Hence we concur with the opinion that these verses do not imply a condemnation of the obtaining of material means of support by ministers of the church and their dependants, other than from the church. These verses are not directed against the state, but against the churches which do not sufficiently or not wholeheartedly provide their ministers with what they need for their material and to keep up to the mark spiritually [34].

The above is accentuated still more, when we pay attention to the articles 11 and 13 of the Dordrecht Church Order, which articles are actually based on 1 Cor. 9 : 13, 14 [35]. As we saw, art. 11 places the consistory under the obligation to provide adequate maintenance for the minister. This regulation was included, because in former years many ministers and sometimes their wives began to perform all kinds of paid duties, because their income as minister was inadequate. The Convent of Wesel (1568) pronounced that "good men of tried faith and conduct in life" should be chosen 'who will bring together the salary of the ministers and anything that will further be required for the performance of the service". And the Synod of Emden (1571) ruled that the members of the church were to provide the maintenance of the ministers. Similar pronouncements were made by the Synods of 1578, 1581 and 1586. At the Synod of Dordrecht (1618/19) art. 11 Dordrecht Church Order, which we discussed higher up, was drawn up. It deserves mention that at this Synod a proposal was put forward to extend article 11 Church Order as follows: 'And we or the respective magistrates will pay the ministers the salaries due to them". The Synod did not take over this proposal, assuming that according to divine law, it is the duty of the church to make provision for the support of the

---

[34] Van Wijk, *loc. cit.* p. 125.

[35] For the following we consulted: H. Bouwman, *Gereformeerd Kerkrecht* (Reformed ecclesiastical law), Kampen, 1928, vol. I.

minister. Although this decision refers to the support during the 'active' service of the minister, yet it is of importance for the retiring pension, because the point of departure has to be that the minister has given himself to the service of the church for life. He remains in the service of the church also after his retirement. The fact that the reformed churches formerly nevertheless asked the magistrates to see to the salaries, was caused by the circumstances that the authorities had the management of all kinds of funds and property which had been given by the Roman Catholic Church for religious purposes. After the Reformation the authorities took this property into their own management. The standpoint of the Calvinists was that the revenues had to be used for the church. Calvin and Voetius have declared themselves clearly about this point. In the 'Afscheiding' (Secession movement) from the Reformed Church in 1834 this was changed, because the 'Secessionists' (Afgescheidenen) had to dispense with the revenues of the Reformed Church.

The same thing applied essentially to the retiring pension.

The Synod of 1578 declared that the care of the ministers also in case of e.g. old-age and illness was the task of the church.

The Synod of 1581 extended this regulation to the widows and orphans, but also stated that this provision had to be made from the public funds which were destined for the support of the church ministers and were in the management of the authorities. The Synod of Dordrecht formulated this in article 13, discussed already before.

Little has come of the observance of these rules. It was not before King William I that affairs were arranged. The payment of the salaries was ensured and the pensions were settled by the state. After the Secession (Afscheiding) article 13 Church Order presented again great difficulties to the 'Secessionists' (Afgescheidenen). Hence it is that so many synods have given their attention to this matter. It was not so much a question whether the church or the state was under the obligation to see to the pensions, but whether it can really be demanded of the local church that it provides for the retired minister of the church. At these synods a provincial or national co-operation was the subject of discussion, a point which is of great urgency in the churches of the Reformation even now.

From the above we can state it to be the general line of policy that the support of the minister of religion till his death is primarily the duty of the church.

This line of policy shows the following with regard to the National Old-age Insurance Act.

In the first place that the basis of the articles 11 and 13 of the Church Order does not exclude others from having a share in the provision. Any activity of the authorities is therefore not at variance with the Dordrecht Church Order, so that it is somewhat doubtful to maintain that a legal regulation is an infringement of the practice of the rule existing for the provision. This rule can be normally observed.

Secondly that, if there should be no diversity of opinion as to the contents of 1 Cor. 9 and the articles 11 and 13 Church Order, even then these arguments apply only partly, because the payments made under the act have a two-fold purpose. In any case the state can ignore the Epistle of St. Paul and the Dordrecht Church Order where the provision of the old of to-day is concerned. In this connexion we wish to point out that one can hardly adduce as an argument the opposition of the Dordrecht Synod of 1618/19 against the amendment "And we or the respective magistrates will pay the ministers of religion the salaries due to them." Such a request cannot be made by the church, because this would be at variance with the primary duty of the church. Moreover this argument would not be to the point, in so far as the National Old-age Insurance Act does not know of a payment of salaries.

Finally that there is no essential infringement by the legal regulation of the rule for making a provision, now that it is a question of payment of premium by the minister himself. This is to say that irrespective of the question whether the church increases the salary by an amount equal to the premium, in both cases the altar offering is applied for the provision of the minister. This reduces the problem to the question whether the state has the right to oblige the churches (indirectly) to realize part of the provision in a special way, for this really follows from the rule laid down by the articles 11 and 13 Church Order. But then it is no longer a matter of the provision itself, but the method of provision. Seen in this light the state certainly does not act against the rule laid down in 1 Cor. 9 for the provision. At most it may be said that if we only consider the payment to the minister himself, it is certainly an expensive provision. But then, it is a *social insurance* in which the solidarity of the insured with his fellow-men plays at least an equally great part as does his own provision.

HARMONISTIC AND DISHARMONISTIC INTERPRETATION *)

BY

G. J. DE VRIES **)

The story how historical research in the nineteenth century exploded the view Winckelmann and his classicist followers had formed of Greek Antiquity, is so well known that a mere mention of the fact will suffice. Any and every subsequent study of the Greeks will have to take into account the results of this research, if only to define one's position. This has been the case since the beginning of our century; it really was so before that: the wise Buckhardt could strike his "Gesamtbilanz des griechischen Lebens" [1] already between 1872 and 1880. Alma Tadema could, indeed, give us after that an idealizing picture like "The Voice of Spring" or suggest an idyll like "Under the Roof of the blue Ionian Sky" (and greater men than he have done it after him), but science could no longer do it with a clear conscience. It strikes one that Clive Bell as late as 1928 can mention "sweet reasonableness" as a characteristic of Athenian life [2]; we understand it somewhat better when we know that the writer was born in 1881 and that the book in which he makes this statement, was conceived about 1910: Bell heard things like that at school and in the lecture-room; teaching roundabout 1900 was still of the old, solid classicist kind.

But the old Adam is unconscionably long in dying. Also serious students of classical Antiquity (and it is fair to mention only these)

---

* The original (Dutch) version of this paper appeared in *Forum der Letteren*, May 1962; I wish to thank the Editors of *F. d. L.* for their kind permission to reprint the paper.

** Professor Dr. G. J. de Vries lectures in the Facutly of Arts of the Free University.

[1] *Griechische Kulturgeschichte* II[5] (Berlin-Stutgart, n.d.), pp. 345—437; I refer to the original edition, as this work should not be read in an abridged form; in spite of it — which made Wilamowitz say that 'it did not exist for science' — it remains surprisingly rich.

[2] Cl. Bell, *Civilization*, p. 64 of the Pelican edition (Harmondsworth, 1938).

down to our own days repeatedly show traces of a classicist view.

One of the most important components in the picture of the Greeks designed by Winckelmann and his followers, was their harmony. Among the Greeks they found the unity of life, for which the 18th century too was already yearning.

Their views are repeatedly met with even at the present day. It is intended in the following pages to point out some instances of harmonistic interpretation (which naturally need by no means always be harmonizing), cases, that is, in which the interpreter consciously or unconsciously assumes the existence of a Greek harmony.

Charles Seltman's *The Twelve Olympians*[3] is written with much taste and, of course, with expert knowledge. But the appreciation cannot make us blind to its shortcomings. Seltman's pantheon is greatly humanized indeed. Uncouth traits in Greek mythology are reduced to foreign influence (on p. 168 Dionysus is also described more or less as being an immigrant; when writing this page Seltman could not know what surprise the next year would have in store for him). All manner of crudities concerning Zeus, Hera and Aphrodite come from the East and have reached the Greeks by way of the Hittites (a much disputed problem) (pp. 29 f., 48, 85). The Babylonian mythical stories which are at the back of them, are "not an assemblage of popular tales, but a product of learned theologians with a prurient mind" (p. 29; the last-mentioned theme recurs later in the book). These stories have been crystallized into the *Theogonia* of Hesiod: "We can only deplore the bad taste of the Boeotian farmer-poet, Hesiod, for using rubbish" (ibid.). Now Seltman cannot deny that Hesiod's ideas have strongly influenced the world of thought of the Greeks: "There were, of course, plenty of credulous men in ancient Greece who were prepared to accept without question what Hesiod had said as if he were some pontiff or apostle of the gods" (p. 47). This weakens, indeed, somewhat the force of his statement, though in itself on the whole true, that "there was no Sacred Book" (p. 6), but Seltman knows the many testimonies of later centuries too well to say something else. Nevertheless he really won't accept it, for he goes on to say: "It is probable that not many of the Greeks permitted their subconscious minds to be severely troubled by the kind of tale that follows, since none of it was ever *de fide*" (p. 48). And

---

[3] London, 1952.

here he becomes harmonistic: the sane, well-balanced worshippers of the harmonious Olympians cannot have been troubled with traumata. The "none of it was ever *de fide*" — on which we can agree with Seltman — is intended to support this view. But the theme of the parricide crops up too often in the fifth century and the reference to the mythological examples, in the present instance the tales in Hesiod, is too frequent [4] for it to be tenable.

Fertility rites and everything connected with it are nothing uncommon in Greek religion. In the mystery cult which was the most famous of all, viz. that of Eleusis, they have their place. But to Seltman they belong to the "crudities". In the chapter devoted to Demeter, he does not mention with a single word the "aischrologia", the prescribed uttering of obscenities. And Clement of Alexandria who, before he embraced Christianity, had been initiated into the mysteries, is vehemently censured for the in Seltman's eyes scabrous manner in which he had rendered the "formula" of the mysteries of Eleusis [5]. The meaning of Clement's words is as yet not sufficiently certain, and the value of his statement is still in dispute [6]; here we are only concerned with what Seltman says about it. He writes: ". . . although a renegade Athenian Clement . . . did his best to smear the older faith, his achievement fell short of his hopes because he had a mind overfond of pornography" (p. 25), and "That celebrated renegade, Clement of Alexandria, who had once been himself an initiate at Eleusis, pretended in his *Exhortation to the Greeks* to betray the secret of the last act [7]. Yet it is likely that he did nothing of the kind and merely substituted a cheap little piece of pornography for the ultimate vision. For the violence of his attack on paganism is significant of his secret belief therein, and so timid a creature as Clement could never have brought himself to break a terrible oath [8]" (p. 162).

Practically everything is untrue here. I will pass in silence the cheap psychology which is to undo Clement. But rendering an ancient fertility formula (whether rightly or not) can hardly be called pornography. What could resemble it, originates from Greek myths. Clement reports, he does not interpret.

It may be added, moreover, that he so little aims at "smearing the

---

[4] Cf. *inter alia* Groeneboom, on Aeschylus, *Eumen.* 640.
[5] *Protrepticus* II, 21, 2 (18 P).
[6] A good *status quaestionis* is found in E. des Places in Brillant-Aigrain, *Histoire des religions* III (Paris, n.d. [1955]), p. 217.
[7] i.e. of the mysteries.
[8] i.e. of secrecy, which was imposed upon the initiated.

old faith" and is so much inclined to show a positive appreciation of whatever he can value of Greek religious notions that the Church has always looked askance at him. It is Seltman who sullies the figure of him who, if only because of one statement about the "glorious freedom of those who live under the heavens" [9] deserves to be remembered. And that, because the primitivity of an ancient fertility formula does not fit into the harmonic Olympus of Seltman.

Seltman's neopaganism — for such it has to be called — really shows a good many Victorian traits. Even when it looks as if he sees the Greek world in the same way as Hollywood considers it: as a nudists' paradise without legal or moral inhibitions: *au fond* it remains very decent. His *Women in Antiquity* [10]) is a charming book; so charming that the absurdities and trivialities of the last two chapters may be forgiven and forgotten. He writes on the freedom woman enjoys in the epic. Also when married, he thinks, and in that connection refers to Helen who in Sparta had been the wife of Menelaus, in Troy of Paris and after the latter's death of Deiphobus and "when Troy fell and Helen — prime cause of the whole miserable war — returned to Sparta, she resumed at the point where she had left off, and was naturally the Queen of Menelaus, King of Sparta, without any loss of dignity of reputation" (p. 49). Surely all this goes off too smoothly. I leave alone the fact that Seltman is completely silent about everything that has been said about Helen afterwards (by Stesichorus and the tragedians); but also in the epic her state of mind is quite different from the mood ascribed to her by Seltman. When she speaks about the reproaches which might induce her brothers to stand aside (*Il.* 3, 242) she presumably only thinks of the social consequences which her behaviour means for them (really this is already sufficient to refute Seltman). The bitterness with which she speaks to and about Paris (*Il.* 3, 399 ff., 427 ff.) may, if need be, taken as an expression of her disappointment; even at a pinch also what she says about Paris to Hector (*Il.* 6, 344 ff.). But in the thanks she addresses to Hector in the funeral lament over his death, her consciousness of what has really happened, finds expression. Seltman has not given this proper consideration and attention; the result is that in his attempt to describe a harmony not disturbed by marriage sanctions, he has trivialized one of the poet's most beautiful creations.

We can also turn up the pages of the *Odyssea*. There Helen is

[9] *Protrepticus*, I, 3, 1 (4 P).
[10] London, 1956; I quote from the edition in the Panbooks.

back in Sparta, "without any loss of dignity or reputation". Indeed, the narration of what happened between the fall of Troy and her return Homer has left to Euripides; and when she appears in the *Odyssea* for the first time she is "like Artemis" (4, 122). That she slips into the wine a drug "that banishes all painful memories" (221) may be a mark of attention for her guest Telemachus. But when she has told how Odysseus once slunk into the city of Troy, and was recognised and then protected by her (235 ff.), Menelaus follows it up with the story how she tried to foil the ruse of the Wooden Horse (266 ff.). "You will have been prompted, I suppose, by some god who wished to give glory to the Trojans" (274 f.), he politely adds in extenuation, but all the same he tells the story. No, in Sparta there is no lack of tensions, and the so-called naive poet has made them felt in an admirable manner. But Seltman does not see them.

Otto's *Theophania* [11], an outstanding publication by a great scholar, really has the same tendency as Seltman's book on the Olympians, only much more deliberately. The writer attacks all kinds of modern views which accentuate the daemonic and the irrational in Greek religion. Rohde is mentioned with little appreciation (pp. 15, 55, 57); Nietzsche and Burckhardt are criticized (pp. 32, 65).

Let it be stated at the outset that emphasizing the rational sides of Greek religion may mean for our generation a beneficial corrective to counteract the one-sidedness, sometimes shown even by a great man like Kristensen. The fear of rationalism and bourgeois ethicism has often led him and his followers to take up indefensible positions.

This being admitted, we may say that Otto's little book is on the whole, I think, inacceptable. This is not be place, however, to give a review which, indeed, would have to be written by a specialist; we are now concerned with finding a harmonistic interpretation, if possible. That is not a difficult matter, for Otto deliberately places himself on Winckelmann's standpoint: of his limited space (123 pages) he even devotes two whole pages to vindicating Winckelmann's heroisation [12].

---

[11] W. F. Otto, *Theophania, Der Geist der altgriechischen Religion* (Hamburg, 1956).

[12] He complains (p. 52) of the fact that W.'s death 'leider nun auch in die Hände des romanschreibenden Psychologen geraten musste'. This is directed against H. Weinstock (not a psychologist), *Die Tragödie des Humanismus* (Heidelberg, [2]1954), pp. 207 ff. W.'s death had made a deep impression in Germany — dozens of years later Goethe still remembers details of the reception of the news. But then he

And it is even saying more, perhaps, that with Goethe and Winckelmann he finds in the Belvedere Apollo the "Glanz der Gottheit, wie Homer sie gesehen" (p. 39), and regrets that later generations have shown a preference for classical and archaic art.

The picture of the purity forming Apollo's atmosphere, Otto rightly rounds off with a description of Socrates' activity (p. 103 ff.). The object of his questioning and searching was "der Gottesdienst....., dem er keiner irdischen Gewalt zu Liebe untreu werden dürfte, selbst wenn sie mit dem Tode drohe (vgl. Plato Apol. 21 ff., 28 ff.; Phaid. 85B, wo er sich als Genossen der dem Apollon dienenden Schwäne und Gottgeweihten bezeichnet)." The harmonistic misrepresentation is found here in the references. Here an important difference is obscured. The attitude of the Socrates of the *Apology* towards the hereafter is perhaps not so agnostic as some make out (often Plato's irony is not recognized); nevertheless in this work his attention is entirely focussed on earthly life. This Socrates Otto is justified in adducing as an instance of Greek harmonic life. But in the *Phaedo* matters are different. To be sure, this dialogue is not so one-sidedly ascetic as it is generally made out to be; the famous "exercise in dying" is after all the means of leading the earthly life in the right manner; and it is saying a good deal that at the end of this very dialogue something is found that may be called an "aesthetic justification of the world" [13]). All the same, the "exercise in dying" is the precondition for beholding the glory mentioned at the end of the dialogue; the swans sing sweetest when they feel their death is near. There is decidedly a breach here in Greek harmony [14] that Otto will not hear admit of.

Saul felt somewhat ill at ease among the prophets. Popper, however, moves without any show of false modesty among the authorities in the field of Greek Antiquity. Let therefore his work [15] be cited here too,

---

writes in 1805: "In diesem Sinne dürfen wir ihn wohl glücklich preisen, dasz er von dem Gipfel des menschlichen Daseins zu den Seligen emporgestiegen, dasz ein kurzer Schrecken, ein schneller Schmerz ihn von den Lebendigen hinweggenommen". Weinstock protests against this mythologization, which together with other things wishes to conceal the terrible agony of death (in Justi we can read about it). It is typical of Otto's position that he fully vindicates Goethe.

[13] Cf. my *Spel bij Plato* (Amsterdam, 1949), p. 296, and for what may have influenced the view *A propos de Pindare fr 33 b Sn.*, Rev. Et. Gr. 69 (1956), p. 445.

[14] Cf. R. Schaerer, *Dieu, l'homme et la vie d'après Platon* (Neuchâtel, 1944), p. 87: harmony is only of limited value to Plato.

[15] K. R. Popper, *The Open Society and Its Enemies*, vol. I, *The Spell of Plato*. As the third impression (London, 1949) is easily accessible to most readers, and

with justified appreciation of the insight which he as an outsider has acquired. Cited; not, however, to challenge again his interpretation of Plato — after 1957 not a single classical scholar will care to do so[16] —, but to find in him a naive worship of Greek harmony, which would

---

the third revised edition (London, 1957) only with great difficulty, my quotations where possible and necessary are given with references to both editions.

[16] The fact is that there appears to be little sense in discussing with this author. It is inconceivable that the numerous critics who in the years between 1947 and 1952 opposed Popper's views, should on not a single point have made some convincing observations. But we see very little of it in P. He does, indeed, enter occasionally into an objection raised, but holds to his standpoint; most objections are ignored. I may be permitted to give an example. In *Theaet.* 174 e ff. there is a passage which is disastrous for a large part of Popper's constructions. This is the opinion of Popper himself, who writes about it as follows: "I do not know how to reconcile this interesting and definitely humanitarian passage ... with Plato's other views". The passage in question he discovered after the appearance (in 1945) of the first edition of his work. In 1950 he speaks about it for the first time ... and then evades the cogent conclusion by adding in the manner typical of him to the above-mentioned statement that the *Theaetetus* is 'perhaps Socratic' and 'perhaps (as against the usual assumption) earlier than the *Republic*" (p. 566 of the American edition, Princeton, 1950). In *Antisthenes Redivivus* (Amsterdam, 1952, p. 60), I pointed out that this chronological resource in which the facts have to be twisted to fit the theory, is inacceptable. R. B. Levinson, whose *In Defense of Plato* (Cambridge, Mass., 1953) was in the press when my publication appeared, uses the same argument and supports it at length (pp. 263; 453; 603). But in 1957 (p. 281) Popper has the passage reprinted unaltered, without even making mention of objections raised. He is even above correcting small factual errors, which are really irrelevant to his argument. Levinson had pointed out (p. 200) that Popper was "wrong beyond his usual custom" in his discussion of a passage from the *Laws* for he supposes Plato himself to be making the complaint which, in fact, Plato ascribes to an ignorant empiric doctor! In 1957 it is still there in the very same words (p. 270, with the addition of 'likely enough', one of those non-committal phrases which we come to hate in Popper), as in 1949 (p. 230). Has Popper grown to be the superior 'wise man', described by him with so much verve, the man who knows?

The only one of all the critics who is mentioned by name is R. Robinson, who agreed with at least part of Popper's propositions. A reference to the place where criticism has been offered, is likewise absent. If Popper does react to it, it is in this form: '... my interpretation has been challenged ...' (p. 218 [1957] or: 'a critic of this passage' (p. 275 [1957]). Does it apply to Popper's readers what he says of the disciples of the Academy, that 'they shall become dogmatic students' (p. 117, resp. 133)? Those who are hit by this *damnatio memoriae* will surely recover from the blow; that Popper has thought fit, however, to apply it also to Levison's great book is below the level of what is permissible in scientific intercourse.

After these pages had been set in type, a 4th rev. edition (London, 1962) of Popper's book appeared. In Vol. I, pp. 321/2, the author defends his dating of the *Theaetetus* against his critics (none of them is mentioned by name). He argues upon the wellknown tradition of an earlier edition of the dialogue. The argument will not hold: the crucial passage is to be found in the dialogue, as we read it; this means: in the dialogue, as it was "published" by its author at a date when, according to Popper, he was fighting with all his strength the ideas, contained in that passage.

In *Reply to a Critic* (ibid., pp. 323—335) Popper reacts to Levinson's criticism. As might have been expected, Professor Popper feels no need to correct his thesis nor his arguments.)

not ill befit an extreme classicist. Popper wants to describe how among the Greeks an "open" society grew out of a "closed" one (at least in principle). One would expect him to have had an eye for the birth-pains and all manner of disharmonies of Greek life. Now and then Popper does indeed speak about the "strain of civilization". But there is apparently only one party which is beginning to feel it: the opponents of "progress", the chief of whom is Plato. Again and again we read about Plato's split mind. Popper finds in him an "inner conflict, a truly titanic struggle in Plato's mind", which is there for all to see, "for it is not at all difficult to read between the lines". But — as Levinson rightly observes [17] — Popper is not really interested in showing a disharmony in Plato: "his great objective is the demolition of Plato the protofascist". And overagainst the one angel of darkness there is a host of angels of light, the famous "Great Generation" (which proves to have been recruited from several generations), the fighters for egalitarian and humanitarian ideals, and the pure innocence of the Athens of Pericles. About the division of light and dark I will not argue now, however strange it may be at times (Levinson has said about it all that is necessary); I only wish to point out that Popper cannot apparently discover a single tension in the "good" party. There is a harmony there as used to be pictured by the most naive classicism. A detail trifle, really unimportant in this connexion, may be given to illustrate this, because it is typical of Popper's method. The well-known musical theorist Damon strongly emphasized the relation between music (in the wide sense of the Greek *mousike*) and social life. This was also the conviction held in Sparta: a first reason for Popper to be suspicious of Damon. The second and definitive reason was that Plato refers to Damon approvingly. Damon accordingly represents a "pro-Spartan attitude in the field of artistic criticism" (p. 201, respectively 230). This latter must be added, for Popper cannot deny that *in politicis* Damon was almost certainly a convinced democrat [18] — but he does not mention it

[17] *Op. cit.*, p. 69 (Cf. pp. 398; 402; 406).

[18] Cf. on this intricate problem A. J. Janssens *De Muziekpsycholoog Damoon van Oa*, Tds. v. Philos. III (1941), pp. 449 ff. (esp. pp. 530 ff.), 649 ff.; H. Ryffel, *Eukosmia*, Mus. Helvet. IV (1947), pp. 23 ff.; G. E. Mooren, *Plutarchus' leven van Pericles* etc. (thesis Nijmegen, 1945), pp. 88 ff.; F. Lasserre, *Plutarque de la Musique* (Olten-Lausanne, 1954), pp. 53 ff.; 80 ff.; V. Ehrenberg, *Sophocles and Pericles* (Oxford, 1954) p. 93 ("politically he must have been on the side of the democrats"). O. A. Raubitschek, *Damon*, Class. et Mediaev. XVI (1955), pp. 78 ff.; W. D. Anderson, *The Importance of Damonian Influence in Plato's Thought*, Trans. Am. Philol. Ass. 86 (1955), pp. 88 ff.; E. Moutsopoulos, *La Musique dans l'oeuvre de Platon* (Paris, 1959), pp. 185 ff.

(perhaps it might exonerate Plato somewhat!). Now the influence of Damon on Pericles has been very great, certainly in music; on this all testimonies from Antiquity, also of undoubted witnesses, are agreed. Consequently Pericles is also chargeable with a pro-Spartan attitude? No, Popper wishes to see his idols pure and free from all blemish; he therefore introduces Damon as a *"friend* of Pericles, who was *liberal enough to tolerate* a pro-Spartan attitude in the field of artistic criticism" (my italics). This is a purely harmonistic interpretation [19].

It is natural to expect that the reverse — the disharmonistic interpretation — will in our days be more in evidence than the harmonistic. A better insight and the experiences of the last few decads which classical scholars have in common with their fellow-men [20] contribute to the growth of a view which does not overlook the disharmonic in Greek life. But here, too, there is sometimes a danger of an overplus.

Adkins' *Merit and Responsibility* is an important contribution to Greek *Geistesgeschichte*. Adkins, a pupil of Dodds, studies in this work the relationship between the "competitive" (Burckhardt's "agonale") and the "co-operative" "virtues". That the necessity to embed co-operative virtues in a system based on competition, was bound to create all sorts of tensions, is self-evident; Adkins has set this out admirably, and although one does not always see eye to eye with him in his interpretation (a good thing, too, for what's the use of a book that nowhere provokes protest?), it is always penetrating. But since his attention has constantly to be directed to discovering disharmonies, he will now and then find them, when they are not there. When in *Iliad* XXIII the chariot race is over, Achilles wants to award the second prize to Eumelus, because by the interference of the goddess Athena he has fallen behind, although he is the "best" charioteer. Of course it is refused, but Eumelius' *arete* is recognised:

---

[19] Popper refers to the famous papyrus Hibeh 13. With the preference peculiar to him for a concatenation of suppositions resulting in suggestions he writes, in another place, that the criticism of this papyrus 'might have been directed against Damon', but 'might easily have been directed' against Plato.

[20] Titles like the following are also met with in the older literature: G. Nebel, *Weltangst und Götterzorn* (Stuttgart, 1951; the fact that it is mentioned here by no means implies that it is recommended); J. de Romilly, *La crainte dans l'oeuvre de Thucydide*, Class. et Mediaev. XVII 1956), pp. 119 ff.; id., *La crainte et l'angoisse dans le théâtre d'Eschyle* (Paris, 1958); Ch. Starr, *The Exorcism of Fear* (in *The Origins of Greek Civilization* [London, 1962], pp. 283 ff.). But they were not so frequent as nowadays.

[21] A. W. H. Adkins, *Merit and Responsibility, A study in Greek Values* (Oxford, 1960).

that is his *character indebilis* as charioteer. Menelaus protests against an in his eyes unsportsmanlike action of Antilochus which lost him, Menelaus, the second prize; Antilochus has disgraced his *arete:* again it is the permanent quality which in the race just run, had no opportunity to manifest itself. Do the participants mean now that the prizes are not to be distributed in accordance with the result of the game, as Adkin thinks (p. 56)? That, therefore, "the prizes could be distributed before the race starts"? Of course not, but there is something special the matter here: Athena has interfered, and Antilochus has "cut", against the rules. Adkins finds here a "hopeless tangle of values", which there isn't. He makes things even more difficult for himself in what follows: when Antilochus at first does not want to give in, Menelaus wishes to submit the matter to the assembled princes and then insists on impartial judgement. He wants to preclude the possibility that afterwards it will be said that Menelaus has won his case by a superiority in *arete:* and here the word denotes of course the social position of Menelaus as the brother of the commander-in-chief. At most we have here the "tangle" of language, which makes some philosophers resort to algebra, but nothing of a "hopeless tangle of values" [22].

It needs some self-conquest to mention Nebel's book on Homer [23] here, and not for the sole reason that the author is not a specialist. Still it will have to be done, because the disharmonistic tendencies are so clearly in evidence in this work. Nebel is the exact counterpart of Seltman and Otto. With him there is no idyllic intercourse between human beings and Olympian gods; on the contrary, with him the gods are the enemies of mankind: Homer is an "atheist" (p. 302). That the Olympian gods in the epic play a rôle sometimes approaching the burlesque, has been argued often enough. It might have been supposed that Drerup [24] had defended this view to its most extreme consequences already; evidently it is possible to go further still. Presumably Nebel does not know his predecessors; nor will he know that even in Antiquity a prelude was made to his song. "As Homer has done his uttermost to make the men of the Trojan war gods,

---

[22] In *De prijsuitreiking in Ilias* XXIII, Hermeneus 31 (1960) pp. 208 ff., I have discussed this in detail.

[23] G. Nebel, *Homer* (Stuttgart, n. d. [1959]. Cf. the review in Tds. v. Gesch., 73 (1960), pp. 4458 ff.

[24] E. Drerup, *Das fünfte Buch der Ilias* (Paderborn, 1913).

so he has made the gods men": that's what Longinus[25] — pseudo-Longinus, if you will — says, and how much criticism of the Olympian gods there is behind that statement! With Nebel this becomes a wild extremism. In book VI of the *Iliad* the Trojan women at the instance of Hector go to the temple of the goddess Athena to implore her to rescue the city. "But Athena wouldn't", the text says, briefly (l. 311). Nebel's commentary is: "Wie lächerlich erscheinen uns, die wir den besinnungslosen Trojahasz der Göttin kennen, die Wahlfahrerinnen (p. 181), and this "lächerlich" is entirely out of place, even seen from Nebel's viewpoint, for Homer's people are among the most dignified beings ever created (Nebel knows that), and the most serious misconception cannot make them ridiculous. In no place does Nebel carry his protest against the traditional view of an unbroken harmony between gods and men in the epic[26] to such an extreme extravagance as in the following passage (p. 228): ".....auch als herausgelöste, zerstreute und belustigte Zuschauer können die Götter sich zum Menschentreiben verhalten, sie freuen sich; wenn die kläglichen und stinkenden[27] Eintagswesen leiden (where does the epic say that??) weil sie in diesem Kontrast ihre Unsterblichkeit und Leichtigkeit noch inniger als sonst genieszen, und der Ekel, den ihnen die Menschen nun einmal erregen (the same question), wird zur Lust, wenn sie den Gemetzlen beiwohnen: Zeus lobt sein Herz am Zusehen." Indeed, the stature of the heroes is in the Homeric epic often more high than that of the gods; but when the gods take delight in watching the contest of the heroes, this a tribute to heroism and remote from the, frankly speaking, perverse interpretation which Nebel gives of it.

For Nebel the great divide is between gods and men; Homer's heroes themselves are depicted by him as possessing an unbroken vitality which even surpasses what is found in the Nibelungen: he glorifies what he calls their "Ares-Raserei" (pp. 191 ff.). There won't be many who will see it in this light: there is a growing awareness of inhibitions and reserves manifesting themselves in Homeric man, too. But Gigon decidedly goes too far when in the discussions the report of which is to be found in *La notion du divin depuis Homère jusqa'à*

---

[25] *De subl.* IX, 7, transl. by A. O. Prickard (Oxford, 1906 [1954]).

[26] Nebel oversimplifies matters; is the intimacy of Athena with Diomedes in the *Iliad*, with Odysseus in the *Odyssea*, a fraud? Cf. A. Pierson, *Hellas* I[3] (Haarlem, 1913), pp. 102 ff.

[27] That there is nothing in the epic that corresponds with the two last words, is clear. The fact that they are added, demonstrates the level of Nebel's style.

Platon [28], pp. 196 f., he sees Hector as a tragic figure (which statement admits of discussion) because in his view he was compelled to fight for a bad cause. This is the direct anti-pole of Seltman's view: the latter minimizes Helen's guilt, Gigon on the other hand overemphasizes it. With Hector, who knows of the inevitable fall of his city, there is no question of unbroken heroism; but there is no moral conflict in him: this is disharmonistic interpretation. Chantraine and Snell rightly opposed it.

A fable has to end with a moral. In this case it could be very simple. So simple, that some hesitation in formulating it is understandable: it was not for nothing that Gildersleeve [29] made fun of those who awarded a classical scholar immortality — if only the meagre immortality of being mentioned in some *History of Classical Scholarship* or a work of that kind — on the strength of his dictum: "Verify your references". The lesson that can be derived from what precedes, is not so very much profounder: it comes to this that in giving an interpretation one should always be conscious of the presuppositions one starts from. Yet it is by no means always superfluous to mention them: the literary scholar in general, and the classical scholar in particular, is inclined to proceed as empiristically as possible — and quite rightly, too, provided that from time to time he gives himself to hermeneutic reflection.

Perhaps there is more, and this is more difficult. Confronted with what presents itself as a harmonious whole, the interpreter will perhaps have the duty to look for a breach; he will, however, also have to ask himself, whether he does not construct the breaches himself. And conversely, in what he sees as a disharmony, he must reckon with the possibility that those who lived in it, were at any rate not aware of a lack of harmony. These are questions that have for instance been asked in the discussions about the method of Lytton Strachey and his followers.

Here an indication must suffice.

---

[28] P. Chantraine and others, *La notion du divin depuis Homère jusqu'à Platon*, Entretiens sur l'antiquité classique (Fondation Hardt), T. I. (Vandoeuvres-Genève, 1954).

[29] B. L. Gildersleeve, *Brief Mention*, Am. J. Phil. 37 (1916), p. 502 (= *Selections from the Brief Mention*, ed. by C. W. E. Miller, Baltimore-London-Oxford, 1930, p. 374).

REFLECTIONS ON CHRISTIANITY AND MEDIEVAL LITERATURE

BY

A. VAN DER LEE *

Any one speaking or writing to-day on what lies behind us in a fairly remote past, feels as it were day by day ever more strongly and clearly how our modern world is drifting away from all past existence. It has become exceedingly difficult to know and understand our own past; we are more and more losing touch with it; nay, many hold the view that communication is unprofitable anyway; for what else can e.g. an essay on the Middle Ages be more and give more than merely a knowledge of what was yesterday, at most attended with a retrospective intellectual pleasure? And yet we should seriously harm ourselves as humans, in our humanity, if we were no longer to look beyond the boundaries of the fleeting present. The truth is that the course of the world is not determined at a given moment by the overtones, but really by the fundamental tone, sounding all the time through all the other tones. And it is the history, the contemplation of the past which is able to remind us of forces which as it were lie buried in us, but which are able to evoke in us a new day, not in order to return to a yesterday, but to build a new morning, a better future, as Wolfram von den Steinen observes in his work 'Der Kosmos des Mittelalters', Berne 1959.

One of these forces which is timeless, a fundamental tone which, if we wish, can be heard even to-day through everything, is in our opinion Christianity, Christian culture, which desires to be studied not for its own sake, but because it is the source, the root of the sociological unity usually designated by the word Europe.

And Christianity, the Christian religion, the encounter of the Holy with the soul, the revelation of the Most High in reality, is — we think —

---

* Prof. Dr. A. van der Lee lectures on German language and literature in the Faculty of Arts of the Free University.

the key to the understanding of the culture, hence also the literature, of the Middle Ages which formed the beginning of the new world, to which we still belong.

Contrary to the view, conmonly held, that the 'Jenseitsfrömmigkeit', the ascetic mystic trait peculiar to the Christian medieval Church, sadly crippled the culture of the germanic nations in all its manifestations, it was in my view exactly that Church with all its specific characteristics and its great, inner energy which formed the soul of every cultural activity of those days. It is this energy from which stems the greater part of the cultural values of the Christian European nations to-day. Christianity entering Western Europe was a reviving, by no means a deadly force.

As is generally known the process of Christian culture which gave shape and form to the pre-christian culture of Europe, has three aspects; three phases of development may be distinguished in it.

In the first place the new religion, which called itself Christian, was embedded in an ancient, flourishing culture. This was the situation of Christianity in the Roman Imperium. This process of struggle and conversion constituted the first phase of Christian culture — that of the Christian empire and of the Fathers. It was to this phase that medieval Western Europe, especially at the time of the so-called Carolingian Renaissance, harked back as if it were an ideal general standard of culture.

The second phase is formed by the struggle of what may be called her classic Christianity, as the bearer and guardian of high and great values, with the barbaric world of the west, which possessed its own cultural tradition and its own social institutions: this conflict exercised and still exercises a not easily over-estimated influence on the development of Western culture.

The third phase is that in which Christianity inspires a new cultural creativity in which the new, christianized, peoples expressed themselves in a consciously christian form in a manner which although new to them was nevertheless already very adequate.

Now it is especially this third phase, this early medieval Western Renaissance, this birth of a new Western world, whose voice can most clearly be heard in the literature of that time and which has welded the culture of Western Europe into a unity in spite of all permanent differences which are rooted in the difference of race, language and home.

If we want to study the literature of our Middle Ages, and, what is

much more, to know, and understand it and if possible 'nachempfinden', we are compelled also, or rather above all, to occupy ourselves with the soil producing it, viz. the Christian religion of those days. Unless this is done, there is a danger of giving a distorted picture of medieval literature, however and in whatever form it has come down to us.

The fact that in studying the cultural manifestations of these 'Dark Ages', contemporary Christianity has been ignored or forgotten, may be explained, but in no way be excused.

Of course it is quite understandable that a secularized world like ours, whose faith and ideals have altogether changed, is fundamentally opposed to a study of Christian culture. One could accept it, if at least it was realized and admitted then, that in so doing the same mistake was made as was committed by the much praised Humanists, who only had an eye for classical culture, and the same fatal error as was made by the theologians of the 18th and 19th centuries, who confined themselves to investigating purely church and doctrinal matters and paid little or no attention to the non-theological aspects of medieval Christian culture. And much fertile land is then allowed to lie fallow, just as it was by them.

Indeed, the field covered by Christian culture, is wide; wider even than that of classical culture, because the former has a longer historical development and comprises a greater number of national literatures. But the trouble that has to be taken for it, is partly compensated for, because every European nation can study this culture in and from the angle of its own history and literature. And because we enjoy the inestimable privilege of still being in the midst of Christian culture, it is the more to be regretted that owing to the lack of knowledge of the specific in medieval Christianity, its religion, literature, etc., in short of its aims and endeavours, the beginnings of our own literary tradition are often incorrectly interpreted or in other words inadequately approached; this was clearly shown e.g. by E. R. Curtius in his monumental work "Europäische Literatur und Lateinisches Mittelalter, Berne 1954²," and only recently again in several places by the Germanist J. Schwietering in his collected essays: "Mystik und höfische Dichtung im Hochmittelalter", Darmstadt, 1960.

By two simple examples it is possible to elucidate the above standpoint, and without entering into detail, to show that proceeding from the theology and the ontology of the medieval church, it is possible to arrive at a good understanding of the problems and the beauty of many medieval literary documents which cannot be reckoned among the so-

called religious writings, by which we mean e.g. the Gospel harmony of Otfried von Weissenburg or the versions of Solomon's Song.

In the field of literature the entry of Christianity in the barbaric world of the Germanic nations not only brought about the rise of a written fixed poetic art, but together with the new things that arose, among other things the church prose, a poetic rendering of the psalms and the introduction of end rhyme, something changed that was of fundamental importance.

The time before the christianization and that immediately after, are not only characterized by a germanic oral tradition on the one hand and a Christian written poetic art on the other. Of essential importance it is to observe that in a time when Christianity has become an established power, the word, that is literature comes to occupy quite a different place than the oral literature had ever had in pagan germanic society. For the poetic word which in the pagan era was the bearer of the praises sung in honour of princes and the messenger of heroic-tragic deeds, Christianity opened up never suspected vistas; it created possibilities and tasks, the design and aim of which was to sing the praise of Almighty God and to be the bearer of the Church's means of Salvation, a perfectly new perspective, which in the poetry of the flourishing period of the Middle Ages inspires the poet to something great. We need for the German language area only think of the 'Arme Heinrich' by Hartmann von Aue and the 'Perzival' by Wolfram von Eschenbach.

The message of the Gospel of St. John: in principio erat verbum, opens up to early medieval literature the view of transcendence which confers a certain dignity on the written word, nay something like holiness which oral germanic poetry did not possess and which was essentially distinguished from the power of the magic charms.

Far into the Middle Ages the word retains this significant accent and the vocabulum 'buoch' used so often in medieval German literature gives to what is written a real foundation of truth. But Christianity not only brings new forms of poetry, it also gives life and thought a new shape. Christian literature brings with it problems, whose existence the germanic world did not suspect, and which led to the great conflicts fortunately inspiring poets as well, which gave the Middle Ages their sharp contour.

The message of the Gospel with its transcendence, its shrinking fear of the Last Judgement and eternal doom, gives a shock to the soul of medieval man and draws deep furrows in the literary-spiritual field of these early centuries. The struggle to understand the Christian idea

of love, accentuated in the opposition Eros-Agape; human earthly love and divine love, produces a literature which does not disappoint our greatest expectations.

While the Investiture struggle and the first Crusade were throwing the whole of Europe into commotion, in the centre of France, in the district round Orléans, Tours and Angers, that is, therefore, the area, south of the Loire, a community of priests was found, the principal representatives of which were Marbod of Angers (c. 1040—1123), Balderich of Bourgueil (1046—1130) and Hildebert of Lavardin (1056—1133). They had friends and admirers also among the secular aristocracy, e.g. in the Norman royal dynasty in England, because in their purely humanist conception of life they studied and devoted themselves to a spirit of moderation and spiritual balance which prevailed in their circle: 'whether you experience joy or suffering, cherish a desire or fear, quid ad rem?' thus we read in a poem by Hildebert (De querimonia et conflictu carnis et spiritus, Migne 171, 989 f.). For these priests, who worshipped noble forms and manners; who sang the praises of their friends in epistolary form, but who could also admonish them earnestly especially in epigrams, gave expression to their feelings in poems. The nucleus and essence of these feelings they sought in Christianity which they served within the framework of Roman Catholic Church. The form of these poems or better the word agrees with their special form of piety, which tamed the wild, spiritualized the physical, which brought home to them that man is an 'animal divinum', a 'divine earthly being' and which taught virtue to these aristocrats of the spirit and philosophers of faith. The life of the members of this Loire-circle was characterized by a taste for elegance and refinement; they not only enjoyed productions of culture, like the cathedrals and buildings of antiquity, but took delight in every manifestation of nature beautifying life and also externally worth living, as e.g. spring which, as Marbod says, one must sing, if one does not want to quarrel with God, or e.g. the beautiful forms of the body, ‚since it is better', Marbod says in a song addressed to the Queen of England, 'for you to show what gifts nature has bestowed on you, because you would stand before God without gratitude, if you conceal His gifts'. (Migne 171, 1717; Migne, col. 1660, carmen 24; line 21 f.).

Balderich (Oeuvres poétiques, ed. Phyllis Abrahams, Paris 1926, p. 143). goes so far as to say that he cannot and will not condemn love, because in that case one must condemn Him who inspired love into man's heart.

But we do well to add immediately that this statement of the archbishop of the Breton Dol is rather an Ovidian playing with words and ideas than an expression of an individual sentiment, as to him and his followers woman as woman is of little significance. Although friendship, the friendship between man and woman, is abundantly sung in letters and poems, and Hildebert calls to mind that at the time of the Sibyls, the female sex was invested with glory, woman still is and remains the seductress who ruined the man Adam.

Although the members of this circle are conscious of this attitude towards woman as such, it is highly significant that e.g. a woman became the superior of the abbey of Fontevrauld, to whom the founder, Robert of Arbrissel, humbly submitted himself as long as he lived, because Jesus hanging on the cross had committed his favourite disciple to the cares of a woman, and Robert and the members of his order would not put themselves above the word and the intention of Jesus, but bent before the will of the brides of Christ.

This establishment of the ordo fontis Ebraldi, in itself perhaps not so very important, is nevertheless a proof that a change of mentality was taking place because from now on it was fitting that, if Mary was the most powerful and best beloved domna of her servants, also on earth a ruler should be chosen to be served in worship, be it for the present only in a religious sense.

Since the time of the fathers of the church the Marian cultus grew only slowly, until in the 11th century it rather suddenly began to flourish. To Herimann of Reichenau (1013—1054) in his beautiful 'Salve Regina' (Anal. hymn. 50, 318) Mary is our life, our sweetness, and our hope because she shows us, exiles from Paradise, her son as our saviour.

As is generally known, the literature of the Middle Ages owes end-rhyme, as a fine but in no way obligatory verse decoration, to the Early Christian Church. Otfried, the religious poet of Alsace, made it an early success in the vernacular. About the year 1000 this art had developed into an almost natural seeming artifice, especially in Latin and chiefly in the festal hymns at the Hallelujah of High Mass, and poets only very rarely refrained from using it.

And towards the end of the 11th century this technique of form and rhyme had grown into a real passion with the poets of the time. With the contents of the poem the technique forms an organic, harmonious whole, as is shown clearest, but also for the first time, in the hymnody, flourishing south of the Loire. Its most important

manuscripts originate from the St. Martialis monastery at Limoges where since the time of Charlemagne the sacred song was practised with great piety and skill. In all manners of forms and all kinds of variations poets sing in these songs about the mystery that God became man; that through his Son God reconciled Himself with the world, and that this is the source of all joy. And this renewal of the human race becomes manifest in the form of this descent of God, in Christ being born of a virgin, the mother of the Lord. This is the reason why the dominant theme of the new song becomes the glorification of Mary, of the virgin, the mother and the bride and why the *theophany of the feminine* in the Ave Maria becomes part of daily prayer.

For all that, as soon as the angelic greetings: 'Ave Maria, gratia plena' has in all manner of variations, become the centre of the song of the poet, woman made her entry in poetry, be it at first in religiosis. The remarkable thing, however, was that this perfectly new element in poetry refined as to form, was enthroned there where at the same time the humanist conception of life — as we showed before — was finding great favour in distinguished clerical circles. Here again the new came, according to a word of Zarathustra, 'on doves' feet in an inaudibly turning world, 'almost imperceptibly' zieht das Ewigweibliche hinan'.

No man will reasonably deny that love of a woman has from of old occupied a central place in lyrical poetry, and that this applies both to our own times and to the past centuries; from the early Middle Ages, however, nothing (in spite of the 'winileodos' and such products [1]) nothing has come down to us, apparently because the germanic and Carolingian age for whatever reason did not yet think it worth while to record such an expression of human sentiment. That poets would really scarcely devote a single word to this theme, appears most clearly from the saga of Waltharius, for instance, in which the love between husband and wife is indeed the factor which starts and sustains the whole action. There is nothing that shows a worship of the specifically feminine; nay even the fact that Hiltgunt is very beautiful, is only mentioned in passing.

The first to pay homage to woman as woman is William of Poitou (1071—1127), who hailed from the same district where men like Marbod, Hildebert and Balderich devoted themselves to a humanist

---

[1] Cf. e.g. C. Soeteman, *Venus apud Germanos?* Neophil. 1960.

style of life, refined in form and spirit, and where the extremely artistic song in honour of the divine woman altogether changed Latin poetry.

There is no doubt that even before William IX love poems had seen the light in the Romance vernacular but it is this count of Poitou and Duke of Aquitania who first tried to venerate wordly woman in a transcendence of her virtues and superior qualities as was accorded to the supermundane Domina in the Latin songs. It looks as though in the words of Robert R. Bezzola [2] from a certain dissatisfaction with the world of chivalry and in order to parade ironically his own worldly style of life he wanted to create a kind of world mysticism of new monasteries like Fontevrauld, based upon the Augustinian doctrine of Amor et Cognitio Dei.

This parallelism between the frame of mind of the clerical and the secular poet in that the soul strives after a transcendence surpassing their individuality, finds expression not only in the contents of some of William's eleven songs that have come down to us, but also in the form, which in the structure of the strophes and the artistic rhyme can be compared with the Latin hymns.

Of course it is quite possible that the Troubadours, of whom William of Poitou was one of the first if not the very first and the Minnesingers have borrowed some motifs features and forms from the Spanish Moors, as many scholars hold, and that the Provençal lyrists were conversant with the poetic art of the Arabian world. This cannot be proved, however, beyond question; many investigations in this direction have shown this. In this respect so-called influences and 'being conversant with something' do not in themselves say very much. If the troubadours did at all learn something from the Arabs, if the Andalusian *Minnesang* influenced that of Provence, surely this cannot be more than an stimulus, an evocation of feelings which had for a long time already been present in Christianity and had become 'spruchreif' from the inside. For the profoundest stirrings in man, the utterance of his 'Lebenskräfte im Innersten' [3] cannot come from without.

An evaluation of the emancipation of woman in the lyric poetry of South Western France in the twelfth century which is met with neither in classical antiquity, nor in the world of the Bible, or in the

---

[2] Guillaume IX de Poitiers et les origines de l'amour courtois, Rom. 66 (1940/41) pp. 145 ff.

[3] W. v. d. Steinen, l.c. p. 252.

early Middle Ages, is only possible when we have eyes for the parallelism of the religious glorification of the Maid of Nazareth, of the dominant position of the Bride of the Lord, in the order of Robert of Arbrissel and the humble and obedient attitude towards the beloved in the songs of William IX and his circle. This parallelism has its origins in the divergence: in the spiritual song the Divine comes to man in the shape of Woman; in the song of the troubadours the feminine almost becomes something divine.

If without a study of Christianity and its culture in the Middle Ages a true understanding and appreciation of the rise and development of the secular love poetry of those days, to which we mostly give the name *Minnesang,* is not well possible (how can we truly appreciate e.g. the art of the greatest medieval minnesinger, Walther von der Vogelweide — to take a pretty arbitrary example — without knowing his religious world), we should likewise not be justified in judging about the aims and endeavours of say, Wolfram von Eschenbach, if we did not approach his work from the angle of the doctrine of the medieval Church.

Putting aside the 'Titurel' which being too short, too fragmentary, prevents an over-all interpretation, Wolfram's work presents itself to us in two monuments, both of them fed from a spiritual, religious source.

In the first work, the *Parzival,* Wolfram occupies himself with the imaginary reality that Chivalry has created in Arthurian poetry: the courtly novel. In the second, unfinished work, the 'Willehalm' the German poet takes a further step: the reality of historical life — the struggle of the occident with the oriental pagans — enters within the horizon of the christian poet. It requires him to define his position fundamentally towards the reality which had been sprung upon medieval man by the crusades in the twelfth century and which threatened to reduce the abstract existence of a theoretical, dogmatic attitude to nothing.

An interpretation of Wolfram's Willehalm, to which we shall in the following restrict ourselves, at the same time and first of all requires us to discuss a somewhat older work dealing with practically the same theme: *the Song of Roland.*

Like Wolfram's Willehalm the song of the Pfaffe Konrad, committed to parchment about 1170, is an adaptation of a French poem which dates perhaps from the first decade of the twelfth century. The historical nucleus is, as we are also told by Einhart, the biographer of Charle-

magne, the annihilation of the Frankish rearguard in the Pyrenees. The French version of the development of this historical event into an epic, which arose from a fusion of Christian religion and Frankish national pride, soon becomes widely popular and also finds many imitators in Germany.

The idea dominating this song is the certainty that in destroying the pagans the devil himself is destroyed. With the sense of earthly beauty, which is beginning to reveal itself in contemporary literature, the *Song of Roland* deliberately does not concern itself. It still represents a different world, that of the war of God against the idols, a world in which the object is to fill hell with as many pagans as possible.

The work reveals a violent religiosity of an almost Old Testament nature in which concepts such as policy, empire and religion are totally different realities from what they are in the following period, i.e. after Charlemagne, whose endeavour to 'christianize' the peoples and tribes round him is in accordance with the spirit of the *Song of Roland*. There is nothing as yet showing a glorying in infirmity, showing the foolishness of the cross.

The contrast good-evil is that of Christian-Pagan. The empire of Charlemagne is the City of God, and that of the Saracens the kingdom of Satan. It is only by this antithetic attitude that the outrages described by the poet can be defended somewhat and made tolerable, because over against this world of ideas, in which all that is earthly, is only seen as an exponent of the metaphysical, the purely human is thrown into the background. The picture designed of history and also of the event in the fields of Roncevaux, is radically theocratic and retrospective.

Charlemagne is the 'dinistman' of God: an angel appears to him and gives him the order to wage the holy war. All who resist him will be consigned to eternal perdition and God's wrath will destroy them. Charlemagne is an instrument in the hand of God, and he is to sweep His haters from the face of the earth.

Since the basic idea of the *Song of Roland* is the actual victory over Satan and God in his providence has destined the unbelievers for eternal death; since He always puts the pagans in the wrong and the Christians always in the right; when the milites Christi cheer when three hundred horsemen of the Saracens are miserably precipitated into an abyss, the *Song of Roland* gives abundant proof to have no eye for the problems of the earthly, the mundane, the creation and it does

not know the conflicts in consequence thereof in the human soul, although in the epilogue the word 'wâre gottes minne' occurs.

But it needed a Wolfram to delineate and to characterize this 'wâre gottes minne'; he has tried from the viewpoint of Christian love to reflect the true christianization of the world, because he could not agree with the solution given in the *Song of Roland.*

This is very clear from his epic Willehalm, which also bears upon the problem of the *Song;* but rejects the rigid theocratic world picture of his predecessor.

No more than in the *Song of Roland,* is the contrast between pagans and Christians obscured in the *Willehalm* it is only baptism which according to the two poets makes man a Christian, a brother of Christ. But by a new interpretation of God's creation, of which the soul is 'minne', it has become impossible to see those that have not been baptized merely as children of Satan.

In the Willehalm, too, pagans and christians stand facing each other in the South of France. Willehalm, a son of Heinrich von Narbonne, is taken prisoner by the pagans. The daughter of the King of these pagans liberates him, however, leaves her pagan husband and flies with Willehalm. She is baptized and becomes Willehalm's wife, now called Gyburc. The pagans advance to take revenge. The pagans are far superior in numbers; the Christians are defeated. Willehalm escapes; he reaches Orange, where he is lovingly received by his wife. She urges him to fetch help; in the meantime she will try to defend the fortress of Orange. This is done, and in the battle of Alichanz the pagans are defeated. Here the work breaks off. As Fr. Maurer has shown clearly [4], the fight against the pagans is a tragic experience of the experience of the discord and suffering in creation. In this struggle it is no longer simply the Children of Light and the Sons of darkness that face one another, but creatures of God, baptized and unbaptized, between whom love — here the love of the pagan Arabelle for the christian knight Willehalm — is able to build a bridge. By this Wolfram remembering his statement that 'durch zweier slahte minne, Uf erde hie durch wibe lôn und ze himel durh engel dôn" (16.30) a new order of things has made its entry in the world, overcomes the rigid dualism, the unrealistic division of light and darkness, without abandoning the Christian foundations.

Because a deep love sprang up between Willehalm and the converted

---

[4] Studien zur Bedeutungs- und Problemgeschichte, Bern 1951.

and baptized Arabelle, Wolfram says 7.27, many had to die innocently, or — in other words — because God and love have become the foundation of Arabelle's existence. And the love of God and for the Christian knight, embodied in Arabella — who thereby becomes the principal character of the poem who bears the whole action although the male persons nevertheless do not suffer by it — complains of the death of so many pagans and Christians, and blames herself for it (252.29 ff.).

Nothing is left any more of a laudable annihilation of the pagans, because the chief characters of the play are conscious of their own imperfections as creatures. The struggle between pagans and christians is rather characterized by great sorrow because of the sinfulness of human existence. In a well-known passage (299.6 ff.) the Margrave summons and urges the knights to the decisive battle. Although this fight is no longer depicted by him with Biblical topoi and apocalyptical metaphors as was usual hitherto, e.g. in the *Song of Roland,* but is on the contrary described realistically in all its atrocities, and the sacred fire of the crusades flames up again in the Knights, Arabella (360.4 ff.) reminds them that every one of them will have to account before God for the blood shed by his hand. By these words she proves to realize that there is not only question here of an interesting conflict in the soul of a woman, but of an existential struggle which concerns all: God wills the fight, but every one will be called to account.

The fighting spirit of the Christians blends with the message of humanity which has its origin not in human autonomy, but in man being a child of God.

And this message, spoken from a heart moved by Christian sympathy, is put by the poet in the mouth of a woman: this cannot be understood unless we realize the fact that exactly in Wolfram's time Christian Mariology was gaining its first triumphs. An interpretation based upon the courtesy and chivalry of the Age, i.e. an explanation which has for its starting-point the position of the noble lady dominating courtly life of those days, does not touch the root of the matter. It still is, indeed, a woman who is the centre in the final phase of the struggle. But the theme so often treated by the *courtly* medieval poets, the theme of a tournament for the sake of a woman, in all its varied delineations, has undergone a thorough change, and has been raised beyond a purely earthly and individual magnitude. Arabelle, or rather the Christian Gyburc is no longer the woman standing in between two contending parties and in consequence making a psychically unbalanced impression,

actuated as she is on the one hand by the love of her father and her countrymen, on the other by love for her Willehalm in the enemy camp and of the Creator-God, who had a short time before shown her His grace. Gyburc, however, is a perfectly balanced personality; she is only a Christian. What is manifested in her words and deeds is not some quite natural psychological reaction, but the discord of creation to which man, since God remains God and His work cannot be fathomed, must be reconciled, although he will be 'fassungslos' in respect of the suffering caused by it.

Reverting now to the *Song of Roland,* it is not difficult to find that the essential differences separating the *Song* from the Willehalm, are caused by the fact that in the former work God's creation is in an intolerable manner metaphysically made a caricature: spiritually and otherwise, the fighting is done with coarse weapons, the one is perfectly good, the other perfectly bad. Wolfram on the other hand tries in his epic to show creation in its true form by shifting the 'conflict situation' arising for man from this creation, to the soul of a woman who through 'minne' learns to know and understand the suffering of this creation.

The confrontation between the poem of Roland and that of Willehalm clearly shows the duplicity of God's world which is wedged between the old Adam and the new; the representative of the old creation which has no prospects and the representative of the creation renewed by Christ. Unlike the poet of the *Song of Roland* Wolfram succeeded in building a bridge between humanity and divinity having its pillars in an imitatio Christi here symbolized in Arabelle's mental distress caused by 'Minne', the sorrow over the dualism of God's creation as it shows itself externally to a human being.

It is hoped that the foregoing will show that the mystery of medieval courtly love, both in its origin, and in its eventual christian spiritualization as found in a poet like Wolfram, can be approached best from the culture and religion of the medieval church.